

THE FRAMING OF POLITICAL INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION:  
MEDIA, STATE, AND ISLAMIC PARTY INTERACTIONS IN TURKEY,  
1995 to 1998

by

Ahmet Uysal,

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial  
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the  
Doctor of Philosophy Degree.

Department of Sociology  
in the Graduate School  
Southern Illinois University, Carbondale

August 2003

**ARCHIVES**

UMI Number: 3120921

Copyright 2004 by  
Uysal, Ahmet

All rights reserved.

### INFORMATION TO USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

**UMI**<sup>®</sup>

---

UMI Microform 3120921

Copyright 2004 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company.

All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest Information and Learning Company  
300 North Zeeb Road  
P.O. Box 1346  
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

Copyright by Ahmet Uysal 2003

All Rights Reserved



**Dissertation Approval**  
The Graduate School  
Southern Illinois University

August 22, 2003

---

I hereby recommend that the dissertation prepared under my supervision by

Ahmet Uysal

Entitled

The Framing of Political Inclusion and Exclusion: Media, State,  
and Islamic Party Interactions in Turkey, 1995-1998

---

be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY degree

Jan E. Heult

*In Charge of Dissertation*

Thomas Calhoun

*Head of Department*

Recommendation concurred in

1. Jan E. Heult
2. Rob Bengt
3. Walter B. Jochims
4. James S. Beckwith
5. Thyos of Wilk

Committee  
for the  
Final Examination

## **AN ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION**

of Ahmet Uysal, for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Sociology, presented on August 22, 2003 at Southern Illinois University Carbondale.

**TITLE:** THE FRAMING OF POLITICAL INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION: MEDIA, STATE, AND ISLAMIC PARTY INTERACTIONS IN TURKEY, 1995 to 1998

**MAJOR PROFESSOR:** Darren Sherkat

This dissertation examines the framing and counterframing processes involving the Islamic Welfare Party (RP), media, and state bureaucracy (the military and judiciary) in Turkish politics from December 1995 to January 1998. This period covers the electoral victory of the RP, its accession to power and its removal from politics. My research focuses specifically on the ideological structuring of beliefs about the inclusion of the RP in the formal political process. I examine interactions between social movements, countermovements, the media, and the state. Using frame analytic theory, I focus on the amplification of particular values of democracy and secularism, and the beliefs that various groups attach to those values. I analyze movement publications, news reports, and official statements from state institutions to examine the connections between beliefs and values, and how the interactions among these groups generate a discourse of framing and counterframing in a dialectical way.

Substantively, the dissertation focuses on the ideological pronouncements of the Islamic Welfare Party, the most prominent Turkish Media (namely, the dailies Sabah, Hurriyet, and Milliyet), and the Turkish military. The key in these debates has been the formal inclusion of a religious party in the political process. The mainstream media

played critical role in the framing of debates about the RP and their eventual fall from power and banning.

I perform a content analysis on documents from the media, the state and the RP for nine events in this period. First, the media texts are taken from the selected newspapers in two forms: (1) news accounts, and (2) opinion columns. Second, I examine press releases and informal media leaks from military officials, especially anonymous General's statements were later admitted to be organized by the National Security Council. Third, the Chief Republican Prosecutor Vural Savas's claims about the RP are taken from his own book, *Militan Democracy*, compiling the Chief Republican Prosecutor Vural Savas' official statements. Looking at the content of these documents over time allows me to assess how the RP, the press, the state institutions respond to one another's claims about the relationships between beliefs and values.

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

I owe special thanks to my dissertation chair, Darren Sherkat, for his invaluable support, lead, and feedback; to committee members (Robert Benford, Ryhs Williams, Walter Jaenig, and Mark Schneider) for promptly accepting to be part of this effort; to my coder, Suveyda Cittir, for hard work; to my wife, Kezban, for her patience; and to my kids (Omer, Tarik, and Selman) for being kids.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>AN ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION.....</b>	<b>i</b>
<b>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....</b>	<b>iii</b>
<b>LIST OF TABLES .....</b>	<b>vi</b>
<b>LIST OF FIGURES .....</b>	<b>viii</b>
<b>ABBREVIATIONS.....</b>	<b>x</b>
<b>CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>LITERATURE REVIEW .....</b>	<b>4</b>
The Framing Perspective: .....	4
Counterframing & Reframing:.....	9
Media Framing:.....	15
Countermovement and Repression: .....	20
<b>THE SUBJECT OF STUDY .....</b>	<b>22</b>
Master Frames of Turkish Secular Elites.....	26
<b>DATA AND METHODS .....</b>	<b>29</b>
Critical Events.....	32
<b>OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS.....</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>CHAPTER II: METHODOLOGY .....</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>THE SOURCES OF THE DATA.....</b>	<b>39</b>
Sources on Media Framing: .....	39
Sources on Military Framing: .....	40
<b>MEDIA AS A COUNTERMOVEMENT: .....</b>	<b>41</b>
<b>THE PERIODS AND INCIDENTS .....</b>	<b>41</b>
A. Before the RP Government:.....	42
B. The RP Government Period: .....	44
C. Toward the End of RP and its Banning:.....	46
<b>CODING: .....</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>CHAPTER III: THE RP IN THE TURKISH MEDIA BEFORE THE COALITION GOVERNMENT .....</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>SECTION I: PRE-ELECTION PERIOD (DECEMBER 11-24) .....</b>	<b>54</b>
Historical Background: .....	54
General Media Attitude toward RP: Before the Elections:.....	59
Framing and Counterframing Strategies.....	61
Reframing Strategies:.....	68
<b>SECTION II: AFTER THE ELECTIONS .....</b>	<b>69</b>
Framing and Counterframing:.....	72
<b>SECTION III: ERBAKAN’S NOMINATION FOR PRIME MINISTER (JUNE 8-15, 1996).....</b>	<b>78</b>
Framing and Counterframing:.....	80



<b>CHAPTER IV: FRAMING AND COUNTERFRAMING DURING REFAH-YOL GOVERNMENT</b> .....	<b>90</b>
SECTION I: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REFAH-YOL GOVERNMENT (JUNE 29 – JULY 5) .....	90
Framing and Counterframing:.....	91
SECTION II: THE SINCAN AFFAIR (FEB 2-14, 1997) .....	102
Democratic Frames: .....	116
The Sincan Meeting .....	118
Pro-RP Framing: .....	119
TANKS ROAMING THE STREETS OF SINCAN: .....	120
SECTION III: THE FEBRUARY 28 <sup>TH</sup> PROCESS.....	125
Media and Military in the February 28 Process:.....	128
Framing And Counterframing During The 28 February Process .....	134
Military and Politics: RP Government and NSC .....	134
Anti-RP Framing:.....	137
Pro-RP Framing in the Media.....	142
<b>CHAPTER V: TOWARD THE END OF RP</b> .....	<b>145</b>
SECTION I: MEDIA, MILITARY AND THE RP GOVERNMENT.....	145
Military’s Briefing to the Members of Judiciary: .....	148
The Briefing’s Message Unveiled: .....	151
GENERAL MEDIA ATTITUDE.....	156
Pro-Military Framing:.....	160
Pro-RP Framing: .....	162
SECTION II. FILING THE SUIT AGAINST THE RP: .....	165
The Analysis of the <i>Militant Democracy</i> :.....	167
Framing and Counterframing in the Media: Filing the Suit against RP .....	179
Anti-RP Framing:.....	180
Pro-RP Framing in the Media: .....	183
SECTION III: THE BANNING OF THE RP .....	186
Framing and Counterframing in the Media: RP Banned .....	189
<b>CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION</b> .....	<b>193</b>
Implications for Media Studies Field:.....	207
Implications for Social Movement Field: .....	211
Future Research and Limitations of this Research: .....	214
<b>ENDNOTES</b> .....	<b>218</b>
<b>REFERENCES</b> .....	<b>223</b>
<b>VITA</b> .....	<b>255</b>

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Media Attitude toward RP before the Elections (December 11-14, 1995).....	59
Table 2: Results for the Parliamentary Elections in December, 1995 .....	70
Table 3: Media Attitude toward RP after the Elections (December 25-31, 1995) .....	70
Table 4: Media Attitude toward RP prior to the Coalition (June 8-15, 1996).....	80
Table 5: Anti-RP Framing (June 15 –21, 1996) .....	81
Table 6: Pro-RP Framing (June 15 –21, 1996).....	87
Table 7: Media Attitude toward RP (June 29 – July 5, 1996) .....	91
Table 8: Anti-RP Framing (June 29 – July 5, 1996).....	93
Table 9: Pro-RP Framing (June 29-June 5, 1996) .....	101
Table 10: Media Attitude toward RP during the Sincan Affair (February 2-14, 1997)..	103
Table 11: Anti-RP Framing During the Sincan Event (February 2-14, 1997).....	106
Table 12: Pro-RP Framing During the Sincan Affair (February 2-14, 1997).....	106
Table 13: Pro-RP Framing during the Sincan Affair (February 2-14, 1997).....	107
Table 14: Anti-RP Framing During the Sincan Affair (February 2-14, 1997).....	108
Table 15: Democratic Framing during the Sincan Affair (February 2-14, 1997).....	117
Table 16: Pro-RP and Democratic Framing: Tanks Roaming The Streets.....	121
Table 17: Media Attitude to RP: National Security Meeting (February 27 - Mar 12, 1997) .....	132
Table 18: Anti-RP Framing: NSC Meeting (February 27 - Mar 12, 1997).....	138
Table 19: Pro-RP Framing: NSC Meeting (February 27 - Mar 12, 1997).....	143
Table 20: Various Uses of Irtija in the Military Briefing of June 1997.....	150
Table 21: Media Attitude toward RP: The End of Coalition (June 12 – 18, 1997).....	157

Table 22: Anti-RP Framing: Toward the End of Coalition (June 12 – 18, 1997) .....	159
Table 23: Democratic/Neutral Framing: Toward the End of the Coalition Government	163
Table 24: Pro-RP Framing: Toward the End of the Coalition Government .....	163
Table 25: General Media Attitude: the Suit Filed (May 22-24, 1997) .....	178
Table 26: Anti-RP Framing after the Suit Filed.....	181
Table 27: Pro-RP Framing after the Suit Filed .....	184
Table 28: General Media Attitude: RP Banned (Jan 14-20, 1998).....	188
Table 29: Anti-RP Framing - Banning of RP .....	190
Table 30: Pro-RP Framing - Banning of RP.....	192
Table 31: Overall Distribution of Anti- and Pro-RP Framings by the News Accounts and Opinion Columns .....	198
Table 32: Fluctuation in the Attitudes of News Accounts and Opinion Columns toward the RP .....	200

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: News Accounts.....	60
Figure 2: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: Opinion Columns .....	60
Figure 3: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: News Accounts.....	71
Figure 4: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: Opinion Columns .....	71
Figure 5: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: News Accounts.....	81
Figure 6: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: Opinion Columns .....	81
Figure 7: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: News Accounts.....	91
Figure 8: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: Opinion Columns .....	91
Figure 9: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: News Accounts.....	104
Figure 10: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: Opinion Columns .....	104
Figure 11: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: News Accounts.....	133

Figure 12: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: Opinion Columns .....	133
Figure 13: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: News Accounts.....	158
Figure 14: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: Opinion Columns .....	158
Figure 15: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: News Accounts.....	179
Figure 16: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: Opinion Columns .....	179
Figure 17: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: News Accounts.....	188
Figure 18: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: Opinion Columns .....	188
Figure 19: News Accounts on RP Suit .....	189
Figure 20: Opinion Columns on RP Suit.....	189
Figure 21: Standardized Odds Ratio between Negative and Neutral Media Coverage of RP.....	196
Figure 22: Average Media Attitude toward RP .....	196
Figure 23: The Difference of Negative RP Attitude from and Pro-RP Attitude .....	196

## **ABBREVIATIONS**

RP	: Refah Partisi (Welfare Party or Prosperity Party)
DYP	: Dogru Yol Partisi (True Path Partisi; a center right party)
NSC	: National Security Council
Refah-Yol	: The Coalition Government formed by RP and DYP
ANAP	: Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party; a center right party)
B/H	: Benford and Hunt
I/K	: Iberra and Kitsuse
SMO	: Social Movement Organization
POS	: Political Opportunity Structure

## CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Turkey is one of the most secular countries in the Muslim world in terms of institutional exclusion of religion from state affairs and from many of its public functions. Yet, Turkey has been experiencing an increased popularity of religion, especially in the late 1980s and 1990s. Ataturk's revolutionary project of cultural Westernization created a strong secularist legacy in Turkey. Along with its strong state tradition inherited from the Ottoman society (Heper 2000; Barkey 2000), this secularist legacy meant the privatization of religion by state power and limiting its public roles not just in state affairs but also in many social and cultural functions (Gole 2002; Heper and Toktas 2003). For example, the religious control over marriage licenses and education was given to the state. Even religious education was put under state control. This was not to subsidize religion but to control its teachings. Strong anticlericalism that opposes public manifestations of religion predominates among the secular elites even after the transition to democracy in Turkey in the 1950s.

Although the journalists and the state institutions adhere to democracy, an anti-clerical orientation dominates their democratic ideals. When democratic demands collide with the elites' view of secularism, the elite groups tend to prefer secularism to democratic principles. This approach was called 'rational democracy' (Sartori 1987) and was adopted by both state elites such as the military and jurists (Heper 2001), and the journalists in Turkey (Heper and Demirel 1996). Sartori (1987) defined 'rational democracy' as a French-type democracy that developed out of a revolutionary struggle and is based on an abstract principle of democracy. It is a somewhat elitist view of democracy that focuses on the possibility that rational politics would bring happiness. It

differs from the Anglo conception of participatory democracy that developed through an evolutionary process. While rationalism is the main philosophy behind the French-type of democracy, empiricism represents the Anglo-type of democracy (Sartori 1987:51-55). For the state elites in Turkey, secularism meant limiting any public functions of religion and making it solely a private matter (Gole 2002; Heper and Toktas 2003) and democracy meant elite leadership for modernization. Based on secularism and nationalism, the Kemalist ideology created its elites (Gole 1997). This ideology both provides an ethos for these elites and justifies and enables their increased role in national security as well as in politics. The Turkish constitution defines religion as a “feeling and private matter of individual conscience” (Erdogan 1999).

As a sign of increasing religious sentiments in the last two decades (Salt 1995), the Islamic movement gained a significant strength with its moderate discourse but had to walk a very fine line between secularism and democracy. As a result of increased religious activities and political liberalization (Kamrava 1998), the Islamic Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi* – RP) became more popular and tried to find a public space for itself but, at the same time, constituted a challenge to the conventional politics in Turkey. In December 1997, as the main representative organization of the Islamic movement, the Islamic Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi* or shortly RP) realized an electoral victory by winning the plurality of the votes cast with 21 percent. The divided nature of the Turkish political arena among various center parties provided the RP with an unexpected opportunity to be part of a coalition government with the secular True Path Party (DYP) in mid-1996. Their yearlong coalition government (known as Refah-Yol) led to a heightened conflict between the secular elites and the Islamic movement, resulting in the



removal of the Islamic party and its secular partner from power, and the banning of the RP from political system.

This dissertation will examine the dynamic relations between the movement framing and counterframing in the process that led to the marginalization of the RP and its exclusion by the secular elites from the public discourse as well as its legal repression. Adopting a contextual constructionist approach, I will look at not only the framing and counterframing used by the actors but also the material and cultural contexts in which those frames and counterframes are constructed. I chose the RP and mainstream journalists as the key representatives of their respective camps. On several occasions, secular state elites, e.g. the military and the judiciary, also joined the campaign against the RP, and their role also contributed to the symbolic battle against the RP by defining its presence as a problem. Therefore, the military and the judiciary will be included in my analysis of the struggle between a religious and a secular agenda, that is, between the RP and the secular establishment. Due to the symbolic nature of the conflict, it is not surprising that the media lead the campaign to defeat the RP coalition. Therefore, my research will focus on the cultural and political aspects of media framing, rather than the organizational context of the news-making process. In brief, this project aims to decipher the framing and counterframing processes between the RP and secular elites in the process that led to the repression of the RP in Turkey. In that regard, the study aims to empirically test these hypotheses about various groups in Turkey: (1) Appeals to a "rational democracy" master frame among state elites (Heper and Guney 1996) and journalists (Heper and Demirel 1996) will lead to opposition to the RP-dominated coalition and to the RP's political exclusion (Yavuz 2000; Gole 2002; Heper and Toktas

2003). In addition, because of commercial settings or state-sponsorship, when the media arena is dominated, they generally support the elite perspectives (Schudson 2002); (2) Compared to opinion columns, the news coverage in the Turkish media will be less negative (and more objective) in its portrayal of the RP across the events (Uysal 2001); (3) Editorial intervention will make news reporting more volatile (Finkel 2000) – swinging from neutral to negative in particular events in its portrayal of the RP compared to opinion columns. The study covers the period from the RP's electoral victory (December 1995) and coming to power (June 1996) to its removal from power (June 1997) and its banning (January 1998).

## ***LITERATURE REVIEW***

### **The Framing Perspective:**

This study aims to help fill the gap in the conceptualization of framing and counterframing by treating them as processes (Benford and Snow 2000) and by analyzing frames and counterframes in a dialectical perspective. Framing analysis made a significant contribution to the social movements literature. Drawing from Goffmann (1974), Snow, Benford, and their associates (1986) defined a frame as “a ‘schemata of interpretation’ that enables individuals ‘to locate, perceive, identify, and label’ occurrences within their life space and the world at large. By rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective” (p.235), and frame alignment as “the “the linkage of individual and SMO interpretative orientations, such that some set of individual interests,

values, and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary”(p.464). Social movements and, of course, countermovements frame the events and situations by employing cultural symbols or what Swidler (1986) called ‘tools’ available in their cultural ‘tool-kit’. Which symbol is used is not a random process but is conditioned by its context (Williams 1995).

Frame alignment theories filled the void left by the theories of political opportunity structure (POS) and resource mobilization in social movements literature, by arguing that political opportunities and resources of a social movement (SM) do not automatically guarantee its success or failure and emphasized the constructed nature of opportunities and resources as well as the effects of culture. Benford and Snow (2000) summarized the variable features of frames that influence framing processes: (1) problem identification and attribution of blame. Social movements attempt to define certain situations as a social problem and sometimes certain groups can be defined as a social problem. When one group defines the other’s existence as a social problem, the other may use the same tactic or a different one. In this research, both the RP and the secular camp defined each other’s authoritarian tendencies as a social problem. (2) Flexibility and rigidity/inclusivity and exclusivity: More inclusive and flexible frames have a better chance to adapt to evolving situations and become a master frame. For example, an exclusive ‘religious rights’ frame caused more reaction to the RP while a ‘human rights’ frame found more support from the outsiders. (3) Depending on its cultural context, variation in interpretive scope and influence, and (4) resonance. Frame resonance is the ability of a certain frame to affect the hearts and minds of the targeted audience (Snow and Benford 1988). Its credibility, salience and consistency affect its ability to resonate among the population.

*Master Frames:* Master frames are the generic frames that are available in a given society and emphasize certain aspects of social reality. For Snow and Benford (1988), "the potency of a master frame will also vary with the extent to which it is relevant to or resonates with the life world of adherents and constituents as well as bystanders. Hypothetically, the greater is the resonance, the more potent the master frame" (p. 140). Some master frames can create room for certain ideas (Noonan 1997). The distinction between restricted and elaborated master frames help explain the main difference between rigid and flexible master frames. For example, for the RP the master frame of religious practice was specifically used to argue against the state control over the use of the sacrificed animal skins.

*Frame Amplification:* "Frame amplification involves the idealization, embellishment, clarification, or invigoration of existing values or beliefs" (Benford and Snow 2000:624; also see Snow et al 1986). The framing process is key for actors engaged in claims-making and counterfaming. For example, the RP tried to amplify the Islamic value of *shura* (counseling) in the election of political leaders as a basis for the democratic principles of majority rule and popular participation. Framing related to the value of *shura* is amplified by the RP to gain support from both constituents and the general public. It helped gain support from religious communities at the movement level and implied their commitment to democratic principles before the general public. In other words, the RP's amplification of a religious value, *shura* or counseling, to a modern democratic participation was the main strategy to prove their commitment to democracy

and, therefore, a necessity for their political legitimacy and inclusion. However, this limited version of democracy did not fully overlap with a Western-style democracy that is based on the principles of popular sovereignty and majority rule.

As another example, the RP leadership amplified the notion of *jihad* (the holy struggle for Islam) to sacralize the mundane activities of the party such as posting the party signs or selling party newspaper. The amplification of the religious belief in jihad (holy struggle) was somewhat problematic in terms of the RP's inclusion and exclusion into mainstream politics. This was because the RP used it to demand a full-hearted support from its religious followers and, at the same time, secular actors used it against the RP as a counterframe that equated jihad with radicalism, fanaticism, and anti-secularism. In that sense, the RP's amplification of jihad is expected to hamper the RP claims of inclusion into mainstream politics. Moreover, the RP sought to amplify cultural values such as justice, solidarity, hard work and honesty in politics. They seem to help the RP's popularity among the electorate but I will not focus on these frames since they are not directly related to the debates about the RP's political inclusion/exclusion.

*Vocabularies of Motives:* Framing processes involve the amplification of different vocabularies of motives: (1) severity of problem, (2) urgency of solution, (3) efficacy and (4) propriety of taking action (Benford 1993a). These formulations of vocabularies of motives structure various dimensions of framing efforts, and they all emphasize different aspects of collective problems and solutions. As an example of the severity of the problem, the secular elites described the situation of the RP's rise to power as a sign of partisan invasion of state bureaucracy (*kadrolaşma*). If the secular groups do not act

soon, the country will be taken over by the sharia movement. Since the RP represented a major sector of society that was defined as a problem, what needed to be done (efficacy of the measures) and its moral justification (propriety) became a major issue. The media's self-assigned role of counterframing helped unite the secular groups against the problem, namely, the RP government. In the suit opened against the RP, the Chief Republican Prosecutor Savas (2001) argued that even though the RP was a major political party in the parliament and in the government, it was not loyal to the democratic and secular regime in Turkey.

The main obstacle for the RP's framing activities was the lack of a free marketplace of ideas in Turkey because the laws prohibit any public framing aiming to change the secularist character of the regime. The establishment of a pro-sharia party is also legally prohibited. Therefore, the RP's framing tasks required a considerable creativity so as not to directly challenge the regime but to make a legitimate case to expand the scope of freedoms for its constituents. In that regard, whether the RP came up with an effective master frame or not became a yardstick for its success or failure.

In a legal context that does not allow religious-based claims, the RP had difficulty in finding an effective master frame to mobilize its religious constituents on the one hand and to neutralize the secularist state elites, on the other. The gap between the popular culture and elite culture made the task of framing more difficult for the RP. The master frames most frequently articulated by the RP were religious duty, justice, freedom, democracy and human rights, and nationalism. The RP's opponents amplified Kemalism, secularism, modernization, separatism, democracy, national security and unity, statism, and nationalism. Because of the radical nature of secularism in Turkey (Hiro 1995) and a

challenging Islamic movement, there were few common master frames available to both sides to come to a shared understanding. The only exceptions were master frames of democracy, human rights and nationalism. Even these master frames did not mean the same thing to each side. For example, while for the RP democracy meant the participation of religious groups in the political process, for secular groups it meant mobilizing the masses around the principles of modern rational ideologies of secularism and nationalism.

### **Counterframing & Reframing:**

The framing perspective in social movements has made significant progress toward treating frames as processes that involve continuous reconstruction of meaning due to counterframing and frame disputes internal to social movement organizations (Benford 1993b). Counterframes can be defined as attempts “to rebut, undermine, or neutralize a person's or group's myths, versions of reality, or interpretive framework” (Benford, 1987:75). Studies on counterframing tactics and framing contests “fail to shed much light on the factors that tend to shape the outcomes of such contests, other than stating or implying the tautology that those who won employed the most resonant framings” (Benford and Snow 2000:626). It is well argued that counterframing affects movement framing (Benford and Snow 2000), but the analysis of the relations between frames and counterframes is still underdeveloped. One exception is Benford and Hunt’s (2001) study on framing and counterframing strategies such as problem denial, counter-attribution, counterprognosis, attack on character and movement responses such as ignoring, keying, embracing, distancing, and counterframing. This provides a useful starting point to

examine each strategy in a context that consists of various actors, and is mediated by the mass media. Later, I will elaborate on Benford and Hunt's (2001) counterframing strategies and Iberra and Kitsuse's (1993) counter-rhetorical strategies comparatively.

The number of possible frames in a process of framing and counterframing is seemingly unlimited. Therefore, which frame prevails or gets rejected (marginalized) and how are significant sociological questions. The social problems literature has made a contribution toward explaining these questions. Counterframing is defined as attempts "to rebut, undermine, or neutralize a person's or group's myths, versions of reality, or interpretive framework" (Benford 1987:75). Counterframing strategies can be sympathetic and unsympathetic toward social problems claims (Iberra and Kitsuse 1993). ***Problem denial*** is the main counterframing strategy noted by Iberra and Kitsuse (I/K) and Benford and Hunt (B/H). Against the RP's claims that there is not enough democracy and freedom in Turkey, the counterclaimants (e.g. Savas 2001) argue that there is plenty of democracy and freedom, perhaps too much? I/K (1993) see the problem denial in the form of 'anti-patterning' where framing is viewed as not a common occurrence – and a '***telling anecdote***' – giving counterexamples. As an example for a telling anecdote, against the claim that smoking is harmful to health, one can say that "my father smoked two packs of cigarettes and nothing happened" (p.45).

***Anti-patterning*** was frequently used against the RP claim that there is not a sufficient freedom of religion in the country, by arguing that the mosques are open and nobody is persecuted for their beliefs. All of these can also be related to other types of counterframing strategies. For example, denying the existence of problem, the counterframers may argue that the claimants seek a hidden agenda rather than revealing



their real intentions. In other words, the anti-RP camp may claim that those who want more freedom and democracy do not really care about democracy and freedom but use it to develop their undeclared agenda. Since the counterframers (i.e., secular groups in Turkey) view religion as a mere personal belief and feeling, and they ignore its public functions (Erdogan 1999), they reject RP's demands related to the social aspects of religion. For example, Islamic religion requires female believers to cover their heads in the public. Ironically, the secularists opposed this practice in universities and state offices (*Milliyet*. 1995a) and allowed in private as it was seen as a private practice.

The other strategy is *counter-attribution* (Benford and Hunt 2001). In other words, while accepting the existence of problems, this strategy attempts to argue that the cause of the problem is different. I/K use different terms for such strategies. One is *naturalizing* by which counterclaimants argue that this problem is natural, common or inevitable (Iberra and Kitsuse 1993: 43). The other strategy is the '*costs involved*', implying that the problem situation must be lived with because its benefits outweigh its costs (I/K: p.43). Against the claims of the lack of religious freedom, the counterarguments tend to be that due the incompatibility between the sharia and secularism, some religious freedoms have to be sacrificed. Another counterframing strategy is *perspectivizing* whereby the counterclaimant characterizes the claim as 'just an opinion' (p. 44). The counterargument that there is enough freedom and democracy in the country and that arguing otherwise, too, is part of democratic rights. This relativizes the original claim as 'just an opinion'.

B/H's third type of counterframing strategy is *counterprognosis* that accepts the existence of the problem but argues for a different solution. I/K's concept of '*tactical criticism*' (p.44-45) is similar to B/H's counterprognosis. For example, some

counterframing argued that there is not enough religious freedom in Turkey but the way RP approaches that issue creates reaction by the state, rather than gaining sympathy. The next strategies are the most aggressive counterframing methods. B/H and I/K's views on as a counterframing strategy are similar attack on character.

***Attack on Character:*** One prominent counterframing strategy noted by B/H is to attack the character of the opposing groups or label them. B/H (2001) note that claims-makers are blamed by the counterframers for treason, insincerity, and naivety. Working for the enemy (i.e., treason) is a common strategy used in Turkey. Those who demand more religious freedom and rights are condemned as a puppet for foreign regimes such as Iran to bring sharia regime, or even for Western powers that have a historical goal to partition the country. Due to historical fears against separatism since the Ottoman period, the treason frame reflects the prevalent worries of the population and has proven to be an effective method to silence the opposition. I/K point to the charges of insincerity and hysteria (p.45-6). ***Insincerity*** is one of the most common strategies used against the political inclusion of the Islamic party and is called *takiyye* in Turkish, meaning dissimulation. That is, the RP demands for democracy and human rights are seen as a part of a hidden agenda to bring a sharia regime to Turkey. This strategy is also used to describe the female students wearing headscarves at campuses not because they see it as a religious duty but to bring the sharia or to cause chaos.

Additionally, B/H's concept of '***naivety***' implies that the counterframer label a claims-maker as well-intended but serving for a harmful idea and action. Some secular groups argue that some religious people are well-intended people but the fundamentalist groups misguide them to bring a sharia regime to Turkey. Similar to the charges against

the antinuclear movement, they are described as ‘all hearts but no heads’ (Benford and Hunt 2001).

*Irrationality* (or Hysteria) is labeled as another counterframing strategy since it was used to determine the irrationality of the opponent (Iberra and Kitsuse 1993:45-46). For example, in Turkey the followers of the Islamic movement are described as following their minds rather than their reason and, therefore, they are not supposed to struggle for such as simple thing as headscarf. I want to add ‘*dishonesty*’ as an additional counterframing strategy to the ones introduced by the I/K and B/H. Benford and Hunt’s term of naivety implies that members of a social movement are well-intended but unknowingly serve the enemy’s plans. However, dishonesty implies that the movement elites are evil-intended people who prey on a naïve population’s feelings and beliefs. Related to rational democracy approach, exploitation of people’s religious beliefs and feelings was frequently defined as a negative value. This strategy is based on the assumption that their followers are naïve. In Turkey, secular elites commonly used this strategy to attack on the character of the Islamic movement leaders, arguing that RP leaders misuse people’s religious beliefs in order to gain political power or bring a sharia regime. This strategy is used to attack the moral character of the Islamic movement leaders who are blamed for brainwashing ignorant masses.

### **Reframing Strategies:**

Reframing strategies are used as a response to the counterframings, Benford and Hunt (2001) identified five types of reframing strategies: (1) ignoring, (2) keying, (3) embracing, (4) distancing, and (5) counterframing. *Ignoring* can be defined as the

countermovement's not taking seriously the charges by the opponents. Frequently, the RP ignored the charges of bringing a sharia regime in Turkey. For example, against the suit filed by the Chief Republican Prosecutor, the RP leader Erbakan said it is a simple claim and is based on the accusations irrelevant to the reality (Zaman 1997n). Another RP officer (Salih Kapusuz) said, the suit "is an accusation based on newspaper accounts, it is baseless" (Zaman 1997m). When a group attempts to change the meaning or label imposed on them by the opponents, it is what B/H called *keying*, borrowing from Goffmann (1974). In some occasions, the RP also reframed the charges of sharia by giving an inclusive definition of sharia, by equating it with Islam. In this sense being 'pro-sharia' is defined as being a Muslim. Similarly, the RP redefined secularism. As the official secularism meant a strict control over religion's public role, the RP tried to broaden the meaning of secularism as the state's noninvolvement with religious freedom and activities. For example, the RP leader Erbakan said, "The RP is the guardian of secularism and, in fact, is the guarantee for real secularism" (Zaman 1997n).

*Embracing* is the strategy whereby the counterframer accepts the charges or the labels directed at them. This strategy is not frequently used since the counterframing labels often tend to attack the character of the opponents. Because the counterframes used against the RP generally aimed to attack on the character of RP members, the RP leaders distanced themselves from these charges. But some radical factions outside the RP organization embraced the charges of seeking a sharia regime. *Distancing* is used to distance the movement from the counterframes. For example, elites frequently described the Islamic movement as *irtija* (i.e., backwardism or religious fundamentalism), the Islamic movement rejected such a label not just because it is used as a derogatory term

but it lacks clarity. While *irtija* was widely used by the counterframers to describe religious groups and actions, even radical religious groups distanced themselves from the charges of *irtija*.

The final reframing strategy against secular counterframers would be the ***countermaligning***, meaning attacking on the character of the counterframers by accusing them for having a double standard, being insincere about democracy and human rights, or being irrational about Kemalism and secularism. The most common example of this strategy was that the RP responded to the charges of misusing people's religious feelings and beliefs by arguing that secularists are misusing Ataturk and secularism to force their individual agendas. An RP deputy (Nurettin Kaldirimci) said, "The definition of secularism and *irtija* is not made correctly. Those who exploit the *irtija* claims are the postmodern followers of the *irtija*" (Milliyet 1997ay), implying that the secularists are the real *irtijaic* or backwardist people.

### **Media Framing:**

Both social movements and social problems literatures help us understand the marginalization, or success, of certain claims. Whether a claim or counterclaim will succeed is affected by various factors such as frame credibility (Benford 1993b), cultural resonance (Benford 1993b; Snow *et al* 1986), availability of master frames (Snow and Benford 1992; Noonan 1997; Miller 1993), power relations (Spector and Kitsuse 1987; Miller 1993), and media access (Gamson 1992; Klendermans and Goslinga 1996; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Scheufele 1999; Gamson and Meyer 1996).

From a social constructionist perspective, it is well established that the mass media are an important symbolic arena where meanings are constantly created and negotiated, and various social groups, institutions, and ideologies struggle over the terms and shape of these social constructions (Gamson 1992; Gray 1993; Hartley 1988; Tuchman 1978). Many scholars depicted the media as an active part of the meaning creation and communication process. For example, what Gusfeld (1989) saw as an “image-making industry” (p.439) is also defined as a “secondary claims-maker” (Best 1990).

Media frames help us make sense of relevant events, organizing the internal structure of media packages (Gamson and Modigliani 1989). “Media frames, largely unspoken and unacknowledged, organize the world” for the reporters as well as the recipients (Gitlin 1980:7). Frames are thought to organize the presentation of events and views in a media story and the frames the journalists choose to report an event can result very different portrayal of the same event (Nelson *et al* 1997). “Media frames are persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual” (Nelson *et al* 1997:7).

A media package is based on a core frame and position as a symbolic device, incorporating new events with a suggested course of action (Gamson and Modigliani 1989). A media package is chosen by the reporters and the columnists according to the biases rooted in cultural and political interests. For example, in Gamson and Modigliani’s (1989) example, they juxtapose a clean air package involving different interpretive frames and suggests a different course of action than does a ‘progress package’ that justifies the air pollution for the sake of progress.

Media elites exert influence on public perceptions by selecting which stories will be covered. It is no secret that there is a selection bias in the media (McCarthy et al 1996; Ericson *et al* 1991), and they also present these stories through the lens of ideological bias (Gitlin 1980; Ryan 1991; Tuchman 1978). Ideological orientations of the journalists often lead to a description bias (McCarthy et al 1996). Sometimes the journalists may develop their own frames (Callaghan and Schnell 2001) rather than reflecting the frames of the groups covered. Biases in coverage and presentation may also emanate from the way the media operate as well as their ideological preferences and material interests. Tansey (1995:179-84) mentions the following factors: the availability of information on the political life, the number of channels available for such information, who controls the transmission of information, in whose interests, the way the recipients react to them, and whether or not the media represent the masses to the elite.

Many scholars argued that the media affect the public discourse even though there was not a clear agreement on the nature of the public sphere (or publicness). Haller (2001) argued that the media “help define public discourse around a social issue” (p. 408). Similarly, others argued that the media influence public opinion rather than merely reflecting it (Gamson 1992) or shape the public discourse by selecting the frames from among various alternatives (Callaghan and Schnell 2001; Thomas 2002).

Some others saw the media as the public itself and called it ‘media public’ (Mules 1998; Carpignano 1999). Mules (1998) defined media public as “an ephemeral space of mediated public address, debate and discussion in which various identities become apparent to audiences on a large scale.” Habermas (1996) defined public sphere as “a sphere in which the public as the vehicle of public opinion is formed” (p.56). However,

this view of public sphere was criticized for viewing the public sphere as a uniform one and for disregarding varieties of power relations and culture that shape the public sphere (Calhoun 1992; Curran 1991; Fraser 1993). Ku (2000) emphasized “the structural, institutional, and discursive levels of the public sphere” (p.216).

I will argue that the monopolistic nature and its strong preferences for secular ideologies enabled the Turkish media to adopt a leading countermovement role. They were definitely effective in mobilizing the ruling elites such as military and judiciary. In other words, the secular media were more effective in the secular sectors of society, that is, the state elites.

*Media and Social Movements:* The media attitude is found to be very critical for the success of certain movements. For example, social movement scholars have argued that sympathetic media coverage during the civil rights movement prevented, or made less effective, the police suppression and violence toward it (McAdam 1996b). A reverse effect will be argued for the Islamic movement in Turkey, that is, its negative media presentation made its repression easier. On controversial issues, the media are more likely to present the positions of the mainstream and elite groups than marginal groups (Gitlin 1980; Ryan 1991; Roshco 1975; Lawrence 1996).

The frames accepted by the public and which frames dominate public debates are related to the power of the claims-maker in society. As Spector and Kitsuse (1987) put it, the power of a claims-making group affects the chances of success of a claim to reach the public. Hence, the media are an important place in the power structure in society (Spector and Kitsuse 1987; Paletz and Entman 1981), and the elite groups and the media are



dependent on each other (Hess 1984). The media need the elite groups and public officials as a source of information and the elite groups may manipulate the media by providing ready-made framing of issues (Schudson 2002; Anderson 1997 cited in Anderson 2002). Moreover, “[t]he media’s openness to manipulation by the powerful contributes to insulating some power holders from accountability to the public” (Paletz and Entman (1981: 6). Some others saw this relationship as a one-way relation, arguing that the media are an arena where elite perspectives are shaded on the public (Jasperson and Watts 1998; Zaller and Chui 1996; Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Media are also instrumental in the communications between the elite groups (Lang and Lang 1980; Schudson 2002). Schudson (2002) argued that, because of commercial settings or state-sponsorship, when the media arena is dominated, they generally support the elite perspectives.

The media role in Turkey can also be explained by the cultural hegemony theory in mass media research (Exoo 1994), implying that the media represent and favor the elite cultural codes. This theory points to the dominant cultural values in the American media such as racism, sexism, manicheism (seeing the human life a continuous struggle between the good and evil) (Exoo 1994:28-29). In Turkey, the dominant values of the media can be said are anti-clerical secularism, social democracy, Westernism, rational democracy, and statism.

In this study, the Turkish media, with their monopolistic nature (UN 1997; Boulton 2001) will be treated as a main actor of the countermovement against the RP government. I adopt Gamson and Meyer’s (1996) view of the media as a part of political opportunity structure. Friendly media access played an important role in the success of the civil rights

movements and others as the media publicize the meanings among the population and between people and government (Ellingston 1997). Also, I will elaborate on how the Turkish media strategically used the anti-clerical master frame against the increasing religious demands. This anticlerical (or secularist) bias does not tolerate any public role of religion and justifies even authoritarianism to suppress the political mobilization of religious groups.

### **Countermovement and Repression:**

A countermovement can be defined as 'a conscious, collective, organized attempt to resist or reverse social change' (Mottl 1980: 620). Countermovements tend to focus their framing strategies on the construction of threat posed by a social movement (Isaac 2002). The interaction between social movements and the state countermovements is a complex one (Hoover and Kowalewski 1992). Therefore, mapping this complex interaction is not an easy task (Zald and Useem 1987). Jasper and Poulsen (1997) argued that

“[w]hen a critical mass of organizations feel threatened, they may organize a countermovement. Professional or trade associations, for example, can serve as countermovement organizations, giving aid to targeted individuals and institutions, coordinating their responses, providing resources, and sharing information about effective strategies. Countermovements thus help targeted institutions hide preexisting vulnerabilities and avoid blunders” (p. 399).

Similarly, Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) elaborated on the conditions for the emergence of countermovements: (a) when the movement shows signs of success; (b) when the movement's goals threaten vested interests; and (c) when political allies are available to the countermovement. Each of these preconditions was found to exist in the recent movements against animal liberation (p.1635). An active countermovement is likely to emerge when the challenging social movement aims to change deeply held social values

(Isaac 2002). To reach their goals, countermovements use various tactics (Klandermans 1990:128): (a) criminalizing social movements and their activities; (b) undermining their organizational strength; and (c) using repression, threats, anti-propaganda, and litigation.

Gamson (1990) argued that social movements that sought to displace extant elites rarely succeeded. That is probably because change-oriented social movements are likely to initiate their counteraction that, in turn, might reverse or prevent such change (Gale 1986). Similarly, Turner and Killian (1972) predicted that a long-haul struggle between a social movement and a countermovement would generally transform the initial movement toward moderation.

Few students of social movements considered the state (or regime) as a countermovement (Mottle 1980; Lo 1982). The interaction between social movements and the state countermovements is a complex one (Hoover and Kowalewski 1992). Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) make a useful distinction between the unitary and federal states that affect the movement-countermovement relations. While the state acts as a countermovement in the former, it allows them to compete in more or less neutral movement environment in the latter. Moreover, “media coverage encourages the emergence of a countermovement as the journalists seek out opposing interests in response to movement claims” (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996:1645).

The tendency or propensity of the state for repression was seen as a major part of the political opportunity structure. While McAdam (1996) saw repression as dimension of political opportunity structure, della Porta (1996) considered it as a parameter of it. Davenport (1995) emphasized the cultural aspects of repression: “When cultural limits of dissident behavior violated, that action “sends a strong message to the regime that it is

directly being challenged and political repression would likely be increased as a means of reestablishing the culturally defined parameters of acceptable behavior” (p.689). My study suggests that perceived repression could be as effective as the actual repression itself.

## ***THE SUBJECT OF STUDY***

### **Historical Overview:**

After falling behind the European industrial revolution and losing its military superiority in the region, Ottoman modernization efforts aimed at technological and organizational reforms. Since these reforms proved to be ineffective against the rapidly expanding European dominance in the world, the ideas of radical Westernization began to find stronger support among the elites in the early twentieth century. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, the new Turkish Republic was founded by Kemal Ataturk on the Western ideals of nationalism and secularism. This wholesale Westernization project was a cultural revolution that aimed at changing the cultural codes of Turkish society (Yavuz 2000; Kadioglu 1998; Atasoy 2000). However, like many revolutions (Brinton 1957), the Turkish revolution failed to change cultural codes of the rural population that constituted the majority of Turkish society (Gulalp 1995; Yavuz 2000; Atasoy 2000; Kadioglu 1998). Interestingly enough, the major economic modernization waves in the 1960s and 1980s coincided with the increases in religious activity and increasing public manifestations of religion, as an economic restructuring led to urbanization. These former peasants and new proletariat had to deal with both material hardships and symbolic problems such as identity and solidarity. Religion played a major

role in both providing meaning and identity for the urbanized segment of society and relieving the material hardships through charity organizations, neighborhood networks, alternative schools and colleges, etc. (Yavuz 2000; Gulalp 1995). Increasing religious sentiments came in conflict with a militantly secularist policies of the Turkish state in the 1990s. The rise of the RP to power represented a critical turning point in the struggle where increasing religious demands were repelled by the cooperation of various secular elite groups, including the media and the military. The strategies and actions of those three actors were decisive for the outcome of the process.

**Media:** In the framing battles that led to the repression of the religiously-oriented RP of Turkey, the media played the role of a countermovement and became a force uniting previously divided elite groups. Both the ideological and economic structuring of the Turkish media positions the journalists as a conservative force against any attempt of change in the nature of the regime. On the ideological side, Turkish journalists identified with Western modernization and favored modernization from above (elitism). The journalists were both the forerunners of Westernization and democratic ideals (Groc 1994). They aimed to educate the public and shape public opinion views and adhered to substantive rationality as “the basic means of resistance to the sultan” (Heper and Demirel 1996). While this modernizing role had a democratizing effect in the Ottoman era to reduce the sultan’s power, the republican period emphasized on the wholesale Westernization that assumed militantly secularist reforms (Hiro 1995). Also shared by state elites such as the military and state bureaucracy, this secularist world-view in the media does not tolerate any public role of religion. With the transition to democracy

following the World War II, like other statist bureaucratic-intellectual elites, the journalists adopted ‘rational democracy’\* (Heper and Demirel 1996). With both economic and political liberalization in the Ozal era of the 1980s, Turkey became more integrated with the world system, many religious groups found more opportunity in the public sphere. Journalists criticized the Ozal government for giving concessions for the reactionary Islam even though Ozal did not have an agenda to Islamize the country.

Since the increasing economic power of religious enterprises also poses a threat to the material interests of the big business the mainstream media are associated with, there was a strong conflict of material interests between the big business and the RP government that was mostly associated with small business. The two main media groups, the Dogan and Sabah groups, dominate seventy percent of the media companies in Turkey. Lately even this duopoly in Turkish media is becoming a monopoly dominated by the Dogan group. As of 2001, Dogan controls sixty-six percent of the advertising revenues of the entire media market (Boulton 2001). The Dogan group tries to hamper its opponents by using its control over the news-coverage industry as well as its monopoly over the distribution of the newspapers and magazines. It owns the radio and TV stations as well as newspapers and magazines. Since the media companies benefit from the current order of things, they have strong interest to weed out any challenging movements that have a prospect to come to power and affect their material and ideological interests. The struggle between the RP government and the media coincided with the struggles between the big bourgeoisie of the center (i.e., Istanbul) and the newly emerging Anatolian business sector in the periphery. While the RP happened to represent the latter,

---

\* As Sartori (1987: 51-53) puts it, rational democracies are born anew rather than a gradual and continuous evolution of society. As it happened in the French example, it involves the break as well as the rejection of the past. It is rationalist and elitist, statist in its orientation.

the media represented the former. Bulut (1999) established the proximity between the RP government and the Anatolian business sector. Between 1996 and 1997, Islamist companies in Turkey achieved a boost both economically and politically. It is impossible to disregard the relations between the rise of RP and the growth of Islamic banking and businesses while the decline and disruption of the Islamic corporations followed the collapse of RP (Bulut 1999).

### **The State: The Judiciary and the Military**

As I explained in the historical overview section, the ideological foundation of the modern Turkish Republic comes from founding fathers, who saw Islam as the main reason why the Ottoman/Turkish society fell behind its counterparts in the West. The Enlightenment ideologies of nationalism and secularism were a main source of their inspiration (Yalçın 1967). To establish a modern nation-state, they believed it necessary to redefine the cultural codes of Turkish society based on the idea of modern individual (Gulalp 1999; Duzdag 1996). The identity of the individuals had to be separated from the traditional identities and affiliations such as tribal, regional, and religious. Islam was seen as a “potential resource for opposition forces... a source of tension” (Yavuz 1997:66). Following the French example of making a modern nation state (Hann 2002), Turkish ruling elites and intellectuals adopted anticlericalism from the French, where there was a long history of struggle between the religious and secular powers. Islam prescribes a comprehensive religious and social order among a politico-religious community (*ummah*). Therefore, the secular nationalism did not resonate with the Muslim masses since it helped the division of the *ummah* rather than its unity. In that sense, secular

nationalism came into direct conflict with Islam. This inherent controversy led to nationalism giving in to religion during the Ottoman era. After the emergence of the Turkish Republic, the founders chose the other alternative, that is, secular nationalism because of the inherent controversy between the two. Therefore, the new national identity and government drew its legitimacy not from sacred religion but from the idea of national sovereignty and republicanism. This process required the privatization of religion by state power because Islamic religion prescribes a complete social system based on religion.

### **Master Frames of Turkish Secular Elites**

*Rational Democracy:* Giovanni Sartori (1987: 51-55) dichotomized the Anglo-American type of democracy with the French-type. While the former is characterized by a gradual evolution of democracy based on empiricism, the latter emerged anew as a result of a revolutionary rupture, involving rejection of the past. Rational democracy is based on abstract principles that are taken as plain truths. In other words, it is not only as a rule of people to solve people's problems but a rule to govern an ideal society "in which everything seemed simple and coordinated, uniform, just and rational" (Sartori 1987:52). Even though popular sovereignty is central to both the Anglo-American and French-type of democracy, democracy meant the rule of actual people in the former, while it was an abstract entity in the latter. For that reason, in Anglo-democracy "it is customary to speak of 'government', while the Europeans [rational democracy] almost always say 'State (capitalized)'" (p.53). The concept of State in the rational democracy is a "depersonalized, impersonal, juridical form" (p.53). In brief, this type of democracy is rationalist and elitist, statist in its orientation.



***Military:*** The actual force behind the so-called ‘soft coup’ was the military – which views itself as the protector of the secular regime and its interventionist legacy in Turkish political culture. Because of its symbolic nature, the soft coup was a cultural war between the RP and secularist elites over the character of the regime. In order to understand the soft coup, we need to understand the legacy of the military in Turkish politics. Since the Ottoman Empire, the military has been both the focus, and a major force, of modernization (Lewis 1961; Rouleau 2000). The founder of the Turkish republic, Kemal Ataturk, was a soldier and used the military as an agent to modernize the country from above. Later on, the military voluntarily adopted the role of protecting modern and secular nature of the regime. Whenever they felt that the secular nature of the regime was in danger the military intervened in the civil political system and restructured political system in 1960, 1970, 1980. Each time the military voluntarily left power to civil politicians after one or two years. Whenever there was a political crisis, these military coups came as a result of their so-called guardian role. Their eagerness to leave power quickly and voluntarily created considerable legitimacy and prestige for the military in the Turkish political culture. Given this legacy, the military was able to force the Islamic party government out of power by a threat of intervention.

***The Islamic Welfare Party (RP):*** The Ottoman Empire was based on a religious doctrine. Islamism was still a popular ideology during the late Ottoman period (Lewis 1961). Ataturk’s nation-building project rejected religion as a source of collective identity and took the religious institutions under strict state control after taking away most of its

traditional functions such as education and marriage. With the liberalization of politics after World War II, there was an increase in religious political participation in the 1970s. Necmettin Erbakan, professor of mechanical engineering, founded a political party called National Order Party (MNP in Turkish) in 1970. This marked the first religion-based political party in Turkish secular regime but it was banned in 1971. However, Erbakan founded another political party named National Salvation Party (MSP) in 1972 and entered the parliamentary elections of 1972, earning 51 seats in the parliament with a 12 percent popular vote and securing a share in several coalition governments afterwards. In this period the Islamic party legitimized some religious demands such as religious education, and helped establish various religious-based high schools (IHL). In the 1980s, Turgut Ozal's economic and political liberalization that showed more tolerance toward religion did not leave much room for the Islamic-oriented RP in the 1980s but the increase in religious education and activities of the 1980s gave its fruit in the 1990s by providing a bigger constituency to RP.

In the mid-1990s, the divided nature of Turkish politics and worsened economic conditions provided opportunities for the RP as a challenger movement. The RP came to power in 1996 by taking advantage of the controversies among the secular parties. Kamrava (1998) argued that the RP's success was "based on the interplay of three factors: the nature and evolution of the Turkish political system; the generally acknowledged failure of most political parties and politicians in the post-1980 coup era; and the organizational capabilities and populist platforms of the RP and its ability to capitalize on the failures of others." However, this surprising victory created a real threat for the established interests of the elite groups such as military and media, leading to an

increasing military patronage in politics with the support of the media duopoly. The RP's religious discourse caused a fierce secularist reaction, especially from the media and military. Also, the religious nature of the party's discourse did not allow them to fully commit to democracy, since democracy takes its legitimacy from people rather than from a divine source.

## **DATA AND METHODS**

I conducted a content analysis of the news accounts and opinion columns of the Turkish mainstream press to study the framing and counterframing processes among the RP, the media and the military between 1996 and 1998 in Turkey. Since I am mainly interested in the meanings created by various groups, I used content analysis of the news coverage and opinion columns to understand and explore beliefs and values articulated by RP, the media and the state (e.g. the military and judiciary). To understand the framing processes in a broader context, I focused on frame amplification, and the use of master frames. I examined especially how certain values and beliefs are amplified by both sides in the framing struggles in order to make their case about the matter of RP's exclusion from, and inclusion into, the political process. This is especially useful in studying the media framing. My study involves the mainstream press (i.e., dailies *Hurriyet*, *Milliyet*, and *Sabah*) only because two main media holdings, the Dogan and Sabah groups control more than two-thirds of the current newspaper circulation. The mainstream media are not exclusive to these groups, but these two constitute the majority and managed to dominate the market for a significant time period.

Of course, the mass media are not limited to the press. There are also audio-visual media such as radio and TV channels. However, these were not examined in the current study. They do not provide easy access for researchers, and there is no archival project for the audio-visual media available for study in Turkey. The newspapers can be a good representative of the whole Turkish media because the ownership crossover between newspapers and TV channels. Each media company generally owns both a TV channel and newspaper and even uses the same journalists for both types of media outlets. For example, the newspaper Sabah is related to TV channel ATV, Milliyet with Kanal-D, Star Gazete with StarTV, and this issue does not pose a serious validity problem.

*Media Sources:* Generally in this order of circulation rates, I examined three most popular mainstream newspapers: (1) Sabah, (2) Hurriyet, and (3) Milliyet. I selected these three newspapers according to their circulation. There are others that belong to the same media groups but these three are the most popular and influential. They are generally available online for the RP government period (June 1996 to March 1998, that is, from the beginning of their government to the prohibition of the party). I coded the texts gathered from the online sources. In some portions of the analysis these newspapers are not available online, and their paper copies were used and coding of paper copies were conducted by an independent coder. The mainstream press in Turkey is used both as a source of information and an actor in the framing battles, constituting the main challenge of my study. It is a difficult task to draw a line between these two functions.

*Identifying RP-Related Framing:* Of course, as the main argument of my study positions the media and the state against the RP, the media's coverage of RP was analyzed as both an activity of news-coverage and framing. The media's use of certain terms to describe the RP were quantitatively documented as word counts. For example, there is a vague pejorative term *irtija* used by only the secular elites. The term literally means backwardism and implies a strong anti-clerical perspective that does not tolerate any public role of religion. Its vagueness serves to condemn various types of religious activities and demands, depending on the context of the debates. Therefore, the use of the *irtija* term will be measured quantitatively to show the prevalence of the anti-clericalism among the secularist groups. The meanings attributed to the term will be elaborated by employing both manifest and latent content analysis.

As I explained earlier, the secular elite's and journalists' adherence to a rational democracy approach implies that politicians must seek ideal politics (i.e., secularism and nationalism) rather than popular politics based on popular demands and mundane aspirations. Similarly, another common term used by secular groups and the media to describe RP's actions was *din istismari* (i.e., the misuse of popular religious feelings). This term was used to attack the character of the RP members, claiming that they immorally deceive people and assuming that most people are ignorant and naïve to believe any propaganda. The elitist values of modernism and secularism are generally seen in the form of condemning all political leaders for compromising modernization by giving in to traditional values. The secularist elites (e.g. the journalists and the military) think that politicians compromise from ideal democracy by paying more attention to people's mundane demands rather than ideal politics. This labeling takes the name of

“populism” against secular politicians and the name of *din istismari* (misuse of religious feelings) in the case of RP.

*Takiyye* (dissimulation or hidden agenda) was another common term used by the media to describe the RP. It literally means dissimulation and implies that the RP seeks a hidden agenda by declaring it ‘guilty by suspicion’. Since the official ideology legally prohibits the use of religious discourse in politics, the RP had to use an indirect language to make a case for its agenda, causing the elites to be suspect about its real intentions as a result. Along with other depictions of the RP in the media, I analyzed the media framings of the RP in a contextual perspective.

## **Critical Events**

I examined nine critical events where the framing and counterframing battles intensified about the church and state relations. I divided the period under study into three parts: (1) the period before the RP government (from the RP’s electoral victory in December 1995 to the establishment of the coalition in July 1996), (2) the one-year period during the RP government in which we witnessed the intensification of the struggle, and (3) the period after the RP was forced out of power in June 1997. This period marked the suppression of the Islamic movement and its related religious demands. This was the period that resulted in the marginalization of the RP frames and the demands for religious freedom. I examined at least two critical events for each period.

### **Critical Events Examined:**

#### *I. Before the Coalition Government:*

- Before Elections: December 11-24, 1995
- After Elections: Dec. 25-31, 1995

- Before Coalition: June 8-15, 1996

II. During the Coalition Government:

- Coalition Founded: June 29 - July 5, 1996
- Sincan Affair: February 2-14, 1997
- NSC Meeting: February 27 - March 12, 1997

III. Toward the End of RP Government and Its Banning:

- Suit Filed: May 22-24, 1997
- Coalition Ended: June 12-18, 1997
- RP Banned: January 14-20, 1998

*Sources on Military Framing:* The data about the role of the military in the framing battles was also drawn mostly from the media since the official documents that were used within the military and National Security Council (NSC) were considered “classified” and inaccessible. However, the some of NSC decisions during the periods were leaked to the press and were not denied by the military. A couple of the classified military documents about political issues were revealed to the public and were admitted by the military to be actual official documents. There were a number of official pronouncements by the NSC, and public speeches of the top generals on various occasions. Out of numerous military briefings to various elite groups such as the judiciary, academia and the media, the full text of the briefing to the judiciary is analyzed. Also, a anonymous military officer’s statements continuously appeared in the media prior the collapse of the RP government. These anonymous statements were later admitted to be a part of the plan executed by the secretary of NSC representing the whole military.

## **OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS**

This dissertation consists of seven chapters, including the introduction. Chapter two elaborates on the methods conceptual apparatus of the study. Chapter three focuses on the first period of study, that is, the framing struggles before and after the 1995 parliamentary elections. The counterframing and re-framing activities are elaborated in detail.

Considering the media's elitist attitude, the voters did not readily accept the media frames during the election. The second section examines the media framing of the second nomination of Mr. Erbakan for prime minister. Since a coalition government between two secular center right parties ANAP and DYP collapsed, RP's coming to power became a real possibility for the first time.

Chapter four analyzes the framing and counterframing during the RP coalition government, consisting of three sections. The first section addresses the period that marked the establishment of an RP coalition government. Section two addresses the second half of the RP government, a period that witnessed the intensification of framing and counterframing, starting from January 1997. In this period the media became more hostile to the RP government and religious issues, assuming a leading role within the secularist camp. The military and other institutions and groups participated in counterframing activities against the RP government.

Chapter five elaborates on the framing, counterframing and reframing activities leading to counterframing that led to the 'soft coup' against the RP government, that is, the collapse of the RP coalition and its banning. This period marked a direct participation of the military in framing contests. In this period the continued existence of the RP was questioned and its legitimacy came under heavy attack not only from the media and



military but also from the other institutions such as the judiciary and in the academia. Section I elaborates on the military framing against the RP coalition by analyzing the official text of the military brief that was given to the members of the judiciary on July 12, 1997. In addition, I elaborate on the media framing of RP and its agenda in the week between the military briefing (June 12, 1997) and the collapse of the RP coalition marked by the Prime Minister Erbakan's resignation (June 18, 1997). Section II examines the filing of the suit by the Chief Republican Prosecutor against the RP (May 22-24, 1997). Both the prosecutor's framing and its media coverage is examined in this section. Section III examines the media coverage of the conclusion of the suit that resulted in the actual banning of the RP by the Constitutional Court (January 14-20, 1998). The final chapter consists of the conclusion and discussion.

## CHAPTER II: METHODOLOGY

In this study, I conducted a content analysis of the editorials and opinion columns along with the news accounts in the Turkish media in order to study the framing and counterframing processes among the RP, the media and permanent state bureaucracy between 1995 and 1998 in Turkey. The framing processes that occurred between the three actors (i.e., RP, the media, and the state) were analyzed by using the printed press as a source of information. The press involves three most popular newspapers (Sabah, Hurriyet and Milliyet). These newspapers were used to identify the framing of each actor. The media's framing was measured by examining the editorials and opinion columns as well as news accounts. I tried to measure the general media attitude toward RP by determining whether it is negative, positive or neutral about an issue, event or a person. I tried to summarize each text (editorial, opinion column or news account) into one single proposition and code it as positive, neutral, or negative tone toward RP. If a media text allows one side's view an issue related to RP, it was coded negative or positive, depending on its approach to RP. In the cases where the text tries to balance its coverage by allowing both side's views or the text not seem to show any preference, it is coded as neutral, the text was coded as neutral.

The framing processes were examined in three periods: pre-RP government, during the RP government, and the end of the RP coalition and its banning. I chose nine incidents (critical discourse moments) to analyze the dynamic relations of framing and counterframing by the media, RP and the military. Here are the critical incidents for each period and the dates of media coverage analyzed:

### **I. Before the Coalition Government:**

- Before Elections: December 11-24, 1995
- After Elections: Dec. 25-31, 1995
- Before Coalition: June 8-15, 1996

### **II. During the Coalition Government:**

- Coalition Founded: June 29 - July 5, 1996
- Sincan Affair: February 2-14, 1997
- NSC Meeting: February 27 - March 12, 1997

### **III. Toward the End of RP Government and Its Banning:**

- Suit Filed: May 22-24, 1997
- Coalition Ended: June 12-18, 1997
- RP Banned: January 14-20, 1998

Of course, it is natural that the editorials and opinion columns display ideological preferences. However, my goal is to show that the Turkish press assumed a leading role in the ideological warfare against the RP government, mostly ignoring universal journalism norms of fairness, balance and minimizing harm. In this struggle, the media's priority was to win over the RP rather than a balanced journalism. Even the news accounts in the Turkish press are heavily loaded with strong ideological expressions, which conflict with the modern idea of journalism. Most of the time, the news reports do not pay due attention to the norms of balance and fairness. As Gamson (1992) pointed out, the news accounts are not mere reflections of what happened. In fact, they tell a story in a certain way and frame the issue they cover in their headings, leads and closings (Gamson 1992). The coverage contains various interpretive comments throughout the story covered in the form of quotations, expert opinions, etc. I chose these two types of media production as a source for my research mainly because of their accessibility, compared to the audio-visual media in Turkey.

Since I am mainly interested in the ideological work done by various groups, content analysis is the method to understand and explain beliefs, values articulated by various

groups in RP, media and military. To understand the nature of the framings in a broader context, I focused on the frame amplification and extension, and the use of master frames. I examined especially how certain values and beliefs are amplified by both sides of the framing contest to make their case about the RP's exclusion from, and inclusion into, the political process. This is especially useful in studying the media framing. That is because the media in my study involve the mainstream press controlled the two major media holdings, the Dogan and Sabah groups, making up two-thirds of the current newspaper circulation. Of course, the mainstream press is not exclusive to these two media groups but these two constitute the majority and managed to dominate the media market for a significant time period. Other newspapers, along with the Islamic press, constitute the minority.

Of course, the mass media are not limited to the press as there are also audio-visual media outlets such as radio and TV channels that were not examined in the current study. They are privately owned and do not provide access to the research and there is not an archival project that is available for study. Since I did not have any access to the audio-visual media, I sufficed with the mainstream press, assuming a parallel between the newspapers and TV channels. However, I have no way of proving that parallel empirically. It would be useful to keep in mind that each media company generally owns TV channels and newspapers and even use the same personnel on both media outlets. For example, the newspaper Sabah is related to TV channel ATV, Milliyet with Kanal-D, Star Gazete with StarTV, Zaman with Samanyolu, Yeni Safak with Kanal7. This can easily imply proximity between the Turkish press and its audio-visual counterparts.

## ***THE SOURCES OF THE DATA***

### **Sources on Media Framing:**

I looked at the mainstream media's three most popular newspapers (Sabah, Hurriyet, Milliyet generally in this order of circulation). I selected these three newspapers because of their high circulation. There are other newspapers that belong to the same media groups and other media companies, but these three are the main and most influential ones. According to the circulation reports of the mid-1996 and early 1997 (Unal 1996; Unal and Sutay 1997), the mainstream media represented about 80 percent of the daily newspapers published in Turkey, excluding the sports-only newspapers. The rest was constituted by the religiously affiliated newspapers (about 20 percent).<sup>1</sup> The newspapers Milliyet, Hurriyet, and Sabah together made up a little less than a half of the mainstream press (Unal 1996; Unal and Sutay 1997). I used the media both as a source of information and an actor in the framing battle. This was the main challenge of my study. It was a difficult task to draw a line between these two functions. According to my earlier study (Uysal 2001), the news reporting in the Turkish press was found to be relatively objective, compared to its editorials and opinion columns that contained a strong anticlerical perspective. In the Western journalism, there are fewer and less permanent opinion columns. However, the opinion columns in the Turkish media are very common and popular, and the columnists write articles on a variety of issues almost every day. Of course, as the main argument of my study positioned the media against RP, the media coverage of RP was analyzed as both an activity of news-coverage and framing.

### **Sources on Military Framing:**

The data about the role of the military in the framing battles were again drawn from the media since the official documents that were used within the military and National Security Council (NSC) is considered classified and inaccessible. An implicit agreement between the media and the military against the RP government raised the question of the media's favoritism toward the latter. Therefore, the some of NSC decisions during the period were leaked to the press and were also defended by the military. In the process, there were anonymous officer's statements to the press about the military's views about various issues including the RP government's policies. The military institution is very attentive to its public image and frequently responds to the anonymous officer's statements and declares its official stance on a matter. In fact, the secretary of the general staff even admitted that their office organized these anonymous statements and that they represented the official military views (Cevizoglu 2001). A couple of the classified military documents involving certain political issues were revealed to the public and were admitted by the military to be true documents. There were a number of official pronouncements by the NSC and the public speeches of the top generals on various occasions. The military officers held briefings to important elite groups such as the judiciary, academia and the media. A full text for one of those military briefings is available for analysis as it appeared in the media. Because of its creative strategy to shape the public opinion rather than resorting to arms, the military actively participated in the claims-making process. Therefore, the data about the military's framing activity are abundant in the media and very little of it are denied by the NSC.

## ***MEDIA AS A COUNTERMOVEMENT:***

Following Heper and Demirel (1996) one of the main hypotheses of my study is that Turkish media adopted a rational democracy approach and, therefore, displayed a strong anti-clerical (secularist) bias and they came to play in their opposition to the RP government. The media coverage of the RP and other groups was compared in terms of the main media principles, namely, the honesty (factuality), fairness and balance, minimizing harm, independence, and conflicts of interests. This provided a good example of unequal treatment of political parties in the Turkish press. I hope to quantitatively show the actual occurrence of media's charges of hidden agenda against the RP. In other words, my analysis showed how the media defined the RP differently from how the RP actually defined itself and balance principle was examined by looking at whether the press provided room for RP's own voice in case of any allegation against the RP. Also, the media pronounced some RP members guilty before they were tried in the court. Other principles of media's independence and conflicts of interest were analyzed by looking at the media general condition.

## ***THE PERIODS AND INCIDENTS***

Since it was not possible to cover the whole period, I looked at certain critical events where the framing and counterframing escalated. I selected nine critical events that led to the intensification of the debates about the future of the RP government in general and the church-state relations in particular. I divided the periods under study into three parts. One is the period before the RP became a part of the government, especially the coverage

of its electoral victory and Erbakan's first authorization as prime minister. Two is the one-year period of the RP coalition in which we witnessed an intensification of the struggle. Three is the period after the RP was forced out of power. This period marked the suppression of the Islamic movement and its related religious demands. This is the period that resulted in the marginalization of the RP frames and the demands for religious freedom. Also, RP made significant frame extensions after seeing the ineffectiveness of the old RP frames. It extended the frames of religious freedom and religious rights to human rights and freedom. Of course, there have been a number of other significant events that contributed to the framing and counterframing battles but the three events chosen are the most significant ones for the author.

Polarization is an underlying question of my study. As a result of increasing framing and counterframing strategies, I hypothesize an increased polarization between RP and secular groups. I try to quantitatively show this polarization in the media framing as well. The rates of sympathetic and critical media coverage were compared for each period of my study to see if the results show that the rate of negative coverage of RP increased in the later periods.

### **A. Before the RP Government:**

I chose three incidents in which I saw the escalation of framing and counterframing in the first period. The first incident is the media coverage of (1) the RP during the parliamentary elections of December 24, 1995. This period's media coverage was analyzed for the dates between December 11 and 24, 1995. The second event was the media coverage of the RP's electoral victory between the dates of December 25 and 31,



1995. This event also marked Mr. Erbakan's first authorization by the President to establish a government, but his failure to do so due to secular parties' reluctance to partner with RP. The third event covered was the RP leader Erbakan's first authorization to establish a government for the second time (June 8-15, 1996) when he secured an agreement with the secular center-right party DYP to form a coalition government.

*Before the Elections:* The probability of the RP's winning the elections caused heightened concerns among the secular elites, and the mainstream press was especially the arena for both the expressions of such concerns and an apparent advocacy of preventing the RP's rise to power before it became a genuine threat. For that reason, my choice of the electoral coverage of the RP in December 1996 provided a good case of the mainstream press's treatment of RP as compared with the other secular parties' coverage. My study of this event covered two weeks (December 12 to 24) of media coverage prior to the elections. I coded the coverage in the mainstream newspapers as three categories (i.e., positive, neutral or negative) and also identified various frames about RP during the period.

*RP's Electoral Victory:* The second event of the first period, the RP's electoral victory, caused somewhat mixed feelings in the Turkish press. On the one hand, there was an effort to express the seriousness of the RP's threat to come to power. On the other hand, there was a significant effort to underplay its success because it won only the plurality of the votes rather than the majority. The event of the RP's electoral victory was also studied for a one-week time frame (December 25 to 31, 1995) after the completion of vote count.

*The RP Leader's Authorization for Government:* The third event in this period involved the nomination of the RP leader by the President for the second time to form a coalition government. This followed the collapse of the coalition government between the two secular center-right parties, ANAP and DYP. A one-week period of media coverage was analyzed (June 8 to 15, 1996). I take this case separately from the electoral victory because this marked a real chance for the RP to come to power and, therefore, was perceived by the secular media as a great threat because the RP government, for the secular media and other elite groups, meant the reversal of the Ataturk's seventy-year-old program to Westernize and modernize the Turkish nation. In a sense, the RP government was seen as the sign of *irtija* (backwardism) that could take the country to the middle ages. This incident marked the time when the previously imagined threat became a real possibility and caused intense propaganda against the RP to prevent the other secular parties from partnering with the RP in a coalition government.

## **B. The RP Government Period:**

The incidents that demanded analysis were numerous during the RP government. However, for the sake of feasibility, I limited the number to three incidents: (1) the RP's making a coalition as a senior partner in June 1996, (b) the Sincan Affair in February 1997, and (3) National Security Council meeting of Feb 28, 1997. The selection of these incidents was made according to the author's own opinion of relevance to the study rather than by a random sampling among possible candidates.

*The Start of RP Government:* Of course, the main event of the period was the RP's making a coalition as a senior partner (June 29 to July 5, 1996). This was one of the main examples of the media framing related to the Islamic party government. For the media and other secular groups, this event marked a wait-and-see approach. On the other hand, for the secular groups, the threat imagined before now became a reality after the formation of a coalition government with the RP.

*Sincan Affair:* One of the critical incidents of the period was the Sincan Affair that weakened the RP's stance and provided the secular media with a lot of material for criticism of the RP government. This event was held on January 30, 1997, as an annual meeting to express solidarity with the Palestinian people. Even though the event had been held each year with the same format, this time it received a sensational coverage in the media. A great controversy came out because of theatrical scenes and speeches at a meeting organized by a RP municipal leader and participated in by various religious figures along with the Iranian ambassador. This incident especially caused strong resentment on the part of secular groups. Especially, the military expressed strong words for those who were responsible for the management of such a meeting. Even the tanks rolled in the streets of Sincan where event was held.

*NSC Meeting:* The next incident marked the start of the process leading to the collapse of the RP government. On the February 28, 1997, the National Security Council (where the military members have a stronger voice and constitute the majority) gathered to discuss various issues that concerned the future of the church and state issues and, therefore, the

future of the RP government. The demands expressed by the National Security Council (NSC) aimed to limit the RP's ability to stay in power as well as to curtail the perceived causes of the Islamic movement (i.e., various religious activities). These demands of the NSC meeting suggested numerous sanctions against religious educational institutions, economic establishments as well as religio-cultural activities. The analysis of this NSC decisions provided a good picture of the military and other secular groups' attitude toward religion. Due to the critical relevance of the event I studied a two-week period between February 27 and March 12, 1997. Because the National Security Council decisions declared the state's new priorities and the threats, the media coverage of each decision helps us to see the media's view on the state's newly defined threats and priorities. In addition to the media coverage of this event, I also looked at the military's official position expressed in its various public announcements such as press statements and other publicized documents.

### **C. Toward the End of RP and its Banning:**

This period included three critical incidents that marked the repression of the RP by the state apparatus. In temporal order, (1) the chief Republican (equivalent of the Attorney General in the United States) filed a suit to ban the RP from institutional politics on May 21, 1997; (2) the military briefing to the members of the judiciary on June 11, 1997, was followed by the Erbakan's resignation from the office of prime minister (June 18, 1997); and (3) the banning of the RP by the Constitutional Court on January 15, 1998. Without ignoring this temporal order, the analysis of these three incidents was organized differently in the writing of the chapter. To provide a more readable comparison between

the media coverage of the initial filing of the suit against RP during the RP government and its banning six months after the collapse of the government, I analyzed the two incidents together. As a result the collapse of the RP coalition is the first incident in the chapter, followed by the initial filing of the suit and its consequent banning. However, the temporal nature of the debates is taken into consideration, as well.

*RP Government:* Prime Minister Erbakan's resignation on June 18, 1997, marked the end of the RP coalition, following the military briefing given to the members of the judiciary a week earlier. The significance of this incident comes from the fact that it marked the victory for the secularist camp against the RP and Islamic framing. The media framing, along with the participation of other secular groups, was thought to lead to the collapse of the RP coalition. I analyzed one-week of media coverage of the incident (June 12 and 18, 1997), starting from the coverage of the military briefing until the resignation of Mr. Erbakan from the office of prime minister.

*Filing the Suit against RP:* On May 21, the chief Republican Prosecutor filed a suit to ban RP by arguing that the RP had become the center of the *irtijaic* activities that aimed to change the secular nature of the regime into a religious-based regime. Because of the controversial nature of the suit, the media coverage of the event was very intense. Therefore, I included only the three-day period of media coverage (May 22-24, 1997), following the suit's filing. However, this short period of media coverage of the RP-related issues neared the number of media texts for one-week coverage of other events in my research.

*RP Banned:* The third incident of this period is the banning of the RP by the Constitutional Court. The reasons the Prosecutor argued for banning the RP was especially important to understand why he saw RP as a danger to the secular regime, how the RP responded to these charges and how the Constitutional Court interpreted both sides and why and how it decided that the RP was a danger to the regime. As to the Chief Republican Prosecutor's framing, his own book (Savas 2001) included his official statements in the Court as well as his public statements as to the RP-related issues at the time of the conflict. Therefore, the book is taken as an actual representation of the Prosecutor's framing for the event rather than a retrospective reconstruction of a past event. The second part of the book involves the charges against the FP as a successor of the RP but was included in my analysis.

### ***CODING:***

The first level of analysis is to determine the general media attitude toward the RP related issues. The general tone of each media text will be measured by determining whether it is negative, positive or neutral about an issue, event or a person. I tried to summarize each text (a news account or an opinion column) into one single proposition and code it as positive, neutral, or negative tone toward RP. If a media text allows one side's view an issue related to RP, it was coded negative or positive, depending on its approach to RP. In the cases where the text tries to balance its coverage by allowing both side's views or the text not seem to show any preference, it is coded as neutral, the text was coded as neutral. The distribution of the news accounts and opinion columns is

presented in the frequencies and percentages for each incident between the dates selected for analysis. The next level of analysis involves examining the framing and counterframing by various actors of the framing contests.

**Framing:** Following Gamson (1992), I acknowledge the risk that the media framing may not represent all of the frames available in society at a certain time. That is because the mere distribution of various frames in the media may provide a good picture of what is covered. However, not just the ones covered but also the ones that are not covered may have more sociological significance in order to understand media framing. To explore the media's non-coverage of certain frames can be measured by the cultural availability concept, I will briefly investigate the alternative media. Gamson's concept of cultural availability tests whether or not the media covered certain major culturally available frames. The frames that are missing in the media are especially important for the sake of my study to point out the media bias or orientation. To decide whether any frame was culturally available, like Gamson, I found out if any organization or group sponsored a certain frame. Not all frames that were missing in the media were expected to be an opponent frame but might be a significant third party's frame, instead. For that purpose, I looked at official declarations, statements by all parties of a dispute, especially the Islamic media was a good source to show that a frame was culturally available. In some cases, the Islamic media was even more responsive to a variety of frames, rather than strictly supporting a certain frame. In a way this part of the study provides a numeric distribution of various frames in the media.

The next level of analysis involved more elaborate analysis of these framings. For example, the irtija frame was commonly used one by the secular groups. However, it

lacks coherence among its users. At the one end, it might suggest a peaceful separation of religion and politics or the suppression of any public role of religion at the other. The analysis of this frame across various institutions and over time provides a dynamic picture of framing and counterframing battles between the Islamic Welfare Party (RP) and the secular groups.

To analyze these framing processes, I followed framing perspective. This perspective provides a better conceptualization of different aspects of frames: namely, diagnostic, prognostic and collective action statements. Benford (1993a) elaborated these aspects of collective action frames. Diagnostic frames express the whats and whos of the problem. I elaborated on what and who is defined as a problem. For example, for the Islamic Welfare party, the lack of freedom and democracy and the existence of the ideologically motivated minority elite groups were seen as social problems. In some cases, they defined monopolistic bourgeoisie as a problem; in others the traditional state bureaucracy was seen as a problem.

For the opposition, too, the scope of the problem was very ambiguous. For the ultrasecular groups such as the military, the whole religious community was a problem. For more liberal secular groups, the religious political party or radical groups were a problem. In my analysis for each incident I determined the framers' ideas on what the problem is and who the culpable agents are. Next, I elaborated on the framers' ideas about the urgency of a solution about the specified problem. The solution, of course, is closely related to the framers' ideas about the nature and cause of the problem. For that purpose, the opinions about the efficacy and propriety of taking action were studied the same way.



The main framing developed by the secular groups to condemn the RP government were the frames of *irtija*, misuse of religious feelings, minority, puppets of external powers (that of Iran or the West). When coding, I took each frame as a part of any proposition that suggests the direction of each claim. Sometimes, these frames are not mutually exclusive and coexist in a single news or opinion column. In that case, I took both frames in the same account as separate frames. Any proposition in the media that suggest that the *irtija* is a serious problem in Turkey, or that *irtijaic* activities has seriously increased was coded as an *irtija* frame. Any proposition that suggests that the Islamic party feed on the misuse of people's religious feelings was coded as the misuse of religious feelings frame. The statement that the RP government is not a legitimate government because it depends on the minority support as opposed to the secular majority was coded as a minority frame.

The media's use of pejorative terms to describe the Islamic movement members and counts were quantitatively documented as word counts. For example, there is a vague pejorative term *irtija* used by only the secular elites. The term literally means backwardism but implies a strong anti-clerical orientation that does not tolerate any public role of religion. Its vagueness serves to condemn various types of religious activities and demands, depending on the context of the debates. The democratic journalists (e.g. Taha Akyol, Cengiz Candar and others) who opposed the interruption of democratic process by military pressure and the Islamic intellectuals refuse to use the term *irtija* to describe religious activities or groups. Similarly, students of Turkish politics do not use this term as a descriptive and analytic term. Many saw RP as loyal to the democratic system in Turkey (see Heper 1997; White 1997; Rouleau 1996). The scope of

the irtija term is expanded by the both media and the military elite in their struggle against the RP government. Especially after the breakdown of the RP government, the irtija term is used to put additional constraints on religious activities such as state-sponsored religious education and liberal religious communities. Therefore, the use of the irtija term was measured quantitatively to show the prevalence of the anti-clericalism in the media. The meanings attributed to the term were elaborated by looking at the texts more closely. In other words, both manifest and latent content analysis were used to explain the media framing about the RP and the Islamic movement.

Similarly, another common term used by secular groups and the media to describe RP's actions was *din istismari* (i.e., the misuse of popular religious feelings). That term was used to attack the character of the RP leaders and/or members, claiming that they immorally deceive people and implying that most people are ignorant and naïve to believe any propaganda. The elitist values of modernism and secularism are generally seen in the form of condemning all political leaders for compromising modernization by giving in to traditional values. Their argument intensifies against the RP as they are seen as compromising modernization and secularism by bringing a religious discourse to political arena. This labeling takes the name of populism against secular politicians and the name of *din istismari* (misuse of religious feelings) in the case of RP.

Another frame commonly used by the media and other secular groups was the minority frame that argues that the RP represents a minority in the country. It was used to condemn the RP that won the plurality of the votes (rather than the majority) in the elections. This frame carries a strong injustice and identity component. On the one hand, it emphasizes the unfairness of the twenty one percent's ruling the other seventy nine

percent. It positions the whole nation against the RP. In a sense, this frame did not leave any room for gray area, that is, the neutral ones, in the political arena. As a result, this frame suggested the destruction of the RP government as a natural result of democracy. In a democratic system, the majority is expected to overcome the minority effectively. Further, it was seen as a moral obligation to save the majority from the minority rule.

The frame of working with the enemy was another common one throughout the periods. It suggests that the RP members or other religious groups are backed, controlled and/or financed by foreign countries in order to create chaos in the country and weaken its global positioning. These foreign countries are mostly Iran, Saudi Arabia and some leading Western nations. This frame carries a strong moral component blaming the opposition with treason and wishing the misfortune of your own country, accepting unjustified donations and working for the enemy. This is an easy and effective framing used because of its effectiveness in silencing the opposition and it makes a great resonance with the traditional culture. That is, since the Ottoman Empire, the division of the country into many states left strong concerns about foreign intervention into local affairs and it is still a common concern among the population. It invalidates the legitimacy of any demands by social movements to change some of the current practices and policies.

## CHAPTER III: THE RP IN THE TURKISH MEDIA BEFORE THE COALITION GOVERNMENT

### *SECTION I: Pre-Election Period (December 11-24)*

#### **Historical Background:**

Falling behind the European industrial revolution and losing its military superiority in the region, the Ottoman modernization efforts aimed at the technological and organizational reforms. Since these reforms proved to be ineffective against the rapidly expanding European dominance in the world, the ideas of radical Westernization began to find stronger support among the elites. The new Turkish Republic was founded by Kemal Ataturk on the Western ideals of nationalism and secularism. This wholesale Westernization project was radical in its stance toward religion. It was in a sense a cultural revolution that changed the cultural codes of Turkish society. I will argue that, like many revolutions (Brinton 1957), the Turkish revolution failed to change the cultural codes of rural life that constituted the major part of Turkish society. Interestingly enough, the major economic modernization waves in the 1960s and 1980s coincided with the increases in the religious activity and in the public appearance of religion because more people moved from rural to urban areas to seek jobs. Moving in large numbers these ex-peasants and new proletariat had to deal with both material hardships and symbolic problems such as identity and solidarity. Religion seems to have played a major role in both providing meaning and identity for the urbanized segment of society and relieving

the material hardships through charity organizations, neighborhood networks, alternative schools and colleges, etc. The increasing religious sentiment came to conflict with a militantly secularist policies of the secular elites in the 1990s. The rise of the RP to power represented a critical turning point in the struggle where the increasing religious demands were repelled by the cooperation of various elite groups, such as the media and the military against the RP. The strategies and actions of those three actors were decisive for the outcome of the process.

Necmettin Erbakan, professor of mechanical engineering, founded a political party called National Order Party (MNP in Turkish) in 1970. This marked the first religion-based political party in Turkey's secular regime. Even though MNP did not publicly defend a sharia regime, it was banned for that reason in 1971. However, Erbakan founded another political party named National Salvation Party (MSP) in 1972 and entered the parliamentary elections of 1972, earning 51 seats in the parliament with a 12 percent popular vote and securing a share in several coalition governments afterwards. The military government took over following a coup in 1980, banning all political leaders and political parties. Erbakan founded Welfare Party (RP) by staying the leader behind the scenes due to the ban. His party could not pass the 10-percent national barrier to qualify for seats in the parliament until 1991. The RP managed to pass this hurdle by making an alliance with other minor parties and qualified for about 30 seats in the parliament.

***Framing and Counterframing:*** With the parliamentary elections approaching, the possibility of significant social change became more likely if the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi in Turkish, RP here on) won the election. Therefore, the parliamentary elections of December 24, 1995, marked increased framing efforts about the nature of the regime,

including main questions of religion and politics, secularism and democracy. To analyze the heightened framing efforts on these questions, I chose the elections of December 24 (the weeks of December 11-24 to be exact). The media and the RP were the main actors of these framing battles. It is clear that the media and other secular groups that opposed the prospect of the RP's coming to power can be seen as a countermovement since they intended to block a social change that the RP might push for. Many secular groups considered the RP and its program as a threat as its electoral victory became a probability. Jasper and Poulsen (1997) argued that

“[w]hen a critical mass of organizations feel threatened, they may organize a countermovement. Professional or trade associations, for example, can serve as countermovement organizations, giving aid to targeted individuals and institutions, coordinating their responses, providing resources, and sharing information about effective strategies. Countermovements thus help targeted institutions hide preexisting vulnerabilities and avoid blunders” (p. 399).

Similarly, the counteraction to RP was a consequence of perceived threats due to the possibility of its coming to power. As we will see later, in Turkey, the state elites actively joined the framing process in the late periods of study.

Few students of social movements considered the state (or regime) as a countermovement (Mottle 1980; Lo 1982). The interaction between social movements and the state countermovements is a complex one (Hoover and Kowalewski 1992). Therefore, mapping this complex interaction is not an easy task (Zald and Useem 1987). In explaining movement-countermovement relations, Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) make a useful distinction between the unitary and federal states that affect the movement-countermovement relations. While the state acts as a countermovement in the former, it allows them to compete in more or less neutral movement environment in the latter. Moreover, “media coverage encourages the emergence of a countermovement as the journalists seek out opposing interests in response to movement claims” (Meyer and

Staggenborg 1996:1645). Turkey better fits the former because of the centralized nature of politics and a weak democratic process. Even though the state's acting as a countermovement was visible even before RP came to power, this became more apparent during the RP government period. That was because RP could not use its power due to the resistance by other state institutions even though it constituted a major part of government.

Since the RP represented a social movement, the media's negative attitude against the RP can be easily seen within the context of a countermovement. I took the media as a countermovement as they aimed to directly challenge the Islamic movement and its main social movement organization, the RP. The findings throughout my research revealed that the mainstream media in Turkey showed a publicly vigilant opposition to the RP along with its resistance to any public manifestation of religion. The media showed a great anti-clerical approach to the ANAP government of the 1980s that can be easily described as "secular and conservative".

In analyzing the media framing, not all of the media showed the same degree of support or opposition in the news and opinion columns. Besides the apparent media opposition to RP, there is significant dichotomy of opposition between the news accounts and opinion columns. This is probably due to a difference in the structuring of each sector. As Finkel (2000) pointed out, the columnists are more independent of censorship than the news reporters. Some (e.g. Akman 2002a) even argued that there emerged a media aristocracy made up of the columnists in Turkey. In other words, the columnists are more independent but this does not necessarily mean that they are more democratic.

Even though they have a relatively higher editorial freedom, they also have interest in keeping the media's status quo, that is, its association with big business.

There are not sufficient checks and balances in the Turkish media because of its monopolistic character as well as its being part of the huge economic venture, rather than each newspaper or TV channel being an independent enterprise. The profitability in the media sector is compensated from other gains, using the media card against political elites. The media companies have a strong interest in the governmental support. For example, they are good at "acquiring cheap state land, indemnities on importing and inexpensive credits from state banks" (Finkel 2000). These companies also earn income from advertisements by the Press Announcement Department controlled by the government (Unsal 1994). Furthermore, these big businesses that own the media have interests in the privatization of the state-owned firms and other businesses such as energy and construction contracts.

The market has few sanctions against a dishonest press because of the lack of alternative (Finkel 2000). Although the press is successful in defending its freedom of expression, it does not do so when it comes to defending other's freedom of opinion, especially the religious perspective. There is a strong bias against the newly emerging Islamic movement and its expression in the social and public realm. As a religious-based organization, RP also received its share of media opposition. In addition to media's ideological interest, the increasing economic power of religious enterprises poses also a material challenge to the privileged big business that the mainstream media are associated with. This material aspect of the conflict between the media and RP increased as the RP came to power and the religious capital reached a significant power.



**Table 1: Media Attitude toward RP before the Elections (December 11-14, 1995)**

	NEWS		COLUMNS	
	#	%	#	%
<b>Anti-RP</b>	35	29	38	55
<b>Neutral</b>	72	61	24	35
<b>Pro-RP</b>	12	10	7	10
	119	100	69	100

### **General Media Attitude toward RP: Before the Elections:**

The election coverage of the RP by the mainstream media shows a significant discrepancy between news accounts and opinion columns. Very broadly, we can say that while the news coverage was relatively neutral to the RP with 61 percent, the columns showed an obvious dislike of the RP. Compared to the pro-RP frames, an anti-RP attitude was obvious in both columns and news accounts. As shown in the table 1, while neutral attitude was a common feature of news (61 percent), the anti-RP attitude dominated the opinion columns (55 percent). The dominance of an anti-RP attitude in the columns can be attributed to the ideological orientation of the columnists in the first period. Both general attitude toward and frame distribution shows a stronger opposition in the opinion columns, than in the news accounts. The coding of each newspaper account as pro-, anti-RP or neutral revealed that the news accounts try to pay attention to the principle of balance in the coverage of the RP and its opposition. Each text that is considered neutral may have a somewhat balanced attitude as it tried to give room for each side's views. However, the analysis of the distribution of specific frames shows that even the neutral texts contain more anti-RP frames than the pro-RP ones. This was true for both news accounts and opinion columns. This was especially significant for the news accounts that




Figure 1: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: News Accounts





Figure 2: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: Opinion Columns

were expected to provide objective news coverage. However, this is not anticipated from opinion columns as their purpose is to provide a perspective on events.

## **Framing and Counterframing Strategies**

The treatment of RP by the media seems to fit the movement-counter movement relations as RP sought a social change and the media assumed a voluntary oppositional role to prevent such as change. In this section, I focused on the counterframing strategies by the media against the RP and the latter's responses to the charges. Of course, when I talk about the mainstream media as a counterframer, this does not mean that the media perform all the framing activity. In fact, the editorials and opinion columns do this job but, at the same time, the media's selection of various frames among the possible frames also shows its role in claims-making. In my analysis I did not make a distinction between the frames directly supported by the media and the frames that received a positive coverage in the media. Following Snow and Benford (1988) in my analysis, I tried to identify what was defined as a problem (diagnostic frames) and who was blamed for responsibility for such a problem.

***Diagnostic Framing:*** Social movements define certain situations or groups as a social problem. Snow & Benford (1988) refer to these framing tasks as "diagnostic framing" that involves both identifying what the problem is and defining culpable agents responsible for such problems. Diagnostic framing that took place in the Turkish media before the 1995 elections covered a wide variety of situations and actors about the RP.

These problems ranged from RP demands to what might happen after RP wins the election and come to power. For example, the way of life supported by the RP was defined as a problem. RP's treatment of women and RP's view of secularism were similarly defined as problems.

The major framing activity that received a great deal of coverage in both the news and opinion columns was that the way of life RP advocated would harm the modern way of life that Turkey has acquired since the establishment of the Republic. The major framing process in this period is the amplification of modernity frame. It is based on the founding fathers' notion of modernity that was inspired by the Enlightenment belief that science and reason can help humanity to rule their destiny and bring happiness. As it was well explained by Gole (1992), the notion of modernity among the founding fathers was a major engine behind Ataturk's reforms to modernize Turkish society. They tried to remove all religious tendencies and practices from the public sphere in order to establish "the modern way of life" (Gole 1998, 2002). In another word, this process of frame amplification is based on the secular value that the modern way of life is desirable over religious way of life. The framing efforts aimed to show that modernity is ideal and that RP's threat to change it must be acted against. Snow and associates (1986) called this type of amplification as "value amplification". In that respect, RP's defending the freedom of headscarf in the universities was framed as an attempt to reverse the modern way of life. The importance of keeping the modern way of life and the symbolic status of women was amplified by the secular groups and was welcomed and defended in the mainstream press of Turkey. The broad nature of this frame was very instrumental in condemning various aspects of the changes that RP promulgated.

There were other anti-RP frames such as RP's anti-Western stance, its treatment of women, the prospect that RP government may harm the relations with the modern world. As to the modernity frame, a news account, for example, made this claim in a question form: "In this election people will decide whether to be modern, contemporary and a part of Europe or to adopt a way of life similar to the one in Iran" (Hurriyet 1995a). Another news story reported that Erbakan would reverse the gains of Ataturk's reforms (Milliyet 1995a). Another framing strategy was to claim that RP exploits people's religious feelings for political gain. This is also based on the secular value that exploiting people's religious beliefs and values are major sins in modern politics by implying that people are somewhat naïve and open to exploitation. For example, a news account reported that, according to university presidents, RP was exploiting headscarf issue... that headscarf is the symbol of being pro-Sharia (Milliyet 1995b). As for the RP leader, Erbakan's statement that when they come to power the university administrators will salute the students with headscarf, the university administrators reportedly said that the opponents of secularism and democracy damaged the prestige of universities (Milliyet 1995b).

Another major counterframing effort that appeared in the media was to portray RP as a threat to the secular regime and democracy through democratic or violent means. This was due to different views of democracy between RP and secular groups. Anti-clerical views of the establishment shared a great suspicion toward RP's religious-based view of democracy. For example, two different news accounts reported that an RP candidate said they would come to power through either vote or bloodshed (Sabah 1995a).

Another dimension of diagnostic framing involves attribution of responsibility (who and what causes the problem) (Snow and Benford 1988). Some showed widespread

economic difficulties as a reason why RP garners a large popular support (Hurriyet 1995c). Mr. Erbakan, the leader of the RP, was presented as the main target of accusations. He was blamed for exploiting people's economic difficulties (Sabah 1995b). Many columnists showed the economic difficulties as the main cause of RP's increasing popularity. For example, a renowned journalist wrote "RP is the target of searches for solutions by hopeless people that are fed up with the injustices and corruptions" (Sazak 1995a:14).

***Counter-Framing Strategies:*** Benford (1993) identified what he called vocabularies of motive. These are four main components of collective action frames: Severity of the problem, urgency of the solution, efficacy of taking action and propriety of taking action. While in the media there were framing strategies that focus on the other aspects of vocabularies of motive, the main strategy focused on the propriety of taking action. This strategy emphasizes the moral necessity of taking action (Benford 1993a) rather than the efficacy of taking action. This tactic was commonly used by the media and other secular groups against the fact that the RP's electoral victory seemed inevitable, implying that it is a moral duty of resisting to RP. For example, the leader of a secular motherland party, Mesut Yilmaz, said, "Don't permit the RP leader [Erbakan]. He defends his dark system called 'just order' and is waiting around the corner" (Sabah 1995b:22).

Since both the secular media and RP operate on different cultural premises, the counterframing strategies seemed to focus on invalidating the other's claims by attacking on the other's character rather than challenging the credibility of the other's claims. The most common counterframing strategy seen in the media was what Ibarra and Kitsuse (1993) called hysteria, implying the irrational or emotional nature of the opponents. This

strategy implies that the opponent is not a rational claims-maker and, therefore, what they claim does not constitute a valid demand. For example, Ms. Chiller, the leader of centrist DYP, claimed that “in the country, there are people that want to cancel the customs union [with Europe] and that want to take the country backward” (Sabah 1995c:19). Mr. Ecevit, the leader of the Democratic Left Party, condemned the RP as a discriminationist: “There are some people that provoke a discrimination between the Alevi and Sunni sects... RP is trying to take back the women’s rights that Ataturk gave them years ago” (Sabah 1995d:17). RP’s anti-Western stance was criticized in the media as an irrational attitude without discussing the benefits and damages of such an attitude. The newspaper Sabah cited the Washington Post description of RP as anti-Western (Sabah 1995e). Similar framing tactics defined the RP as radical, intolerant and anti-regime. For example, Hurriyet claimed that the RP was radicalizing (Hurriyet 1995d). Another news account was labeling RP leader as ‘irreconcilable’: “Mr. Erbakan is against any reconciliation” (Hurriyet 1995e:22).

The columns were even clearer about condemning RP as an irrational movement. For example, Hasan Cemal claimed that “RP’s program called ‘just order’ is an absurdity from start to end and populist, statist and totalitarian system” (Cemal 1995:19). Many columnists alarmed about the harm RP’s victory will give to foreign policy. For example, one said “RP’s foreign policy rhetoric is ideological and intolerant” (Kohen 1995a:16). Another one warned “RP’s winning the election will damage Turkey’s image. Can a country with an Iran-like image attract as many tourists?” (Ozkok 1995a:27). The same columnist and editor claimed that “the Western media consider this election as a critical

choice, a critical test of the Turkish model that is modern, secular and Muslim” (Ozkok 1995b:27).

Many other columns coded as ‘anti-RP’ claimed that RP was against the secular regime. These framing tactics tried to marginalize the RP from mainstream politics by emphasizing that RP seeks a regime change. In the following excerpt from a news account (Hurriyet 1995d). editorial opinion is mixed with news coverage:

RP first implied a mood change by saying in its election statements that it would not intervene with the monetary system, it would maintain its economic ties with Europe, and would lower the customs. However, this atmosphere change in RP left its place to its old fierce and scary look. Erbakan... started to cite the verses from Koran, saying that dealing with usury is to fight against Allah... Erbakan defined the agreement with the European customs union as a scrap paper and he said he would tear off that scrap paper (p.25).

Another counterframing strategy of attacking the character of the opponents is what I called dishonesty. I see this strategy as different from other strategies such as insincerity (hidden agenda) stated by both Benford and Hunt (2001) and Iberra and Kitsuse (1993) and hysteria labeled by the Iberra and Kitsuse (1993) implying the irrational and/or emotional nature of the opponent. Dishonesty, instead, considers the opponent as a rational actor with a moral flaw as the opponent is condemned for deceiving ignorant and naïve majority. The main example of this strategy is the blame of exploiting people’s religious feelings and beliefs, implying that people are somewhat ignorant, naïve or innocent to be deceived by immoral groups.

The RP is blamed for exploiting religion for political gain (e.g. exploiting religious issues such as headscarf issue along with others). This strategy is based on the anti-clerical bias among secular elite groups, opposing any public appearance of religion. This approach considers religion only as a feeling and/or belief, ignoring (and even rejecting) its public manifestations (see Gole 2002; Yavuz 1997; Heper and Toktas 2003). For example, a news account reported that, according to university presidents, RP was



exploiting the headscarf issue... claiming that headscarf is the symbol of being pro-Sharia (Milliyet 1995b). The leader of the centrist Motherland party, Mesut Yilmaz, claimed that RP divided people “Muslims voting for it vs. disbelievers voting for others” (Hurriyet 1995f:25). Similar claims were abundant in the press, accusing RP of exploiting religion.<sup>2</sup> This strategy of condemning the RP for exploiting religious feelings was common among the opinion columns. One of the starkest of such charges came from Mengi of Sabah who wanted to reject the RP’s claims said “No God fearing person can say that there is no freedom of religion and conscience in Turkey... Islam does not fit only one party and you cannot call an institution a political party that wants to come to power through bloodshed if not through vote. The RP is using Islam as a tool of blackmail” (1995:3).

Another framing strategy was the charge of insincerity, claiming that the opponent has a hidden agenda. Claiming that it became obvious that the RP is a party of *takiyye* (dissimulation or hidden-agenda), the leader of the Democratic Left Party, Mr. Ecevit said “what his party says does not coincide with what Erbakan says” (Milliyet 1995b:24). Somewhere else, it was stated that “DSP has not left the arena for the backward-minded ones that try to destroy the Republic under the masque of ‘just order’, they want to drive the country into the darkness of the middle ages and try to exclude women from politics...” (Sabah 1995g:21). The same strategy of ‘insincerity’ was obvious in many opinion columns. The chief-columnist of Hurriyet, Oktay Eksi, was very direct in his opposition to RP:

Have you ever heard that the liar Necmi [Erbakan] saying that we will leave [power] by elections like we come to power with elections as he already announced himself as the victor of the incoming elections. Do you remember that you heard any promise on this matter by the party leader or its responsible posts, not by the fourth class party member? (Eksi 1995a:25).

## **Reframing Strategies:**

As Benford and Hunt (2001) explained, the social movements may adopt various reframing strategies as a response to the charges from the countermovements. These include ignoring, keying, embracing, distancing and counter-maligning. Among these, the most common strategy adopted by RP was that of distancing. Against the charges of RP's radicalization in the latter days, Erbakan said that "RP is a party of mercy, its method is a sweet talk, convincing and service" (Hurriyet 1995i:26). Against the claims that RP will seek revenge from the secular groups, the RP said that it would not seek the revenge of the earlier periods (Sazak 1996b). Against the claims that the military is against the RP, it claimed that the military will be the most pleased with the RP's electoral victory (Milliyet 1995e; Bila 1995a).

Keying is another reframing strategy that tries to redefine certain terms that were negatively attributed to them (Benford and Hunt 2001). Against the criticism against the RP's failure to nominate female candidates, Erbakan said "RP women are not offended by not being candidates because they work for Turkey, not for male domination" (Sabah 1995h:14). Against the charges that RP will reverse the modernization project of the founding fathers, RP claimed that "those who fought for the independence and established the Republic think like the RP" (Bila 1995a:14).

Another reframing strategy frequently used by RP was that of counter-maligning, that is, the attack on the character of the opponents. For example, Erbakan harshly criticized a secular party's leader, Ms. Ciller, by saying that "They are used to imitating so much that they even started to imitate us... Ms. Ciller is not the people of the Republic but the trash of the Republic" (Cekirge 1995:20). Against the opponents charges that RP will eliminate

the people of Ataturk, RP said Ms. Chiller and people like her are the trash of the Republic... We are the real people of the Republic” (Sabah 1995i:27).

## ***Section II: After The Elections***

In the 1996 parliamentary elections, the RP won the plurality of votes with 21 percent. This electoral victory created a mixed feeling in the media and among the secular elites. On the one hand, this was seen as a materialization of a threat to secular regime from a religious party. On the other hand, RP’s support represented only one-fifth of the population and, therefore, that was not seen a major problem. I analyzed the media’s coverage of RP’s electoral victory for the week following the elections (December 25 to 31, 1995). The media attitude toward the RP in this period can be summarized as a general distaste toward it. When I analyzed each text’s attitude toward RP (media bias), the news coverage revealed an interesting result. There seemed to be a split between the partiality and neutrality toward the RP. Almost half of the news adopted a neutral (or balanced) approach toward the RP with 54 percent. Furthermore, the remaining news accounts were also more or less evenly split between and anti-RP attitude (21 percent) and pro-RP one (25 percent). This divided attitude was unique to this event, i.e., RP’s electoral victory following the general elections. The author attributes this result to a well-expected victory by the RP and the beginning of a new period where the media want to see the RP as a legitimate political actor. However, this is only true for the news coverage.

**Table 2: Results for the Parliamentary Elections in December, 1995**


	Political Parties	Election Percentage	Deputies #	Deputies %
1	<b>RP</b>	21.38	158	28
2	<b>ANAP</b>	19.65	132	24
3	<b>DYP</b>	19.18	135	25
4	<b>DSP</b>	14.64	76	14
5	<b>CHP</b>	10.71	49	9
<b>Total</b>		<b>85.56</b>	<b>550</b>	<b>100</b>

**Table 3: Media Attitude toward RP after the Elections (December 25-31, 1995)**


	NEWS		COLUMNS	
	#	%	#	%
<b>Anti-RP</b>	26	21	54	44
<b>Neutral</b>	68	55	44	35
<b>Pro-RP</b>	30	24	26	21
<b>Total</b>	124	100	124	100

An anti-RP attitude was more obvious among the columnists as their purpose to make sense of the results for the public. As the Table 2 shows, almost one-third of the opinion columns were found to be neutral (35 percent). However, the remaining opinion columns were dominated by an anti-RP attitude (44 percent), as opposed to pro-RP ones (21 percent). The fact that anti-RP attitude was twice more than the pro-RP ones clearly shows a media bias toward the RP and its coming to power.

**General Media Attitude toward RP:** I analyzed the media attitude in the week (December 8-15, 1995) prior to establishing the coalition of the Refah-Yol (i.e., abbreviation of Refah Partisi and Dogru Yol Partisi). What was interesting about this period was that a pro-RP attitude in the news accounts was more dominant than the anti-RP ones for the first time (24 percent). The pro-RP attitude constituted about one-fifth of



**Figure 3: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: News Accounts**



**Figure 4: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: Opinion Columns**

the total news accounts (21 percent). In fact, neutral coverage was the major trend in the news coverage, constituting 55 percent of total news. However, this neutral attitude was still a major one in the opinion columns but with a lesser degree (35 percent).

The main contrast between the pro- and anti-RP attitudes was reversed and was more polarized in the opinion columns. The anti-RP attitude was about two times more (44 percent) in the opinion columns than in the news accounts (21 percent) of this period (see Table 3). Parallel to the news account, the anti-RP attitude was less common in the columns, as well. This negative attitude in this period (44 percent) was relatively lower than the previous period (55 percent). The neutral opinion columns (35 percent) were less than the anti-RP attitude (44 percent). The pro-RP attitude remained relatively low, constituting 21 percent of the columns higher than the previous period (10 percent), implying that among the columnists there was very little sympathy toward RP.

## **Framing and Counterframing:**

The RP's electoral victory caused a cautious opposition in the media. Most of the framing activity tried to discard RP as a legitimate claims-maker. One of main framing strategies was to position RP against the rest of the political parties. Its 21 percent electoral support was interpreted in a way that the rest of society showed a clear opposition to RP. In other words, the whole population was framed as RP vs. the rest. The former was interpreted as a threat to the secular regime and latter as the supporters of the secular regime. This was in a way a simplification by the media as the RP found a political void due to the struggle between the secular parties. Two explanations can be given why it was a simplification. First, the election was not solely based on a secular-vs.-religious conflict. Second, RP was not the only party with a religious agenda. Both centrist parties such as ANAP and DYP attracted certain religious groups and some small nationalist parties such as the BBP (Grand Unity Party) followed a religious agenda and made an election alliance with ANAP.

The most significant theme in both the news accounts and opinion columns was that RP were entitled to be allowed to form a coalition government. This did not necessarily mean that they supported the RP government but tolerated that prospect as a result of democratic process. There were two main ideas behind their tolerance for an RP coalition government. One is the idea that the failure to allow RP government contradicts with the nature of democratic system. Two, if the RP government is not allowed it would cause more popular support for it and, in turn, would make it a bigger threat.

In the media's approach to the RP and its electoral victory, two main framing processes were commonly at work, that is, belief amplification of democracy and of

secularism. Their relationship showed some parallel and contradiction at the same time. Frame amplification can be defined as “clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem or set of events” (Snow *et al* 1986:239). In other words, it involves highlighting certain issues such as values and beliefs. The amplification of democracy and secularism fits well to what Snow and his associates (1986) call value amplification because most of the arguments based on the desirability of secularism and democracy for Turkish society. Value amplification is defined as “the identification, idealization, and elevation of one or more values presumed basic to prospective constituents but which have not inspired collective action for any number of reasons” (Snow *et al* 1986:240). The framing strategies to incorporate the RP into institutional politics as well as to exclude from it are based on the amplification of a certain value about political process. The idealization or amplification of secularism generally led the counterframers to oppose the RP’s coming to power as it was seen as a threat to secular regime. Another value amplification, that is, the amplification of democracy, had a totally different implication for the incorporation of RP into conventional politics. Both of these framing strategies emphasized the desirability and necessity of both secular and democratic regime in Turkey.

Similarly, another framing process was at work about the incorporation of RP into Turkish politics, Snow *et al* (1986) called this framing process as belief amplification, beliefs can be defined as a perceived relationships “between two things or between some thing and a characteristic of it” (Bem 1970:4 cited in Snow *et al* 1986). Belief amplification can be seen as an idealization or highlighting of certain beliefs as to certain things and issues. The amplification of secularism mainly meant a negative stance against

the RP, manifesting itself in the amplification of two main beliefs about the consequence of RP victory. One was that RP is a threat to secular regime. Two, as a result, RP must not come to power. Even though it was easy to analyze the first belief in the media, the second one presented various forms, ranging from a total rejection of RP as a legitimate political actor to allowing it to change and incorporate into political process.

The framing activity in the post-election period focused on whether or not RP must be allowed to form a coalition government. When put this way, the simple conclusion was that those who thought that RP must be allowed to form a government were more numerous than those who opposed it. In the news accounts about 29 percent thought that RP must be allowed to form a coalition government and 12 percent thought that RP must take a part in the government. The result was similar in the opinion columns with 34 percent accepting RP government as opposed to 11 percent opposing that possibility. However, the issue gets more complicated when looked at more closely because not all of those who tolerate an RP government actually support RP government as a good thing. Many of these frames have a negative condition and reservations toward the RP government. For example, some thought that, if not allowed, RP would become a bigger force in the next election (three percent in both the news and opinion columns). Or, some thought that the president must authorize the RP leader to form a government as a result of democratic tradition but RP would not be able to find a coalition partner from among secular parties (three percent in the news and three percent in the columns).

The claim that RP represented a minority was another counterframing theme in the media covering the election results and the RP's prospect of coming to power. The minority frame was used with three different implications. One was that the 80 percent of



the electorate that voted for other parties were in fact against the RP. On this frame, there were citations from the press as well as opinions from the national political figures. For example, the daily *Hurriyet* cited the French press's view that "there is no danger of Iranification [becoming like Iranian regime] or Algerianization in Turkey as 80 percent of the population voted pro-secularism (*Hurriyet* 1995h:23). Another daily, *Milliyet*, cited the British press: "[In the election], a negative result did not happen that may challenge the secular regime (*Milliyet* 1995c).<sup>3</sup> Two, RP is not legitimately entitled to rule the majority. Three, the RP's coming to power does not constitute a problem because it represents only a fraction of Turkish society. The minority frame was visible in the news accounts (four percent) but it was the most frequent frame in the opinion columns (21 percent).

Along with the minority frame, a similar but less frequent attitude was the underplaying of the RP's electoral success. This constituted three percent of the frames in the opinion columns. For example, a columnist said, "Even though RP is screaming with a joy of victory, its momentum came to a stop" (*Cavli* 1995:14). Another one claimed, "Perhaps one of the most significant results of this election was that Turkey would not be like Algeria or Iran. The fact that RP obtained a vote a little over 20 percent was a concrete sign for people's reluctance to see the solution in religious-based parties" (*Dogru* 1995b:7).

That the RP is a threat to secular regime was another counterframing strategy that appeared in the media. It implies that RP seeks a sharia-based regime and, therefore, must be prevented before it has a chance to come to power. Even though RP has never claimed that it seeks a sharia regime as in Iran, this framing strategy condemns RP for that reason.

The ideology of anti-clericalism was embedded in the founding of the Republic and was amplified by the secular groups and the media as they see any public manifestation of religion as a threat to secular regime (Yavuz 1997). This framing strategy received a bigger support among the columnists than the news accounts (seven percent vs. 11 percent respectively). A less common frame that appeared only in the news accounts (three percent) was also related to the anti-regime debate. It suggested that RP maintains a hidden agenda that aims at a regime change by insincerely using the democratic system. A columnist did not find sincere Erbakan's conciliatory attitude after the election: "There are doubts about Erbakan's conciliatory attitude after the election. Some will see this as a tactic unless RP won't change its main strategy" (Kohen 1995b:16).

The next media framing that the RP must not come to power is related to the previous ones. Those who were opposed to the RP's coming to power were solely seeing it as a threat to the secular regime. Only 11 percent of the news accounts and opinion columns each provided room for the claim that RP must not come to power. A columnist said, "Demirel [the president] must authorize Erbakan to form the government and Erbakan must be tested" (Tamer 1995a:6). The other columnist suspects the sincerity of Erbakan but supports his founding the government: "Erbakan made a U-turn by forgetting what he said before the election. He made the distinction of 'us vs. them'. However, he must be given the duty to form the government. Nobody including TUSIAD [Businessmen's Association] can ignore six million people that voted for them" (Dogru 1995a:7).

On the other camp, there was the media framing sympathetic to RP and its founding a government. About two-thirds of the news accounts (30 percent) did not oppose RP.

This was represented in various claims (1) that the RP can be considered successful in the elections, (2) that RP must be allowed to form a coalition government and otherwise it will increase its popular support and (3) that it is a political party within the system.

Those who claimed that RP was successful constitute four percent of the news and eight percent of the columns. Like many others, a columnist said, “RP’s election results are not something to underplay” (Donat 1995a:13).<sup>4</sup> Those who claimed that the RP leader must be allowed to form a coalition government constitute a significant majority of the frames (29 percent of the news and 34 percent of the columns). However, what I call a ‘democratic frame’ is not all supportive of RP’s coming to power. Only 20 percent of the news accounts argued that RP must form a government due to the reluctance of other secular parties to form a government with the RP (12 percent of the news). About 17 percent of the columns share the same frame. For example, a columnist, Emin Colasan, expressed his concern: “To whom will the government and the head of the parliament be given? By convention, RP must take the duty. However, I wonder if the head of the parliament that was founded by Ataturk will be given to a coalition government that acts like the enemy of Ataturk” (Colasan 1995a:5). Another columnist explained this dilemma very clearly: “RP’s coming to power and staying away from it both create a problem. If excluded from government, its discourse might get more radical and, therefore, might open to a wider constituency. In turn, [social] polarization might become more severe” (Uluengin 1995:16).

A counterframing strategy of distancing the RP government from the modern world manifested itself in various forms. First, RP government will damage Turkey’s foreign relations (five percent of the news). There were numerous citations from foreign press

about the risks that RP governments represented Turkey's foreign relations. Second, RP will turn the country into Iran and/or Algeria (five percent of the news and two percent of the columns).<sup>5</sup> A columnist defined this problem as follows: "If RP does not come to power, it will be stronger in the future. If it comes to power, it will turn the country into Iran without notice. In opposition Erbakan turns our country into Algeria, he can do anything in power" (Eksi 1995b).<sup>6</sup>

### ***Section III: ERBAKAN'S NOMINATION FOR PRIME MINISTER (JUNE 8-15, 1996)***

In the elections of December 1995, RP won the plurality of votes with 21 percent in a very fragmented political arena in Turkey (see Table 2 above). There were various factors contributing to the RP's electoral victory. Due to a rapid modernization and rural-to-urban migrations, the RP's ability to use "a language of disadvantage" (Bugra 2002) played a significant role in attracting the working class to the party. With this result RP secured only 158 seats in a 550-member parliament of Turkey. Since the RP seats in the parliament would not secure the majority for a government, it had to look for a coalition partner from among other parties. However, the secular center right parties that held number two and three seats refused to partner with RP for a coalition government. As a result, two secular center right parties (i.e., DYP and ANAP) founded a coalition government called ANA-YOL by creating a majority coalition over RP. However, this government could only last six months due to personal rivalries between the leaders of coalition partners.<sup>7</sup> After the breakup of government, the only possible coalition formula

had to include RP due to numerical setup of the parliament. The RP managed to reach a coalition agreement with the DYP.

This week of June 8-15 under study was the period where Mr. Erbakan was authorized by the President to found a government for the second time. I compared the media attitude toward RP and framing in this period as opposed to the previous one. The first period followed the general parliamentary elections of December 1995 where RP failed to find a coalition partner. The second nomination came after the collapse of the coalition government between two secular parties.

The second nomination of Erbakan resulted in a renewed framing of RP-related issues in the media. At this level of analysis, the media attitude was coded according to the general attitude of each text of news accounts or opinion columns. When a text supported an RP agenda or allowed only RP to speak by excluding contrary opinions it was coded 'pro-RP'. When a news account and opinion column support or allow the RP's opponents to speak on an issue related to RP's agenda, it was coded 'anti-RP'. When it did not involve any support of each side of debate or it allowed both sides to speak, it was coded 'neutral', meaning a balanced coverage. As long as it provided room for both sides, I did not consider the weight of each side in coding it 'neutral' without disregarding the possibility that one side might be given more room and emphasis in a neutral account.

There was a major change in the media attitudes to RP between the first nomination of Erbakan and the second nomination. This difference was the softening of anti-RP attitude in both news accounts and opinion columns (see Figures 1 and 2). The Table 4 shows the general media attitude toward RP. This was the period only where a

**Table 4: Media Attitude toward RP prior to the Coalition (June 8-15, 1996)**

	NEWS		COLUMNS	
	#	%	#	%
<b>Anti-RP</b>	24	21	35	40
<b>Neutral</b>	59	50	37	42
<b>Pro-RP</b>	34	29	16	18
<b>Total</b>	117	100	88	100

sympathetic media attitude was more common than the anti-RP attitude in the news accounts (29 percent vs. 21 percent). A three-fold increase in the pro-RP attitude is especially important as it rose from 10 percent in the previous period to 29 percent. That was probably due to the exhaustion of other options to keep the RP outside the government and the futility of forcing secular parties to position against RP. The neutral attitude was still dominant with exactly a half of the total news accounts.

Even the anti-RP attitude among opinion columns lost its strength since the first time while still being a major one. While the anti-RP attitude was 55 percent in the first nomination, it declined to 40 percent in this period. Similarly, the pro-RP attitude in columns almost doubled from the first time (from 10 percent to 18 percent). The dominant anti-RP attitude in the previous period lost its power to both pro-RP ones and to neutral ones. Here I noticed a similar weight of anti-RP and neutral attitudes.

### **Framing and Counterframing:**

After I analyzed the general media attitude, next I analyzed the specific framings about the RP agenda. Here, I analyzed mainly the opposing and supporting framing about the RP agenda. This involved the framing efforts to define RP as a social problem and RP




Figure 5: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: News Accounts




Figure 6: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: Opinion Columns

Table 5: Anti-RP Framing (June 15 –21, 1996)

Frames	News		Columns	
	Occurrences	Percentage	Occurrences	Percentage
Refah-Yol is an escape from corruption charges	2	11	17	33
Refah-Yol must not be established	4	23	7	13
RP is anti-secular	5	29	6	12
RP is dishonest			6	12
Foreign Public is negative to Refah-Yol Government			5	10
Reminding old bad words by RP and DYP about each other	2	11	3	6
RP has a hidden agenda	2	11	2	4
Negative economic program	1	5	2	4
RP is a minority	1	5	1	1
RP is anti-Western	1	5	1	1
RP is anti-modern			2	4
<b>Total</b>	18	100	52	100

and the responses to these charges from RP camp (that includes RP followers and a small groups of supporters in the media. There were some democratic journalists' frames were also considered as pro-RP. Even though they did not support the RP's religious oriented agenda but defended it as a legitimate political actor and legitimate government.

Therefore, they opposed any military intervention in political process. The only exception

was the frame that opposed both the RP government and military intervention and this frame is coded 'neutral'.

Media's negative attitude against the RP seems to have softened in this period compared to the first nomination of RP leader. The ratio of positive to negative frames toward RP was 47 to 217. However, this ratio dropped to 39 to 70 (see Table 5). In other words, the anti-RP frames were four times more common than pro-RP ones in the first nomination following the parliamentary elections while this dropped to less than two times in the second nominations six months later. Before analyzing the framing of individual issues it might be useful to consider a particular framing that disappeared since the last time, i.e., the first nomination of Erbakan. First, one major anti-RP frame focused on the danger that that RP will occupy the state posts. However, in the later period media framing quoted this belief amplification and the media they seem to be less concerned on the part of Turkish press. Second, in this period there was no mentioning of the claim that civil society is against the RP government. Third, the press does not seem to claim that RP government might have a negative impact on the economy and foreign relations. Fourth, there was no mentioning of pejorative claims such that RP will take the country into darkness. Most of the media framing against RP aimed to prove the impropriety of the RP's coming to power. Some showed more specific reasons for it but others were content with more general explanations. Preventing the RP from coming to power was the second most common anti-RP framing strategy in both news accounts (23 percent) and opinion columns (13 percent). A columnist thought that it would be better for Turkey to keep RP in the opposition (Cemal 1996a; Heper 1996a). Another one went a step



further and even criticized the press and business sector for not showing enough resistance to RP (Oktay 1996a).

*Moral Charges:* Before the elections, it was a major question whether or not RP will adjust to democratic system. Many journalists thought that RP government might pose a threat to the regime. On the other hand, the problems that the leader of DYP was facing were not ideological questions but moral ones. That is, there was some corruption accusations that Mrs. Ciller caused harm to the state property. The major counterframing effort was to show that Refah-Yol government was based on an immoral partnership between an Islamic Party (RP) with a hidden agenda and a secular party, i.e., DYP, that is caught up with corruption charges. Some columnists were more direct in naming dishonesty as a character of RP (Coskun 1996b). The charge of escaping from corruption charges was the most common frame among the opinion columns and the second most common anti-RP frame in the news accounts. Mengi (1996a) of daily Sabah viewed it as the engine of Refah-Yol government: “Erbakan wants to disprove the idea that they cannot come to power even if they win the election; Ciller is keen on the idea of Refah-Yol government due to her fear of Constitutional Court” (p.3). Many other columnists shared the same view that Ciller’s main concern was to save her political career by avoiding a parliamentary resolution for her trial in the constitutional court (see Candar 1996a; Sazak 1996a; Dogan 1996a).

Another framing effort that questioned the moral basis of Refah-Yol government was reminding the coalition partners’ previous negative words about each other. Both news accounts and columns reminded the readers those negative words (see Hurriyet 1996a). One columnist noted, “Erbakan wants to share power with the center right parties that he

called ‘imitators of the West’” (Coskun 1996a:3). Similarly, some opinion columns were more direct in mentioning both RP and DYP as dishonest political actors: “How can you believe Erbakan, who can lie while looking at people’s eyes” (Atakli 1996a:6).<sup>8</sup>

The charge of hidden-agenda was also a form of attack on RP’s moral character. Both news accounts and columns demonstrated room for this framing strategy, constituting 11 percent of frames in the news accounts and four percent in the opinion columns. For example, a columnist finds it unbelievable that Erbakan would change: “None of the principles that Erbakan used to defend just a couple of weeks ago does not occur in the coalition protocol and program... Is it possible to change in such a short period of time?” (Neftci 1996a:7). Many columnists showed similar suspicions about Erbakan’s mentioning of secularism and Kemalism (Dogan 1996b, Tan 1996a; Mengi 1996b). Similar frames by the secular groups were also cited in the news accounts (e.g. Hurriyet 1996b).

A major framing effort was to show RP as a fraction of society, the rest of society is positioned against it, opposing RP’s coming to power. For this reason, the minority frame can be seen as a part of the moral charge against RP as its coming to power with a 21 percent vote is framed as unfair and unjust. For example, a columnist opposed to the idea of RP’s coming to power because its vote represents only 21 percent of the population (Atakli 1996b). Another one (Alpay 1996a) expressed the same view, based on two reasons: “suspicion about RP’s commitment to democracy and RP’s lack of competence in governing the country” (p.18).

One of the major anti-RP frames in the media was that RP was a threat to secular regime. This framing strategy was the most common one among the news accounts (29

percent) and third most common one in opinion columns (12 percent). The leader of Democratic Left Party, Mr. Ecevit, was quoted by the media saying: “Even though the DYP-RP coalition seems possible numerically, it is politically difficult and dangerous to the secular democratic regime” (Hurriyet 1996b:24). The same views of threat to the secular regime were also obvious in the opinion columns (12 percent). One claimed that the dangers of RP government would be even greater “If this party of religion (*din partisi*) comes to power by itself or by a comfortable majority, it will end secular government, will try to bring a sharia regime and to force an Islamic education” (Halman 1996a:23). One columnist blamed both partners of the coalition for helping each other’s morally questionable causes: “The enemies of the Republic are coming to power and, at the same time, the rule of lying and tricking maintains its power. What a misfortune is that the votes of Ataturk’s followers benefit RP and the votes of innocent believers serve to lying and tricking” (Coskun 1996b:3).

The claims that RP has an anti-modern and anti-Western agenda have a moral tone according to the secular basis of the regime. RP was criticized for being anti-modern: “Among our concerns about RP are its opposition to rational thought and its distortion of realities” (Halman 1996a:23). One reminded Erbakan’s old attitude as hampering his success that Erbakan is against the West and modernization: “Erbakan presented ‘Turkey’s efforts to integrate with the world’ as imitation and being pro-Western clubism” (Barlas 1996a:15).

### **Pro-RP Framing in the Media:**

Pro-RP framing efforts consist of two groups of framing activity: (1) RP's own framing efforts to divert the charges from secular groups, especially the media members and (2) the sympathetic coverage in the media. Both of these framing activities are taken from the media coverage of the RP. The major framing efforts by the RP aimed to counter numerous charges against it (see Table 6). The main concern was to show that RP was ready to reconcile with other political parties and was loyal to the rules of the political system in Turkey. In that respect, it responded to the charge of antisecularism by incorporating secularism as one of its own. For example, in Erbakan's meeting with a secular party leader, Ecevit, that expressed his concern about secularism during RP government, Mr. Erbakan said: "RP is the real guardian of the Republic, democracy and secularism" (Hurriyet 1996c:24). In a similar event, Erbakan is reported to say that they do not have a plan to be like Iran as a response to another secular party leader, Mr. Baykal, who said that Turkey should not be like Iran, in his meeting with Erbakan (Milliyet 1996a). In an interview, Erbakan said he supports secularism as in England and Switzerland, claiming they are the only real secular party (Mengi 1996b). Some columnists did not see RP as a threat to secular regime. One blamed the crisis of government as a threat to the regime rather than RP itself, arguing that state institutions such as Supreme Court would not allow RP to change the regime (Akyol 1996a). One cited a French daily *Le Soir's* opinion that RP cannot make Turkey like Iran or Algeria (Mengi 1996b).

Table 6: Pro-RP Framing (June 15 –21, 1996)

Frames	News		Columns	
	Occurrences	Percentage	Occurrences	Percentage
Positive economic program	3	14	3	18
RP is part of the system	4	18		
RP Will Not Harm Foreign Relations			2	12
Positive to Refah-Yol	15	68	12	70
Total	22	100	17	100

Another pro-RP framing appeared in the media was that RP was a part of the system and regime, implying that it is a legal party and, therefore, must be treated as a normal, legitimate political actor. For example, a senior leader in DYP that opposed to RP government reportedly said, “I found it meaningless to discuss whether or not RP is a part of the system. RP is the most natural part of the democratic body” (Milliyet 1996b; for similar views see Hurriyet 1996d; Hurriyet 1996e; Barlas 1996b; Tacitly 1996a). Another columnist left the burden of proof on RP: “Now is the time for RP to clearly show that it is a part of democratic system and secular Turkey” (Civaoglu 1996a:19). Tamer (1996a) of Sabah was more direct in his support for RP’s government: “In a context where the weakest party is preparing for government, no one can see it as a favor to let the number one party to form a government... Everybody has to accept this nomination for government” (p.30). One columnist (Dogru 1996a) criticized both media and the state institutions for not accepting RP as legitimate actor of Turkish society:

Big press does not see RP a reality... it sees it as minor party. It was against its being part of the government... Dominant powers in Turkey do not accept the reality of RP. However, RP is a reality. Any maneuver that tries to keep this reality from power will strengthen RP even further (p.9).

Some public opinion leaders, including both media members and others, supported a somewhat cautious framing effort that aimed to incorporate RP and allow it to come to

power claimed that RP would become stronger if it was prevented from sharing power at this time (see Akyol 1996b; Karsli 1996a). Following the elections, as main representative of the big bourgeoisie in Turkey, the Turkish Association of Industrialist Businessmen (TUSIAD) posted advertisements in the media inviting the two secular center rights to cooperate against RP (Ozel 1997). Unlike the first nomination, the bourgeoisie is said to be more tolerant RP government. Trade unions also shared this view (Sabah 1996a). For example, one of the big businessman (Ishak Alaton) said, “we must try and experience an RP government. Perhaps it would not lead to a disaster and would come out better” (Milliyet 1996c:11). Even a anonymous military officer is quoted saying: “They must come to power this time because their vote is continuously increasing. Otherwise, their vote would boom in the next elections” (Milliyet 1996p:15). Even the military was less oppositional to an RP government , there was no official military statement that opposed the RP government. Moreover, in the previous period, the association of big business (TUSIAD) supported the exclusion of RP from government by calling for other secular parties to cooperate against RP. However, the TUSIAD seemed to remain silent about the prospect of RP’s coming to power.

*Democracy Frame:* Both RP and its sympathetic audience regarded the party as a part of democratic system which, therefore, must be allowed to come to power. They opposed the idea that the military might prevent RP from coming to power. The RP leader said, “We are not against pluralistic democracy. In fact, we are the real defenders of democracy” (Mengi 1996b:3). Vice chairman of RP committee, Abdullatif Sener, said the former chief of staff, Dogan Gures, is not against a government with RP (Hurriyet 1996f). The RP leader, Erbakan, himself expressed a similar view that the military is the

main part of society just like the majority of society supports RP (Milliyet 1996d). One columnist criticized some people's hopes that military should intervene against RP and said: "Those who see military intervention as a solution to this political impasse will damage the future of their children and grandchildren" (Tamer 1996a:8). One criticized a foreign rating company (American Risk Services) and its coverage in the media that claimed that military might prevent RP from government: "How can you be a democrat if you do not mind the word of military coup" (Altan 1996a:18).

Against the charges of anti-Westernism and anti-modernity, RP seemed to be more accommodative in this period and softened its discourse toward European Union and Customs Union. Going one step further, Erbakan claimed that the RP were the real supporters of Customs Union (Hurriyet 1996e). He was reported as saying that he supported Turkey's membership in NATO and the Customs Union (Mengi 1996b). Of course, not only RP's responses to various charges are as important as their sympathetic coverage in the media.

## **CHAPTER IV: FRAMING AND COUNTERFRAMING DURING REFAH-YOL GOVERNMENT**

### ***SECTION I: The Establishment of the Refah-Yol Government***

***(June 29 – July 5)***



The dominance of neutral attitude continued to be the main character of the news coverage in this period, constituting more than half of the news accounts with 56 percent (see Table 7). However, compared to the previous period, the contrast between the anti- and pro-RP attitudes was reversed in the coverage of this period. In other words, the anti-RP attitude (27 percent) became more frequent than the pro-RP ones (17 percent) in the news accounts. Unlike the previous period when the neutral and opposing attitudes were almost even in the opinion columns (42 and 40 percent), the anti-RP attitude was very dominant in this period, constituting about two-thirds of the columns (61 percent). On the other hand, the neutral attitude constituted only a small portion of the opinion columns (27 percent). Moreover, the pro-RP attitude is even less than the previous period, constituting a minor portion of the opinion columns (12 percent).

The main difference in coverage Erbakan's first nomination and this time was an overall negative attitude in the latter. This attitude was more obvious in the opinion columns. I attribute this change to the fact that the prospect of RP's coming to power was higher this time and it was seen as a potential threat to both ideological and material interests of the Turkish media. The difference between the level of opposition to



**Table 7: Media Attitude toward RP (June 29 – July 5, 1996)**

	NEWS		COLUMNS	
	#	%	#	%
<b>Anti-RP</b>	71	27	107	61
<b>Neutral</b>	148	56	48	27
<b>Pro-RP</b>	43	17	20	12
<b>Total</b>	262	100	175	100

**Figure 7: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: News Accounts****Figure 8: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: Opinion Columns**

RP government in news accounts and opinion columns can be explained partly by the way the news coverage and opinion columns operate. The news coverage generally allows both sides to voice their opinions as to the establishment of the RP government. However, the main concern of the opinion columns is to help shape the public opinion along with their perspective on the issue. Due to their visible anti-clerical bias, the columns mostly opposed the possibility of a religious-based political party coming to power.

## **Framing and Counterframing:**

Counterframing strategies that took place in the media were analyzed with respect to each other. As anticipated from the general attitude of the media toward RP, the counterframing against RP was dominant with respect to its sympathetic framing. As shown in Table 8, eighty-six occurrences of counterframing in the news accounts and 131 occurrences in the opinion columns were identified in the week before the establishment of the Refah-Yol government (June 29 to July 5, 1996). On the other hand, the sympathetic framing displayed only 18 occurrences in the news and 29 occurrences in the columns. In the news accounts, the most common counterframing strategy employed by the secular groups and its coverage in the mainstream Turkish press was mainly based on the strategy of attacking the character of the opponents.

The first three most common strategies were based on this counterframing strategy, i.e., attack on character of opponent. The most common framing strategy was about the threat that RP government might pose to the secular regime. About 23 percent of the opposing frames in the news coverage claimed that RP had an anti-secular agenda and, therefore, is a threat to the current secular regime. For example, what RP did not do was defined as a problem for the daily *Hurriyet*. It criticized RP leader's not mentioning the secularism and the principles of Ataturk in his note he wrote in the notebook of the memorial during his visit to Ataturk's graveyard (*Hurriyet* 1996m). Several columnists defined as a problem the RP leader's not mentioning the secularism in his visit to Ataturk's grave (e.g. Eksi 1996a; Asik 1996a; Pular 1996a). Many others blamed the leader of the secular DYP for compromising from secularism in her partnership with the RP. Parallel to many others, a columnist said,

**Table 8: Anti-RP Framing (June 29 – July 5, 1996)**

Anti-RP Frames	News		Columns	
	#	%	#	%
RP is anti-secular	19	23	16	12
Refah-Yol is an escape from corruption charges	11	13	42	32
RP will occupy the state posts	10	12	2	1
Foreign Public is negative to Refah-Yol government	10	12		
RP has a hidden agenda	6	7	13	10
Civil society is against Refah-Yol government	6	7	1	1
RP is a minority	5	6	4	3
Negative economic program	4	5	17	14
Reminding old bad words by RP and DYP about each other	4	5	4	3
RP is radical	3	4	2	1
RP is anti-Western	3	4	1	1
Bourgeoisie is negative to Refah-Yol government	1	1		
Refah-Yol will Harm Foreign Relations			9	8
Objections to Refah-Yol from within DYP			7	5
Negative to Refah-Yol			7	5
Blame Ciller & Yilmaz			3	2
Refah-Yol will take Turkey into darkness			2	1
Blame Media			1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>131</b>	<b>100</b>

Coming to power is every political party's right. However, RP stole the post of prime minister by an unethical bargain to cover up Mrs. Ciller's corruptions. They will cover up the corruptions. Ciller will surprisingly be indemnified by RP that exploit religion everyday by talking about such sacred concepts as religion, faith and Allah, prophet (Colasan 1996a:5).

Another one criticized the RP's secular coalition partner, DYP, for compromising from secularism when they did not nominate Turhan Tayan, who was seen as the symbol of eight-year continuous education<sup>9</sup> for the ministry of education (Hurriyet 1996l). In opinion columns, this framing strategy (i.e., RP's anti-secularism) was the third most

common one behind the charges of corruption and negative economic program. Peksen of Hurriyet put it in very stark terms:

I would not believe that Erbakan would be a prime minister even if I saw it in my dream. However, this has happened. So, what will happen next? The gentleman [Erbakan] is pro-sharia, it is known that he praised the sharia regimes such as in Iran and Saudi Arabia. Therefore, he might try to destroy democracy and bring sharia after he came to power through democratic methods (Peksen 1996a:15).<sup>10</sup>

A major part of the counterframing strategies was to question the ethical quality of the Refah-Yol government. This moral charge was expressed in various forms: from questioning the moral basis for coalition government, to the charges of hidden agenda, or representing a minority interest as well as reminding the coalition partners of their negative words about each other in the past. The claim that the RP government represents a minority government can also be seen a moral charge against the coalition partners.

The second most common form of counterframing strategies in the news accounts was also a moral charge to both the RP and its coalition partner in that both parties trying to avoid corruption charges in their establishing a coalition government. This constituted 13 percent of the opposing frames in the news. However, this strategy was the most dominant one among the opinion columns, constituting about one-third of the opinion columns (32 percent). Many of the corruption charges went along with the charges of compromising from secularism, blaming Mrs. Ciller for allowing the so-called anti-secular RP to come to power as a result of her efforts to avoid corruption charges.

A major newspaper, Hurriyet, reported, “in the negotiations of coalition by the RP and DYP, it is foreseen that both sides will disregard the commission to investigate corruptions” (Hurriyet 1996k:22). Some columnists summarized the general attitude in the media toward the Refah-Yol government: “This government does not have a moral basis” (Ozkok 1996a:25), covering up two dark issues (the corruption charges against

both RP and DYP) by an understanding of saving each other (Akbal 1996a). Others defined the formation of this government in more stark terms: blackmail (Toker 1996b), a partnership of shame (Cemal 1996b) and an immoral alliance (Colasan 1996b).

The third most common framing strategy in the news accounts was the concern that RP will invade state offices (*kadroasma*), implying that RP will challenge the secular regime by replacing the secular officials with religious ones. Even though this claim took place several of times in the opinion columns, it was the third most common framing in the news accounts (12 percent). One news account cites a secular leftist party, DSP: “the members of DSP expressed their concern about the organization (mobilization) of pro-sharia movement in the state posts” (Milliyet 1996n:14). Another leftist secular party CHP’s leader, Baykal, expressed a similar claim: “When I said the state is under siege, some were uncertain about what we mean. We have seen that the state is under occupation, not under siege” (Hurriyet 1996j:25; Sabah 1996e:1; Milliyet 1996n:14).<sup>11</sup>

A very common frame in the news accounts (12 percent) but did not find any coverage in the opinion columns was the negative view of the RP by the foreign press and countries. Of course, not all of them would be negative to the RP but some negative ones were cited in the Turkish press. As to the negative ones, a general frame was that RP might pose a threat to the secular regime in Turkey. For example, the daily Hurriyet (1996f) reported that Europe was worried about the Refah-Yol government. The other daily Milliyet (1996m) claimed the same for the USA. Some news accounts pointed to the risk that the Refah-Yol might damage Turkey’s relations with the West. For example, the daily Sabah (1996b) cited, “the French news agency’s (AFP) reminded that Erbakan saw the European Union as a Christian Club and said that Mr. Erbakan wants an Islamic

Union from Kazakhstan to Morocco” p.11). One version of this framing strategy suggests that the RP can cause problems with Turkey’s neighbors. One columnist argued “the duo of Hoja [Erbakan] and Ciller may take the country into dangerous waters, first in economy and then in foreign relations... Especially in the Aegean Sea, they may provoke Greece willingly and intentionally” (Cemal 1996a:19).

One of the most effective counterframing strategies to disqualify the RP as a legitimate actor and claims-maker was to accuse it of a hidden agenda. The main implication of this claim is the charge that RP will seek to change the secular regime into a more religious one. With this charge, even the most sincere statements of loyalty to the democratic regime become irrelevant. Both news accounts and opinion columns provided significant coverage for this frame, constituting seven percent and 10 percent of counterframes respectively. As explained earlier, the charge of hidden-agenda is an ambiguous but an effective strategy in condemning a challenger even though the actor may or may not have a hidden agenda. The secretary of the secular CHP is reported in a news account, as saying “the parliament should not allow Erbakan and Ciller’s partnership of concealment in order to avoid the trial in the Constitutional Court” (Milliyet 1996l:19). The leader of another secular party, DSP, described the RP leader, Erbakan, as the master of concealment and tried to establish the connection between the charge of hidden-agenda and the threat to the regime: “The biggest danger of a coalition government formed by RP is the possibility that a religious organization will take over the state posts” (Hurriyet 1996g:25). Several columnists were in disbelief about Erbakan’s compromising and constructive attitude in establishing government (e.g. Neftci 1996c; Sazak 1996b; Colasan 1996a; Sirmen 1996a). Another columnist reminded

RP's earlier statements and explained his suspicion: "He no longer opposes to NATO and European Union... A coalition government is, of course, a reconciliation but isn't this too much?" (Mengi 1996a:3).

Another counterframing strategy aimed at depicting RP's demands as not very important ones, implying that (a) RP represents only a minority and (b) civil society is against the RP government. The minority frame underscores RP's electoral victory as it represents only 21 percent of the population. This claim positions against RP the rest of electorates that voted for other parties. The claim that civil society is against RP and its coming to power constituted seven percent of the counterframes against the RP government in the news accounts and only one percent of the columns. The minority frame also made up the seven percent of the counterframes in the news accounts and three percent of the opinion columns.

Due to the strong state tradition in Turkey, civil society organizations are weak (Karaman and Aras 2000). In many events, the secular elites mobilize the civil society organizations for their goals and many different religious organizations whose counterparts can be considered civil society organizations in the West are not recognized and excluded from public discourse. Therefore, those organizations that join the public discourse share the same with official ideology. However, the press cites various secular civil society organizations to disqualify RP's framing. A news account reported, "Some civil society organizations called for opposing deputies within DYP and demanded that they vote 'no' to the establishment of Refah-Yol... In the call, 'you have a historical opportunity. Do not take the country into darkness'" (Sabah 1996c:11). The daily Milliyet

(1996e:13) went a step further: “Women organizations stated that they would sue Mrs. Ciller for making a coalition government with RP”.

As for the minority frame that was apparent through various periods under study, the fact that RP won the election with 21 percent was framed as an insignificant issue because it was seen only a fraction of society. For example, the leader of the DSP said that the majority of the nation that did not vote for RP sees “this party as a serious threat to the secular democratic Republic” (Hurriyet 1996g:25). Columnists cited similar opinions from other secular groups and expressed similar views of their own. Neglecting the DYP’s 19 percent electoral support part of the coalition government (see Table 2 above), a columnist (Bila 1996a) mentioned that the 80 percent of the public does not want RP government. A columnist claimed:

The 75 percent of Turkey does not share RP policies. They are against its world-view, economic policies and way of life. Half of this 75 percent is deeply suspicious about RP. They believe that RP is a wolf in a lamb-mask... that it will change Turkey from a secular and democratic country into a theocratic state based on religious principles (Birand 1996a:16).

Another common anti-RP attitude was that the Refah-Yol government would have a negative effect on economy, constituting five percent of counterframing in the news coverage and 14 percent in the opinion columns. One news account expressed its suspicion about the RP’s economic program: “It is still unknown how the RP’s program called ‘Just Order’ program that is impossible to apply will affect the markets during policy implementations” (Milliyet 1996f:7). Many news accounts reported that the stock exchange and other markets was shocked by the Refah-Yol government (Milliyet 1996g). Another column pointed to the negative developments in the tourism sector: “Tour operators said that there were early cancellations of reservation due to RP’s radical image” (Hurriyet 1996h:7). Similarly, some columnists displayed negative attitudes



toward RP's economic plan. One columnist on economic issues claimed: "[Economic] professionals agree on one thing. If the Refah-Yol government is established, it will be more difficult for Turkey to find loans in foreign markets" (Neftci 1996b:7). A similar view was as follows: "Mr. Erbakan's opinions may cause economy to falter that is already fragile and may disrupt financial markets... To find foreign loans may become more difficult... it is not likely for this government to make the reforms" (Ulagay 1996a:9). One was worried about RP's early election project, thinking that an election policy may have negative consequences in economy (Soysal 1996a). Of course, not all media accounts attributed a negative impact of RP to the economy. I will analyze the frames that RP will have a positive effect on economy later on in the pro-RP framing section.

Another counterframing strategy used by the media to show a moral flaw in the partners of coalition government was to remind their audience about the partners' negative words toward each other. Both news accounts and opinion columns cited these earlier negative utterances (see Milliyet 1996o).

### **Pro-RP Framing and Reframing Strategies:**

Not all of the columnists opposed RP's coming to power, several of them supported this idea. They saw RP as a legitimate political actor. They saw RP's coming to power as an opportunity to integrate it into conventional politics: "If [RP] comes to power in a coalition, then it cannot keep its promises. Therefore, it is better to let RP come to power partially and integrate it with the regime" (Civaoglu 1996c:17). Some others wanted to see this happening to demystify RP's popularity. Cemal (1996b) of daily Sabah argued

that RP must win the confidence vote so that it does not become a hero. One columnist (Alpay 1996b) seemed even more optimistic about RP: “I think, as an Islamic party, RP plays a significant role worldwide in rejecting violence and radicalism” while he warned about negative aspects of RP’s discourses. Others did not think RP was a radical party, praising RP’s lenient approach to the issues it previously opposed such as customs union with Europe and relations with Israel (Kohen 1996a). The positive attitude was generally expressed that RP is seen positively in the Islamic world.

Against the charges of threat to secularism, some columnists criticized the media’s and some secular groups’ propaganda that secularism is threatened (Barlas 1996c). Gokmen (1996a) of *Hurriyet* said, “I believed that RP as a part of the government could advance Turkey and modernize it, rather than taking it backward. I screamed the futility of fearing about sharia and separatism” (p.22). Similarly, some criticized the exclusionary attitude by the secular groups and the media toward RP: “We must definitely cure the RP syndrome that darkens Turkey’s political horizons. RP is also a product of our society. We must integrate RP into the system and power-sharing” (Barlas 1996d:15). One of the big businessmen saw RP as a guarantee for secularism rather than being a threat to secularism (Milliyet 1996i).

Similarly, some argued that RP started the process of integrating into the system: “RP’s change of attitude for the sake of government must not be excluded and, in fact, must be encouraged. Both RP and its opponents must avoid provocative actions against each other” (Akyol 1996a). A secular journalist, Dogru (1996a) of *Sabah*, argued that all the negative speculations about the RP must be put in a test. Therefore, RP must win the confidence from the parliament even though he thinks that most of the negative thinking

Table 9: Pro-RP Framing (June 29-June 5, 1996)

Pro-RP Framing	News		Columns	
	Occurrences	Percentage	Occurrences	Percentage
Bourgeoisie is positive to Refah-Yol	7	39	0	0
RP is a part of society	1	6	5	17
Positive economic program	2	11	1	3
Foreign press is neutral	8	44		
RP would not Change the Regime	0	0	3	11
Refah-Yol will Not Harm Foreign Relations	0	0	4	14
Positive to Refah-Yol	0	0	16	55
<i>Total</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>29</i>	<i>100</i>

about RP is probably correct. One columnist even idealizes the Refah-Yol coalition for Turkish democracy: “The RP-DYP coalition is a historical opportunity for reconciliation... If this coalition succeeds, we will see that an Islamic party can be democrat and compromising like Christian democratic parties” (Barlas 1996c:15).

As for the RP’s economic program, some (e.g. Civaoglu 1996b) found useful the fact that the coalition government program involved the issues of European Union and customs union along with banking institutions, interest and convertibility. One news account reported that foreign investors did not panic because of RP government (Milliyet 1996j). The business sector is reported to be “positive to RP government, provided it remains loyal to a market economy” (Sabah 1996g:7). Moreover, labor sectors were also reported to be sympathetic to RP government since one of the former leader of a trade union (Necati Celik) became a minister of labor (Sabah 1996f).<sup>12</sup> Similarly, denying the charges of anti-Westernism, RP leader said, “USA is a country that is both ally and friend for us” (Sabah 1996d:19; Milliyet 1996k:15).

## ***SECTION II: The Sincan Affair (Feb 2-14, 1997)***

One of the critical events that led to the escalation of framing and counterframing was the Sincan Affair. It involved disputes about various issues concerning the relations between religion and politics, media and democracy, and democracy and military. In a sense, the consequence of this event and its coverage in the media was seen as a forerunner of a stronger military involvement in the claims-making process.

In Feb. 1, 1997, an annual meeting was held by a RP municipal leaders in Sincan, a small town close to Ankara, to express the RP's support for Palestinian *intifada*. The Iranian ambassador was invited to make a speech for Palestine and pictures of the guerillas that fought against Israel were displayed on the walls. The speeches made by both the RP's municipal leader and Iranian ambassador framed as the biggest problem of the day and the event was also sensationally covered in headlines. The next day, when the reporters flooded Sincan to report the municipal activities, a female reporter was beaten by a religious fanatic. As a result of the tension, the tanks rolled in the streets of the city two days later (February 4, 1997). From this date on, the military influence in Turkish politics increased and even forced the dissolution of RP government 4 months later. This process marked a significant change in the relationship between politics and religion at the expense of the latter. The author thinks that the event led to a well known military reaction witnessed in the February 28 National Security Council Meeting, which I will elaborate in the next section.

I established two levels of analysis represented by different statistics: (1) the overall distribution of media attitude toward the RP agenda as positive, negative and neutral, (2) the distribution of media frames in the news accounts about RP. This calculation is


**Table 10: Media Attitude toward RP during the Sincan Affair (February 2-14, 1997)**

Frames	News		Columns	
	#	%	#	%
Anti-RP	109	55	114	75
Neutral	63	32	27	17
Pro-RP	26	13	12	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>198</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>153</b>	<b>100</b>


independent of each other because some columns do not have a discernible frame as some columns have multiple frames. When calculating the sympathetic (positive), negative or neutral media coverage, each article is reduced to one of the attitudes. When both positive and negative frames are quoted or the text does not present any manifest preference over the subject, the text was coded as neutral. When the text support or cover a single frame, it was coded as positive or negative respectively. However, any frame that took place in a newspaper account was counted and sometimes a newspaper account consists of multiple frames, supportive and critical of the RP agenda.

### **General Attitude in the News Accounts and Opinion Columns**

Of course, compared to opinions columns, the news accounts are expected to respect the journalistic principles of balance, fairness and minimizing harm. I considered neutral any news account that respects the principles of balance and fairness between both sides of disputes. However, the Turkish press shows a significant deviation from these principles. The neutral framing of certain issues would be the majority but it is not the case in this period. The anti-RP and neutral news coverage more or less reversed since the previous period where 27 percent anti-RP and 56 percent neutral attitudes in the media (see Table 10 and Figure 1). The rate of anti-RP claims with 55 percent is almost



**Figure 9: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: News Accounts**



**Figure 10: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: Opinion Columns**

twice more than the neutral news coverage with 32 percent. The mainstream media supported a certain type of frame even though it provides room for some other frames. That is, the news coverage of the Turkish press mainly supported oppositional frames against the RP government. Compared to the anti-RP attitude in the news, the number and rate of the frames supporting RP were a mere minority with 13 percent, similar to the previous period's 17 percent. This led to the conclusion that the fair and balanced news coverage was not a common practice in this period. In fact, this supports my thesis that the press assumed an oppositional (countermovement) role against RP.

The same can be said of the columns overall attitudes toward RP (see Table 10 and Figure 2). However, the columns display more anti-RP attitude (75 percent) than the news accounts (55 percent). In other words, even though both news accounts and opinion columns showed an anti-RP attitude, this opposition was more dominant among the columns. This can be easily attributed to the relative effect of journalistic norms of balance, fairness in the news coverage. Similarly, the fact that neutral news was (32 percent) was almost twice more than the neutral columns (17 percent) can be attributed to

the same effect of journalistic principles. Like the news coverage, the pro-RP attitude was still a minority (eight percent) in this period and did not change much since the previous period.

### **Framing and Counterframing:**

The frames analyzed in this period covered all the news and opinion columns (including editorials) that addressed any of the RP agenda. Since both the government and the media saw each other as an uncompromising opponent, the frame disputes did not focus on the validity of the frames but on the total acceptability of each other as acceptable claims-makers. One thing can be said in advance: the mainstream press seemed to ignore the framing of the real actors (i.e., the Iranian Ambassador and municipal leader). That is why my initial plan to analyze framing struggles in a dialectic way was not realized completely. In a way the frames on each side were related only superficially. Despite all, there were significant framing efforts to disqualify each other's claims in and through the media.

As a second level of analysis, I elaborated the distribution of particular frames about the RP and its agenda. This meant finding relevant frames in the news accounts and opinion columns. Some news about RP covered an event about RP without carrying any frame visible to the author. As a result the total number of news accounts and that of opinion columns came out to be different from the total number of frames in these texts. For example, since some news accounts did not carry any visible frame and some contained a few frames, the number is not much different among the news accounts and the frames in these accounts, 198 and 206 respectively (see Table 11). However, the

**Table 11: Anti-RP Framing During the Sincan Event (February 2-14, 1997)**

<b>Opposing Frames</b>	<b>News Accounts</b>		<b>Columns</b>	
	<b>#</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>#</b>	<b>%</b>
Planned Action by RP	2	5	3	13
Revealed RP's Hidden Agenda	4	11	0	0
Call for Sharia	9	24	11	42
Praising Terrorist Organizations	1	3	2	7
Minority Domination over Majority	0	0	2	7
Provocation for Hatred & Enmity	3	8	0	0
Disgrace ( <i>Rezalet</i> )	5	14	6	26
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>85</b>

**Table 12: Pro-RP Framing During the Sincan Affair (February 2-14, 1997)**

<b>Pro-RP Framing</b>	<b>News Accounts</b>		<b>Columns</b>	
	<b>#</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>#</b>	<b>%</b>
An Ordinary Meeting Media Exaggerated	7	19	2	7
Provocation	4	11	1	4
No call for sharia	2	6	1	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>15</b>

opinion columns generally contain multiple frames, as its goal is to express the writer's opinion. In that sense, columns involved at least one frame about the RP and its agenda. Therefore, the total number of frames in the columns almost doubled the number of opinion columns about RP with 153 and 283, respectively.

Unlike the general classification of the news accounts and columns as anti-, pro-RP or neutral coverage, the frames were classified as anti-, pro-RP and democratic. Since there are obviously democratic ideas between pro- and anti-RP frames, democratic frames, of course, are not limited to these frames. However, I preferred the "democratic" over "neutral" since the common focus of these frames was to maintain the democratic process that seemed to blur out during the struggle between the RP and secularist groups. The authors of these frames (e.g., Cengiz Candar, Mehmet Barlas, Taha Akyol and



**Table 13: Pro-RP Framing during the Sincan Affair (February 2-14, 1997)**

<b>Pro-RP Frames</b>	<b>News Accounts</b>		<b>Columns</b>	
	<b>#</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>#</b>	<b>%</b>
RP is equal to Turkey	2	13	4	17
RP supports democracy	3	19	13	54
State's pressure on religion	7	43	2	8
Secular Groups Provoked	4	25	5	21
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>24</i>	<i>100</i>

Mehmet Ali Birand) cannot be easily classified other than democratic. However, their frames varied between opposition and support, depending on specific issues. Each frame was classified according to whether it supported RP or opposed it. When it does neither support nor oppose RP and if it criticizes both RP and its secular opponents, it was classified as 'democratic'.

As to particular frames that took place in the Turkish press, I analyzed the news accounts and opinion columns for each particular frame. Even though there were frames about female students' headscarves in the universities, analysis of these frames will be combined with the frames about the same issue in other periods and analyzed in an independent section below. Besides, for this period I singled out the frames about the Sincan Affair in this period, about the mosque construction project, about the tanks roaming the streets of the city of Sincan. In analyzing the specific frame concerning the RP's agenda for certain issues, all of these frames were counted both separately and in conjunction with general RP agenda. As a result, the number of specific frames related to RP and its agenda were predominantly negative to the RP, rather than being supportive. In addition, I identified twelve of what I called democratic frames that are critical of both the media and RP but supported the maintenance of democratic process.

**Table 14: Anti-RP Framing During the Sincan Affair (February 2-14, 1997)**

<b>Opposing Frames</b>	News Accounts		Columns	
	#	%	#	%
Social Conflict (Struggle, tension)	15	17	33	24
Regime Change	21	25	19	14
Foreign States (Iran, Algeria 9, Libya 2)	11	13	17	13
Misuses religion (or religious feelings)	11	13	14	11
RP is minority + Majority against RP	9	10	12	9
Hidden Agenda	7	8	10	8
Discrimination of secular and religious	6	7	7	5
RP not Democratic	3	3	7	5
RP Oppressive	0		5	4
RP must go	0		4	3
Call for Civil Society	2	2	3	2
Turkey has the most freedom of religion	2	2	2	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>133</b>	<b>100</b>

*Anti-Regime Frames:* Among the opposing frames about RP, the most common one was what I call the anti-regime frame. It consists of various parallel frames (e.g. RP is compromising from democracy or secularism) and it is seeking a hidden agenda. The combined rate of the regime change frames is about one-third (36 percent) of eighty-seven general frames opposing RP. Most of these frames focus on the perceived threats posed by RP to the secular regime. Many news and columns framed the increasing religious appearances and demands as a clear and present danger to the secular regime. Along with direct statements about the increasing threats, some argued that RP itself was a sign (or a result) of increasing religious movement. Some others argued that Islamic movement had a negative connotation and sometimes it covered the whole religious people and any demand for religious rights and freedom. The main representative of regime change frames, for the author, was the *irtija* frame. As it will be explained in the *irtija* section below, this frame sees religion solely as a private matter and opposed any of its public manifestations. Depending on the degree of anti-clericalism, the term *irtija* is used by some for only radical groups and for all religious community by others to claim

that there is a danger of a sharia regime taking over. Many also used this term to define RP and its related groups. A significant media framing presented the Sincan affair as the resurgence of irtija and called for an action to prevent it from getting more serious. A columnist expressed his sense of threat as follows:

Turkey is pushed toward being a country of Sufi orders and sheikhs and both the parliament and the regime are left powerless in the face of this development. So much that Iran increased its activities to export its counterrevolution to Turkey, its representative in Turkey dared to make open provocations. The government watches [Iran's] intervention in our domestic affairs without any reaction. This itself is not surprising. What is surprising is that the main elements of the regime outside the government is displaying the same inaction (lack of reaction)... Turkey is driven toward being a state of sharia first, then toward being a state of *tarik* (Sufism). This effort continues without any resistance" (Sirmen 1997a).<sup>13</sup>

*Hidden Agenda Frame (Takiyye<sup>14</sup>):* Some frames state that RP has a hidden agenda and disguise its real intentions. Therefore, the blame for hidden agenda implies that 1) RP uses democratic opportunities to advance its hidden religious agenda and 2) it aims at destroying democratic system if they are allowed. This frame was effective in disqualifying RP as a legitimate claims-maker because it did not focus on what they really said and meant but it questioned its motives. This was one of the frames that attack the character of others, it tried to focus on the morality of the claims-maker rather focusing on the validity of its opponents' claims. For example, Mesut Yilmaz, the leader of the secular right party (ANAP), interpreted the Sincan event as revealing RP's hidden agenda (Sabah 1997d). One columnist asked: "How quickly the screams of 'religion is in danger' quickly left its place for the screams of 'secular regime is in danger'? The RP with a hidden agenda revealed its real face very early" Mengi 1997). A news account quoted the chief-of-staff: "Here is their real face. I do not know what to say. Their goal is to make modern Turkey like Iran" (Hurriyet 1997a:25). Like the term irtija, the charge of

hidden agenda was instrumental in condemning the pro-RP framing. I will analyze the various uses of *takiyye* over different periods in its independent section below.

*Threat to Democracy Frame:* A few of the opposing frames emphasized that RP is also a threat to the democratic system. This frame is closely related to each other because democracy is part of the official ideology although secularism seems to have priority over democracy (Tamer 1997a). The claim that RP is a threat to democracy implies that RP will probably change the democratic system into a theocratic one. Therefore, both hidden agenda and democracy frames display distrust against RP's sincerity about democracy. To conclude, all of the frames that state that RP is a threat to the secular or democratic regime, that it has a hidden agenda shows a deep distrust against the RP government as this distrust was already common among the journalists even before RP came to power within a coalition government. For example, a columnist argued that "RP's democracy works only for itself and RP wants democracy only for itself" (Sever 1997).

*Social Conflict Frame:* The next most common anti-RP frame was that RP wants a social conflict (17 percent). This main frame comes in different forms. One is that RP encourages violence. Seven out of fifteen social conflict frames were about RP's support or encouragement of violence. This claim was especially attributed to RP since an RP sympathizer physically attacked a female journalist during the coverage of Sincan events. Even though RP condemned the incident and distanced itself from other radical groups (Heper 2001), the opposition led by the media did not stop blaming RP for encouraging or supporting violence. This strategy was very successful to disqualify RP as a legitimate claims-maker in the democratic system. There were significant efforts by its opponents to relate RP with radical religious groups and this effort received an ample space in the

press, as well. Other frames that focus on social conflict claim that RP wants tension, or RP seeks polarization among its followers and others. These ‘social conflict frames’ can also be related to discrimination frame. With six percent overall, the discrimination frame argues that RP wants to divide Turkish people as religious vs. seculars, believers vs. non-believers and discriminate against others.

Considered with the previous groups of frames suggesting that RP was a danger to the secular and democratic regime, the frames whose main goal was to disqualify RP as a claims-maker rather than to challenge the validity of RP frames. Their combined appearance constituted about half of all anti-RP frames with 49 percent. As far as my research is concerned, none of the RP members were convicted committing religious violence. However, the media and other secular groups were eager to depict RP as a radical group. RP is criticized in the media for radicalizing and the Sincan affair is taken as the proof for this radicalization. The chief columnist of the biggest newspaper claimed, “The latest events including the Sincan affair disprove those who said RP had been domesticated in power and that there was nothing to fear about RP. This event shows their stupidity... Perhaps we needed such events to show the reality to those stupid ones” (Eksi 1997a:23). Another columnist saw this event as a forerunner of more serious threats materializing (Colasan 1997a). A news account presented the event as a rehearsal for a rebellion (Hurriyet 1997b).

*Exploitation of Religion:* The two other important frames are misuse of religion and foreign conspiracy with 10 percent each. The misuse of religion is the second most common of single frames as the others are combined frames. This frame was as effective as it was ambiguous due to the high cultural resonance of foreign conspiracy. The misuse

of religion has different emphases. Some mentioned the misuse of religion or Islam, some mentioned the misuse of people's religious feelings and beliefs. Some involved condemning some simple demands for freedom of religion and individual practices. Each aspect carried slightly different implications, depending on the strategic needs of its users. All showed a great distaste toward any public appearance or public role of religion. This frame was expressed in various normative terms such as exploitation of religion (*din sömürüsü*), misuse of religious feelings (*dini duyguların istismarı*), misuse of mosque, Ramadan, headscarf, etc. For example, one columnist condemned the RP's defending certain religious practices: "Headscarf? It is for vote. Ritual sacrifice of animals? For money. Mosque? For but a political turnout and big revenues" (Halman 1997). These frames see these practices as strictly private issues and any demand for their public function was condemned as a misuse of religion. This attitude can be easily seen in the media frames about the headscarf. A collective demand for the removal of ban over headscarf in the universities was framed as a misuse and politicization of headscarf.

*Foreign Conspiracy Frame:* The framing that related RP with foreign government makes a significant portion of anti-RP frames with 10 percent. I call this frame a "foreign connection frame". Foreign connection frame is popular in the media because its direct function is to disqualify the opponent (i.e., RP) as a valid claims-maker. Most of the frames of this kind focus on Iran not only because the Iranian Ambassador made a provocative speech in the controversial event but also because Iran has been a major concern for secular elites after the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. One of the fears of official Ideology in Turkey is thought to be a reactionary Islam (Yavuz 2000). Kemal Ataturk established modern Turkey on a secularist principle that limits religion only to

private sphere (Mardin 1991). This was realized by state force in the face of resistance coming from traditional religious institutions and societal groups.

Transition to democracy in Turkey increased the visibility of public role of religion. The tension between church and state relatively decreased with democratic process but it remains a source of conflict in Turkey. Similarly, the joining of RP in a coalition-government caused heightened concerns on the part of secular elites and secular groups. The Iranian conspiracy was an effective framing strategy in condemning a local movement as an undue movement both in the eyes of general public and especially secular elites. Historically, due to the sectarian differences, Iranian Shiite regime and Sunni Islamic movement of Turkey are disconnected. Because RP chose to operate within the principle of democratic system in Turkey, RP distanced its organization and its ideology from radicalism that Iran bolstered. However, the Iranian conspiracy makes a great sense for the secular elite and secular groups. This frame easily condemns the Islamic movement as a foreign element rather than considering its democratic demands as part of democratic process. It also implies that RP is a radical movement and its repression is justified. This strategy is especially useful considering the RP frames were not far off from the conservative majority. For example, a journalist argued: "'Iran sends militants to Ankara instead of diplomats" (Dogan 1997b). The leader of the Democratic Left Party, Ecevit said, "Iran displayed the extradition of its revolution to Turkey" (Milliyet 1997e). On the other hand, the Algerian connection frame had different implications. Because of a bloody conflict that started after the prevention of Islamic Salvation Front from coming to power in Algeria, Algerian example implied that RP's

efforts will lead Turkey to a chaos and bloodshed, as happened in Algeria. The RP's response to these charges was that RP will never be like Iran and Algeria.

*Minority Frame:* The minority frame claims that RP represents a minor portion of society but is over-represented in the government. Even though RP established a legal coalition with a secular party (DYP) and ruled as a coalition. RP's actions and claims were framed as a minority that unjustly rules over majority. This frame consisted of eight percent of anti-RP frames that appeared in the news accounts and six percent in the columns. For example, one columnist argued that: "It is not possible to find that a 21 percent minority government tries to change the fate of a nation, especially when 80 percent of voters are against it. However, this 80 percent surrendered to the 20 percent" (Akbal 1997a).

There were two other less frequent frames with two percent each. One calls for civil society to take action against the RP government. Another journalist and former diplomat, Sukru Elekdag, called for secular parties to cooperate against RP and mentioned the passive nature of civil society, saying "we [civil society] must make the coup" (Elekdag 1997a). This frame distanced itself from a common expectation in the press that only military can oust RP. Instead, it invited civil society to participate in the political process and show a civil resistance to RP government. This frame also shares the same assumption with previous frame that RP is a minority. Other minor frame was that Turkey had the most freedom of religion. This was to counter RP's claim that religious freedom is not sufficient in Turkey.

One frame that was not seen in the news accounts but was spelled out in the columns was that RP coalition must leave the government. These are more direct frames that saw



RP as a clear danger to the political system and publicly demanded the collapse of RP government. For example, a columnist argued that “the scenes in Sincan probably prove that Refah-Yol government must quit” (Cemal 1997a). All these findings support my hypothesis that there is a strong anti-clerical (secularist) tendency in Turkish media.

### **Pro-RP’s Framing:**

My review of Islamic press’s coverage of RP framing revealed that RP responded to most of the anti-RP frames. However, its responses did not find enough coverage in the mainstream media. Only sixteen RP frames were covered in the mainstream media (eight percent of total frames). The most prominent RP frame covered in the media was that the state oppressed religion in Turkey (four percent). This frame stressed the insufficient level of religious freedom in Turkey. Next, RP blamed the media for the tension in the public opinion as a result of some of RP projects, implying that these actions were usual and normal demands of democratic process. One of the columnists, Mehmet Barlas (1997a) criticized the media for provocation. He argued that the prime minister, Mr. Erbakan, did not follow his religious agenda during his government but the media still finds simple issues to cause tension. Emphasizing that military is more democratic than the civilian opposition to their government, Ahmet Bilgin, RP’s municipal leader in Diyabakir, said “if the civilians had tanks, they would crush us” (Milliyet 1997a). RP’s associate speaker of the parliament, Oguzhan Asilturk, said “some part of the media and interest groups seek help from the tank palettes and military boots” (Milliyet 1997b). A columnist of daily Hurriyet found the accusations that RP is radical:

“We may not like Mr. Erbakan and RP leadership’s policies and may suspect their commitment to democratic rules. However, we do not have any evidence for that RP leadership wants to commit

to arms by looking at their past and present... It would be unfair that RP leadership seeks a method similar to the radical Islamic movement in Algeria" (Neftci 1997:7).

According to my review of the Islamic media, this counter-attribution was a common strategy used by both media and RP. Similarly, the Islamic media blamed mainstream media for creating an artificial conflict. As a response the charges that RP is a threat to democracy, RP claimed that it defended democracy and it represented a major part of Turkey. While the first claim implies that RP is part of democratic process and, therefore, should be considered as a legitimate political actor, the second claim stresses that RP represents a dominant perspective of Turkish people. In a sense, this view carries a totalitarian implication that may threaten other types of opinion.

Sevket Kazan, Minister of Justice of RP, said "we will clean up the media" (1997c). As a response to Kazan's statements, media's hostility became even more negative and caused worries among democratic journalists. This was taken as a sign of RP's unrelenting war against the media. For example, Ziya Sonay, a former president of Journalists' Trade Union in Turkey, warned RP with a latent threat:

The fate of the governments is well known who struggled with the press. The Refah-Yol government must devote its energy to solve the country's problem, instead of struggling with the press. They must fulfill their promises prior to elections instead of displaying an attitude contrary to the principle of secular republic in Ataturk's Turkey" (Milliyet 1997f).

### **Democratic Frames:**

These are the frames that do support either side by rejecting RP's religious agenda and media's anti-democratic tendency. They constitute about one-tenth of total frames (11 percent) in the news accounts and 16 percent in the opinion columns (see Table 15). These frames focus on provocation. For example, one of the prominent democrat

**Table 15: Democratic Framing during the Sincan Affair (February 2-14, 1997)**

<b>Democracy Frames</b>	<b>News Accounts</b>		<b>Columns</b>	
	<b>#</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>#</b>	<b>%</b>
Both Sides Provoked	5	41	9	31
Civil Opposition Needed	0	-	7	24
Media Exaggerates	3	25	6	21
Military was Provoked	2	17	5	17
Returning Turkey back to the 1930s	2	17	2	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>100</b>

journalists that opposed the media's support for military intervention criticized RP for helping the polarization even though he thinks RP should be a major actor in Turkish democratic system: "Why do RP members seem to expect good result from polarization?... Confusing their 20 percent electoral support with majority support, they become involved with unnecessary conflicts with the press" (Candar 1997a). About half of the democratic frames blamed both media and RP for increasing tension between the religious and secular groups (four to five percent average).

Others claim that military is provoked by media (two percent), and that media exaggerated an ordinary meeting in Sincan (three percent). These three frames pointed to an unnecessary exaggeration and tension created after a simple event (nine percent combined). "Yes, there are some disturbing actions by RP but the media and opposition exaggerates" (Akyol 1997b). Democratic frames emphasized that those who opposed RP created a crisis out of simple event, aiming at returning the nation to the 1930s where the single party rule prevailed and people's attitudes and habits were forced to modernize by state power. "In Turkey, it is a necessity to overcome this conflict through the adoption of republic by the Islamists and the recognition of democratic rights of Islamists by the Republic" (Akyol 1997a). A columnist condemned the attack on a journalist but also

criticized the media's attack on RP upon this single incident: "However, we try to blame the whole RP and RP community, instead... By doing that, we invoke enmities and deepen the polarization" (Midilli 1997). On the one hand, the media showed a "take no prisoner" approach to the RP government. On the other hand, they complained about the government's insensitivity to the media demands and criticisms. Even the democratic journalists joined this criticism (e.g. Alpay 1997a).

While the RP's winning plurality of votes did not mean a clear victory and what I called democratic journalists generally maintained a democratic stance. Therefore, as to democracy, all the frames in the press emphasize RP's perceived threats to democratic system. In society, there were some frames that RP must be incorporated into democratic system and even few of the columnists defended that RP should not be forced outside the democratic process and their incorporation to the system would strengthen Turkish democracy, as well. Those journalists were later on expelled from the mainstream media as a result of a combined efforts of the media ownership and the National Security Council. For a detailed explanation of this operation see the Andic affair on page 130 below.

## **The Sincan Meeting**

### **Anti-RP Frames:**

The media attitude to the Sincan affair was oppositional in character (65 percent). As it was overall considered by the press as a sign of clear and present danger to the secular regime, the press attitude toward the Sincan Affair was sensational in tone and expressed a clear anti-clerical bias in its coverage. More than half of the anti-RP frames about the

Sincan affair deemed it to be a sign of regime change (35 percent of opposing frames). Regime change was explained in two different ways. One, the Sincan event was framed as a call for Sharia (constituting 24 percent of the frames about Sincan Meeting). Even though the Islamic press, RP and even the local municipal leader that organized the event did not accept this claim, the mainstream press was very persistent about the call for sharia. Call for sharia seemed to serve a double purpose. As it was difficult to find a direct evidence between the event and sharia, its ambiguous statement as a call for sharia helped to condemn both the event and the groups that were related with it. Two, this event revealed the hidden agenda pursued by RP (11 percent). Secular groups generally worried about RP's sincerity for democracy. There were three other anti-RP frames that appeared in the news accounts. 14 percent of the anti-RP frames described the event as a disgrace (rezalet). Two, the Sincan event was a provocation for hatred and enmity among population. This claim is similar to a common claim that RP wants tension in society. Last and least, it praised terrorist organizations with three percent of the opposing frames. However, among all of these frames not even one news account or opinion column mentioned the event's reason for gathering, that is, the Palestinian problem.

### **Pro-RP Framing:**

Most of the pro-RP frames came from RP itself. The most common RP frame was that the event was an ordinary event that has no anti-regime message. However, the secular media exaggerated the event and framed it as serious problem that ended up with marching of tanks in the city streets. Riza Ulucak, one of the associate chairmen of the RP, defended their municipal leader as follows:

Yildiz is a very successful municipal leader... For me, he did not commit any crime. I believe that the justice will be served and he will return to his job after proven not guilty. After reminding that there was no reaction about the same event the previous year, Ulucak said that the State Security Tribunal asked 12 years of prison due to the lack of Ataturk's poster... Yildiz, the municipal leader, is not responsible for the speech by the Iranian ambassador (Milliyet 1997g).

Most of the RP frames were focused on this frame with 19 percent. The Islamic media shared this opinion as well. My study of the liberal religious newspaper, Zaman, revealed that most of the frames agreed on that the mainstream press exaggerated the simple event while warning RP not to create excuses for such an exaggeration. Related to the previous one, the other common frame supporting RP's position was that the media was trying to provoke the military against the RP government (11 percent). Even though this frame agrees with the previous one in exaggeration of the event, it differs in that the former does not imply any reason for exaggeration but the latter sees the provocation of the military as a motive. The least commonly covered RP frame was that the event did not mean a call for sharia. Even though this frame was the most common frame backed by RP and the Islamic media, it was the least covered one in the mainstream media.

### ***Tanks Roaming the Streets of Sincan:***

As a sign of showing military's attitude toward the incident on February 4, the military marched the tanks in the city of Sincan where the pro-Palestine meeting held. All the newspapers reported the incident in their headlines. Sabah reported the event as "Protest with Tanks". In Milliyet, the event was headlined as "the military passed from Sincan". I classified the frames about tanks roaming the streets as democratic and pro-military frames. There were several reasons for this preference. Firstly, the limited number of democratic frames as opposed to pro-military frames in the media. In the coverage of the tanks' march, only six of the frames in news account opposed military involvement in politics (23 percent). Secondly, only democratic journalists agreed that

Table 16: Pro-RP and Democratic Framing: Tanks Roaming The Streets

Pro-RP Frames	News Accounts		Columns	
	#	%	#	%
A sign of Military Intervention	4	15	11	34
RP is not afraid of military intervention	1	4	2	6
You cannot distance RP and military	1	4	2	6
There was no need for tanks	-	1	4	12
<i>Subtotal</i>	6	23	19	59
Democratic Frames				
Usual Action (NOT Intervention)	17	62	9	28
Democratic (Civil) Expression	4	15	4	13
<i>Subtotal</i>	21	77	13	41
<b>Total</b>	27	100%	32	100%

this was a military warning and a sign of military intervention in civil politics. Four of the democratic frames emphasized that the tanks signified a military intervention. For example, one of the secular journalists tried to reconcile both sides: “It is necessary to overcome this conflict through Islamists accepting the Republic and the Republic’s recognizing the democratic rights of the Islamists. Therefore, both sides, especially RP that is responsible in government, must avoid provoking behaviors” (Akyol 1997a).

Another columnist blamed RP for provoking secular groups:

[RP] provokes both the military and DYP (its secular partner) by bringing into agenda the critical issues such as Mosque in Cankaya, Taksim, headscarf issues... However, in this context, especially the military must remain calm. Yesterday’s tank protest in Sincan was wrong” (Asik 1997a).

The other two frames were represented by only one account each. First, RP is not afraid of military intervention. For example, Erbakan is reported saying, Tanks’ roaming Sincan is not related to our agenda. In the Republican day, 240 tanks march” (Hurriyet 1997c:23). Second, that nobody can come in between RP and military, implying that the media is trying to cause a tension between the two. For example, implying a provocation by the media, RP leader (Erbakan) is reported to say “it is useless to try to damage the love between us and the courageous military and our harmony with our coalition partner” (Sabah 1997e).

Pro-military frames were dominant in the mainstream press with a total of 77 percent of the related frames. I identified two complementary frames in this camp. One, tanks' march was an ordinary action, implying that it was not a sign of intervention (62 percent). A columnist supported the tanks' march in the city of Sincan while he was surprised by the fact that the journalists that were physically attacked did not want a military coup (Coskun 1997b). For example, a democratic journalist, Rauf Tamer, explained the media's preference of secularism over democracy as follows:

Our principle of secularism is bigger than our love for democracy... We are pleased even by the tank sound. The reason why we give compromises from democracy is that we can find democracy again but we cannot find secularism once we loose it (Tamer 1997a).

Similarly, another journalist argued that women worried more about "sharia's sound" than "tanks' sound": [W]omen's ears hear more of sharia sounds than tank sounds. Because they feel threatened directly. Because they think that an authoritarian regime like Iran may one day force them into black burkas, slavery, inferior class. Are those women wrong? No, our women are right from heaven to earth" (Cemal 1997c).<sup>15</sup> Another journalist blamed RP's secular partner DYP, for the increasing role of military: However, if the civilians, especially some hundred members of True Way Party (DYP)...follow a woman [Tansu Ciller] and trying to cover up the mistakes in question, those who love this country involuntarily find solution in the blocking of these developments by the Turkish Armed Forces" (Akbal 1997b).

The other framing claimed that the tanks in the streets reflected a democratic and civil expression by the military (15 percent). For example, one columnist blamed the civil government for military's actions: "Tank is not a solution to civil blindness...If tanks come, it is not because of the military officers but because of those who came out of elections. The tanks' protest in Sincan must be seen as a military's democratic



expression” (Dogru 1997a).<sup>16</sup> A columnist cited his talk with an army general that admitted that the tanks passing the streets of Sincan is an intervention but not a military coup, saying that military intervention does not always have to be a coup:

There are degrees of intervention: Implying, cautioning, oral warning, written warning, ultimatum, coup and revolution. In military, gradualism is a principle. It does not have to be a coup. The 12 March, for example, was an ultimatum. Before the 12 September, there was an oral warning first, then a written warning. Tanks’ roaming the streets of Sincan fits which degree? It fits in-between oral warning and written warning. Warning with tanks is an intervention but it is not a military coup (Coskun 1997a:3).

## CONCLUSION

My initial plan to analyze the framing and counterframing in a dialectic perspective and to relate one’s success over the other was not fully realized because of the biased nature of Turkish press. This was because weak democratic orientation among the journalists and the regulated market-place of ideas<sup>17</sup> makes it difficult to realize a relatively free exchange of ideas. Therefore, in Turkish political context, the success or failure of a certain movement frame does depend on its resonance with the common culture. I attribute the failure of pro-RP framing to the gap between the secular elite culture and a religious culture of the populace. In this context, the power structure determines which frames gets accepted or rejected. The ideological proximity between the media sector and the secular ruling elite determined whose frames are accepted and publicized. From another aspect, RP’s religious orientation caused significant credibility problems for RP’s democratic frames. RP’s indecision to define the problems of headscarf and religious education between democratic rights and religious rights prevented a sound framing that appeals to the populace and that can find acceptance among the secular elite. The indecision in RP’s framing strategies caused additional

suspicion on the part of secular groups, i.e., that RP is not sincere about democracy but it uses a democratic framing only when they help to realize its goals.

The parallel between the news accounts and opinion columns is clear in that both show a strong anti-RP attitude. However, this attitude is stronger in the news accounts than in the opinion columns. This relatively small difference can be attributed to the fact that the news accounts are more subject to editorial control than columns in Turkish media. This media campaign against the RP government was affected by the existence of some democratic columnists' resistance. Even though those columnists were minorities, their open resistance cost them their jobs in the newspapers later on.

When there is not a master frame that is resonant to both sides, the framing conflict aims at disqualifying others as a legitimate claims-maker more often than disproving the validity of the opponents' claims. In this process the strategy of attacking on the character of opponents become very instrumental. In addition, RP's framing strategies were counterproductive. Supporting my thesis that RP government caused the unification of the secular elites as well as groups against itself, a journalist states: "No other force other than REFAH-YOL government would be able to save the universities out of pacifism, inability, carelessness and mindlessness. They would care less if the world collapses. However, the duo of Mr. Erbakan and Mrs. Ciller became the maker of tremendous unity yesterday" (Guclu 1997).

### ***SECTION III: The February 28th Process***

#### **Introduction:**

When RP obtained the plurality of vote in July 1996, the military did not prevent it from taking power by adopting a wait-and-see approach. This wait-and-see period lasted until December 1996 (Heper and Guney 2000) marked by an intelligence report submitted to the National Security Council (NSC) about the increasing threat of religious plot to bring a sharia regime (Milliyet 1997av). The next month the NSC gave a briefing to the president about increasing security threats posed by some Islamic activities. Three weeks after the Sincan Affair where the tanks marched in the streets of Sincan (February 4th, 1997), the National Security Council held a controversial meeting and announced a statement that aimed to reinstate the priorities of the regime about the issues of religion and politics. In turn, this statement affected the Refah-Yol government's ability to govern the country. In 1982, the current Turkish constitution was drafted by the military that took over the government through a military coup in 1980. The public approved the constitution in a referendum. It gives a privileged status to the military within the establishment through the institution of National Security Council where the military members outnumber their civilian counterparts four to five led under the leadership of the president.

In relation to the civilian authority, the constitution prescribes a privileged status for military by placing it somewhat above the civilian government. According to the constitution (Article 117), the chief-of-staff is nominated by the government and appointed by the president. He is accountable to the prime minister, unlike many Western states where the military is responsible to the ministry of defense. The article 118 of the

Constitution institutionalized the National Security Council that involves five military members and four civilian members and the president. Before it was amended in 2001, the article said that the National Security Council ‘informs’ the cabinet of ministries about the decisions of the Council and the cabinet considers them as a priority. The actual wording in Turkish was ‘*bildirir*’ meaning ‘making known’, had a sense of both dictating and informing. It was clear that the military officers and some of their civilian supporters wanted to read it as ‘dictating’. Many others understood it as a recommendation. As I will analyze below in detail, the media was split between these two readings. However, the declaration of National Security Council implied it meant a dictation as it included ‘sanctions’ in its text. The last article in the official NSC declaration says, “it was assessed that actions that contradict with these principles will lead to new tensions and sanctions by disrupting the peace and trust in society” (Milliyet 1997h).

Due to its critical implications, Erbakan hesitated to sign the declaration for five days. In the meantime he tried to reject the existence of a NSC decision and of any controversy between the military and civil members of the NSC, saying there was a full agreement at the NSC meeting (Sabah 1997e; Hurriyet 1997i). However, this was denied by the armed forces, saying that the armed forces will agree only with those who commit to the principle of Ataturk (Sabah 1997f). Then, the RP leadership argued that the NSC couldn’t dictate to the government. Erbakan said that NSC was a counseling organ, refusing the NSC decisions and blaming the media for making up news (Sabah 1997g; 1997h). As the pressure mounted, Erbakan tried to soften the declaration but this was rejected by the military (Sabah 1997i). Similarly, his efforts to garner support from other political parties were also proven unsuccessful. Erbakan chose to sign the decisions

probably to extend his stay in power and to diffuse the crisis over time, rejecting the existence of any crisis as well (Sabah 1997j).

As to the status of military in Turkish politics, a brief background would be useful. Since the Ottoman society the military class was a privileged one since the Empire was built on conquests. During the demise of the Empire, the military institution was the main target of the modernization efforts that opened it to the Western influence. Especially, the French Enlightenment project affected the late Ottoman elites, especially the military. This positivist military elite founded the nation-state of modern Turkish Republic out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. As the founding father, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk promoted a revolutionary project of cultural modernization based on secular nationalism. Both principles of nationalism and secularism contradicted the old Islamic view of the *Ummah* (religio-political community). After a single party-rule till the end of the World War II, the ruling elite voluntarily agreed to introduce a multi-party system. However, this transition was not very smooth, as the ruling elite did not want to submit to the political leaders as the state elites saw popular demands about religion as a threat to secular regime. The state-elites led by the military assigned themselves the authority to intervene the political process and leave after they secured the necessary changes in the system.

In 1960, the military took over the government by a coup d'état. It left the power to civilian after redesigning the rules of politics in Turkey. In 1970, the military again intervened in politics by giving a memorandum to the civilian government that, in turn, resigned and a new government of technocrats was established. Then, it left power to a real democratic process. Due to a political turmoil and increasing armed conflicts

between the leftist and right wing factions of society, the military took over the government in 1980, made a new constitution and remained in power for three years. The military coup came as a result of the Leftist movements in Turkey and fears of Soviet influence. Therefore, state-sponsored religious education was introduced to neutralize the leftist and socialist influence of the Soviet Unions. However, as an unintended consequence, it gave rise to an increased manifestation of religious activities in society (Rouleau 1996). The secular elite grew unhappy about the increasing religious feelings and practices and its public manifestation in the late 1980s and the 1990s. The Islamic Welfare Party (RP) was a significant sign of the increasing Islamic movement and managed to secure the number one seat in the parliamentary election of 1995. RP's coming to power in 1996 caused additional concerns among the secular elites and secular groups. During the RP coalition government with a secular party, DYP, the concerns about the secularism increased in media and the military send a very strong message that led to the resignation of the RP leader from government four months later. The period studied in this section is mostly about how this message is communicated by various political actors through various layers of political culture in Turkey.

### **Media and Military in the February 28 Process:**

Starting with the Sincan affair where the tanks marched in the streets of Sincan, what is called 'the process of February 28' was thought to be a type of a military intervention even though there was not a full agreement on the nature of this intervention (Coskun 1997a:3). The event was called a 'postmodern coup' (Alkan 2001; Candar 1997), a transparent coup (Cerrahoglu 1997), soft coup (Kamrava 1998), a modern coup (Cemal 1997g), a warning (Milliyet 1997z) and a military ultimatum (Dogan 1997c; Civaoglu

1997b; Sabah 1997ac)<sup>18</sup>. The reason for this confusion was its unique nature, i.e., realizing the goal of dispelling a legitimate government through mobilizing a public opinion backed up by a threat of a military coup. Many researchers agreed that there was a parallel between the media and military in this process (Erdogan 1999; Ozkok 2002; Akman 2002b; Ergin 2001). Political parties, the president, the Constitutional Court, academia and professional organizations provided their support for the process (Erdogan 1999).

For the subject matter of my project, I will focus on the relation between the media and military. Considering the fact that the new RP government threatened the ideological and material interests of the secular elites, both military and the media had strong interest in maintaining the status quo and the establishment. While the material interests of the corporate media demanded that their strong interest in the state subsidies and contracts are maintained (Finkel 2000), the ideological status of secular Kemalism provided the military with the role of guardianship of the Republic and an excuse to get involved in politics. That is because “Kemalism that constitutes the world-view of the Turkish Armed Forces represents a civilizational rupture: the Republic that represents the West and Modernity versus Ottomanism that represents the East and Islam” (Bozdemir 1985: 2653). The RP’s coming to power represented a significant shift from these economic and ideological priorities from big businesses toward small businesses, from radical secularism toward an establishment of religion. Similar to the military framing that blamed the democratic process, some journalists had a similar view, “since politics could not topple a government that caused a trouble for Turkey, we have experienced a ‘postmodern’ process” (Gonensin 2001).

As we will see below, the media did not question the validity of the military framing and generally chose to report the news from a military perspective. In this process, it was a very common practice in the media that an anonymous general expressed his dislike against the policies of the RP government in a threatening mode. The then secretary of general staff, Erol Ozkasnak, admitted that these statements were organized by his office after being approved by the second chief of general staff (Cevizoglu 2001)<sup>19</sup>. Similarly, the office of NSC later on admitted that it was in control of the statements to the media (Milliyet 2001a). Nevertheless, the media mostly chose to follow the military lead. Neither the proponents nor the opponents of the military rejected this proximity between the media and military. Some journalists even admitted that they supported the February 28 process (Ergin 2001; Ozkok 2002; Akman 2002b)<sup>20</sup>. The military, too, admitted that the journalists were trying to please the military in this process (Milliyet 2001a).

However, the situation was even more controversial for the journalists who opposed military intervention against the civilian government. The military seemed to have launched a psychological operation against those democratic journalists, along with RP, some members of the parliament, some civil society organizations and businessmen (Ilicak 2000a). The Andic (reminder) affair provided a live example for such an operation. Signed by the second chief of general staff and its secretary, a military document suggested the manipulation of the confessions by a recently captured terrorist leader of PKK, a separatist Kurdish terrorist organization in order to show democratic groups as supporters of the terrorist organization (Ilicak 2000a; Yeni Safak 2000a)<sup>21</sup>. The chief of general staff publicly admitted the document was genuine but claimed that it was only a



draft work but not applied (Milliyet 2000). The military document even suggested filing charges against these journalists in the state security courts. The targeted journalists said that those action plans were carried out (Yeni Safak 2000b) because they were fired after the document was released to the public. This provides a clear example of the close relation between the media and military in the February 28 process against the RP government. The journalist who was among the targeted journalists argued that the second chief of general staff, Cevik Bir, forced the media to fire some of these journalists (Birand 2001)<sup>22</sup>. Aydin Dogan, the majority owner of Turkish media outlets, also admitted that the military pressured them to fire some journalists who opposed to the February 28 process (Bayer 2001; Akman 2002d<sup>23</sup>).

### **Media Framing and the RP**


General media attitude of the media toward RP can be summarized as an increased polarization between anti-RP attitudes and pro-RP ones. The neutral attitude in the news coverage decreased five percent since the previous period (see ). As shown in Table 17, the anti-RP attitude was a little less than two thirds of the total news accounts (57 percent) and the pro-RP attitude was about one-fifth of total news coverage (16 percent). The former was the dominant one among both the news accounts and opinion columns. A slight increase in the pro-RP coverage (from 13 percent to 16 percent) since the previous period can be attributed to a small groups of purely democratic tendency among journalists.

**Table 17: Media Attitude to RP: National Security Meeting (February 27 - Mar 12, 1997)**


	NEWS		COLUMNS	
	#	%	#	%
Anti-RP	219	57	183	67
Neutral	102	27	67	24
Pro-RP	59	16	26	9
	380	100	276	100

The opinion columns represented a different trend in this period: while the pro-RP attitude was similar, the neutral attitude and the anti-RP changed significantly. The neutral attitude increased to 24 percent from 17 percent in the previous period. On the other hand, the anti-RP attitude decreased to 67 percent from 75 percent in the previous period. This difference can be attributed to the attitude of some columnists that distancing themselves equally from both RP and the pro-military solutions. Since the prospect of a military coup became more apparent, some journalist publicly disapproved of any military intervention. However, this type of journalism was still minority, constituting less than a quarter of the opinion columns (24 four percent). On the other hand, anti-RP columnists showed a strong anti-RP attitude and generally appreciative of the military's taking initiative. They even blamed other secular parties for failing to cooperate against RP. Some of the columns with an anti-RP attitude were belong to some democratic journalists. When their column criticized solely RP, they were coded as anti-RP. When they criticized both RP and pro-military interventions, they were coded neutral and when they defended RP against its opponents, they were coded as pro-RP.

The main characteristic of this period was a continuing trend of decline in the neutral news coverage (from 32 percent to 27 percent), which is under a higher editorial pressure compared to the opinion columns (Finkel 2000). Neutral coverage in the news accounts



**Figure 11: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: News Accounts**



**Figure 12: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: Opinion Columns**

lost its ground to both pro-RP and anti-RP attitudes in this period. This constitutes a contrast to the trend in the opinion columns. That is, the dominant anti-RP attitude in the opinion columns lost some of its strength even though it represented their main character, declining from 75 percent in the previous period to 67 percent. The reason for this reverse trend in the opinion columns is that some democratic columnists that previously used to criticize RP governments policies in the previous periods started to adopt a more neutral attitude in this period. In other words, the journalists who frequently criticized RP government before chose to criticize both RP and its opponents equally and sometimes defended RP's positive role in Turkish democracy against the proponents of a military intervention against the RP government. However, despite this reverse trend between the news coverage and opinion columns, the anti-RP attitude in the former was still higher than the anti-RP attitude in the latter (57 percent and 67 percent respectively).

## **Framing And Counterframing During The 28 February Process**

I conducted an analysis of what some intellectuals called a ‘postmodern coup’,<sup>24</sup> (Candar 1997e; Alkan 2001; Cevizoglu 2001) for a period of two weeks, starting two days prior to the event (February 27) until March 12, 1997. In this period, my associate and I identified 193 instances of framing in the news coverage and 152 instances in the opinion columns. Unlike the news accounts, the instances of framing in the news coverage were higher than the opinion columns. This was probably because of the increased framing battles between the actors of the conflict. In other words, both RP and its secular opponents including the military made numerous explanations that took in the press and responses to these statements also took place in the media. The media joined these framing battles in the form of a biased news coverage and opinion columns. As I explained earlier, the neutral news coverage lost its strength compared to the previous periods. However, there was a reverse trend in the opinion columns as the instances of neutral framing increased in this period because some columns that were opposed to both the Refah-Yol government and a military intervention. Even though the anti-RP framing was parallel in the news coverage and in the opinion columns, it was not the case for pro-RP framing. As we will see below, the emphasis in the news coverage differed from the one in the opinion columns.

### **Military and Politics: RP Government and NSC**

The coverage of the NSC meeting of February 28 in the Turkish media displayed a great sympathy toward the military and distaste toward the RP government. Overall this was apparent in both the style and content of the media coverage. The news coverage

allowed the anti-RP camp to speak for itself and the columns mostly did not question the validity of the agenda that was pushed forward by the military in the NSC meeting. The media readily accepted the decisions forced by the military members of the NSC that were reluctantly signed by the prime minister. For example, a columnist argued that by resisting the NSC decisions, RP was trying to weaken the image of military officers (Tokatli 1997a), ignoring the possibility that the military officers might be using the same strategy. Another one did not mind the military talking about politics in a country where the exploitation of religion is considered normal (Gureli 1997a). Another columnist wanted RP to back down from the crisis because he thought it would be difficult for military to do so (Akyol 1997c). The NSC decisions involved various restrictions on religious activities that were seen as a sign of increasing threats to the secular regime in Turkey. These decisions suggested the banning of traditional religious gear, the closing of private Koran seminaries, the pursuit of antiseccular speeches, protests, pro-irtija movements, the adoption of compulsory education<sup>25</sup> along with other decisions.<sup>26</sup>

The main focus of the debates in the media was whether the NSC can force (or dictate) the government to carry out its decisions. The pro-military camp argued that the constitution authorized the NSC to dictate its decisions to the government. The other camp thought the NSC could only recommend to the government. However, this group was not homogenous. Some of them showed a support for the RP government while the others equally distanced themselves from both RP and military's supporters. The latter can be described as a democratic group that opposed any military intervention to politics even though they did not necessarily supported RP's agenda. What I can call 'pro-

dictation' frame received more coverage (12 percent combined) in both news and opinion columns than the 'recommendation' frame (nine percent combined).

On the pro-military camp, some news coverage reported that a former chief-of-staff and a current member of DYP said that the decisions of NSC are dictations rather than 'recommendations' (Milliyet 1997l). The leader of CHP, Deniz Baykal, said "anybody can oppose to those decisions but the prime minister and vice prime minister cannot" (Milliyet 1997m). Another news account reported the opinion of the military as explained by an anonymous military officer: "we do not deal with the parliament working as a legislator but with the administration, we have problems with the execution (Sabah 1997l). The leader of another secular party (Yilmaz of ANAP) criticized RP for submitting to the NSC (Sabah 1997m). Similarly, several columnists argued that the government could not ignore the NSC decisions (Mengi 1997e; Dogru 1997b).

As for the recommendation frame, some democrats and RP members supported this frame. One columnist argued that NSC is not above the government and the parliament (Cemal 1997e). Some others criticized the word 'sanctions' in the NSC declaration because the constitution does not require any sanctions for NSC decisions (Candar 1997b; Hurriyet 1997f; Hurriyet 1997g). Candar of Sabah even criticized the argument that RP must step down in order to prevent a military coup, saying that this argument itself latently threatens the RP government with a military intervention (Candar 1997c). The leader of ANAP argued that the NSC could only recommend (Milliyet 1997n). RP, too, did not accept that NSC was authorized to dictate on the government. One of the spokesmen for RP said, "the job of NSC is different, that of government is different. Even if they call it a statement, its content is a recommendation. Demanding the things in

the constitution does not change anything” (Sabah 1997k). Similarly, some of the big businessmen supported the recommendation frame. “NSC is a high institution where they offer reasonable, useful recommendations about the country. What is important are the applications” (Hurriyet 1997e). RP members also thought that the NSC could only recommend to the government and the government is not obligated to carry out these recommendations. For example, a prominent minister of RP government, Abdullah Gul, said that the government does not have to apply the NSC decisions because he thought that the constitution gives the government the authority to apply or reject it (Milliyet 1997n). Other RP members, including its leader, shared this opinion (Milliyet 1997p; Milliyet 1997r; Milliyet 1997s).

### **Anti-RP Framing:**

*Anti-Regime Framing:* Two of the most common anti-RP framings were apparent in both news coverage and opinion columns: (1) RP poses a threat to the regime in Turkey; (2) RP is against secularism because it seeks a sharia regime. In terms of their emphasis, they are closely related. While the first one implies a general problem, the second one specifies the direction of the threat, i.e., secularism. These two frames combined constituted a major part of the news accounts with 40 percent and constituted about 28 percent of the framing in opinion columns (see Table 18). Most of the news accounts covered anti-RP framing through third parties. For example, the leader of secular leftist party, Mr. Ecevit is reported saying that in the eight-month period of RP government, it was seen that RP was positioned outside the regime (Milliyet 1997i). It was obvious that the military was uncomfortable with the RP government and its policies. One event that

Table 18: Anti-RP Framing: NSC Meeting (February 27 - Mar 12, 1997)

Opposing Frames	News Accounts		Columns	
	#	%	#	%
RP wants sharia and is anti-secular	38	19	23	16
RP Threat to the regime	42	21	19	12
RP (or Refah-Yol) is minority	2	1	17	11
RP Must leave the government	6	3	12	8
NSC dictates	11	6	10	6
RP Dishonest	7	4	10	6
RP Exploits Religion	15	8	8	5
Refah-Yol – Corruption	10	5	8	5
Neither Coup d’Etat nor Sharia	8	4	8	5
RP with fascistic and oppressive tendency	2	1	8	5
Occupying the State Posts	20	10	7	5
RP has a hidden agenda	7	4	7	5
NSC recommends	9	5	6	4
Civil Society against RP (or Refah-Yol)	7	4	6	4
RP Creates Tension	1	1	3	2
RP provokes military			2	1
8 Year Continuous Compulsory Education	9	5	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>193</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>

caused a controversy was Erbakan’s invitation of Sufi leaders to an official Ramadan dinner in his office. This event was seen in the media not only as recognition of Sufi orders but also as a favoritism toward them. Both of these actions were not a legitimate actors in political culture of Turkey.<sup>27</sup> A former secretary general of NSC is reported saying,

“Anybody can be invited to the office of prime minister and they can be a member of a Sufi order but if they publicly says ‘they are inviting the Sufi leaders [to a dinner in the office of the Prime Minister], it means drawing a sword against secularism. Such steps puts those who are responsible for protecting national security and the character of the Republic into a delicate position (Milliyet 1997o).

An MP from another secular left party, CHP, was cited saying that the mosque project in Taksim Square, wearing headscarf in government offices and Sufi orders invading state posts all constituted a danger to democracy (Milliyet 1997j). One columnist established a connection between the threat to secularism and to regime: “Everybody knows that this government will end soon because the NSC decision means filing charges against RP about irtija that is a threat to the regime” (Mengi 1997b).



As for the specific anti-secularism frames, the press showed a great interest in the subject-matter. Many opponents of RP found themselves a favorable reception in the media. For example, one of the members of secular DYP, Işıl Saygın was reported to blame RP for exploiting the ban on women's headscarf for its political gain: "they try to create the impression that as if those who wear headscarf are Muslim and those who do not wear it are not Muslims" (Milliyet 1997k). All of the *irtija* frames that took place in the media implied that it posed a threat to the secularism the way it was applied in Turkey (see the *irtija* section below). One columnist of Sabah warned RP to control the fundamentalist groups at one time (Birand 1997a) and wanted RP to exclude its radical elements at other time (Birand 1997b). Related to the minority frame below with an emphasis on secularism, a columnist said, 95 percent of Turkey would not approve compromising from the regime of a secular democratic republic" (Sertoglu 1997a; see Asik 1997c). Questioning its sincerity, another columnist criticized RP's claim that they want a secularism similar to the West, "As if they want a secular system, as if they defend equality between men and women, as if they adopt a secular legal system, as if they care about secular education and as if they support compulsory religious education. No, none of the above. They do not even care about secularism" (Cemal 1997d). Another columnist was more direct on blaming RP for the increasing threats to the secular regime, "encouraged by RP's coming to power, *Irtija* (reactionary Islam) boomed, ... RP sees *irtija* as a relative rather than an opponent" (Mengi 1997c).

*Exploitation of Religion:* Related to the anti-regime and secularist frames, the exploitation of religion frame was also a significant one with a 13 percent combined in

both news accounts and opinion columns. Considered with other frames of ‘threats to regime’, we can easily conclude that the media focused on protecting the secular character of the regime among other possible elements of the regime such as democracy, nationalism, etc. A female member of secular DYP, Isilay Saygin, said that RP was exploiting the issue of headscarf for political gain (Milliyet 1997k). A columnist mentions what he thinks RP exploits such as religious schools, Koran seminaries, Sufi orders, headscarf (Mengi 1997d; see Altan 1997a). The other one claims that RP represents the exploitation of religion, “RP’s coming to government replaced the economic-based demands with the demands of exploiting religion” (Mengi 1997f).

*Hidden Agenda:* The hidden agenda received a significant amount of coverage in the media constituting nine percent of the frames in the news and opinion columns combined. The hidden agenda frame is a strategy to attack on the character of the opponents (Benford and Hunt 2001; Iberra and Kitsuse 19993), blaming the RP for hiding its real intentions to change the regime. In that sense, this framing strategy is also closely related to previous anti-RP frames because it does not think RP is sincere about democracy. Ergin of Hurriyet argued that Erbakan was hiding his real agenda by saying that he agreed with the military officers and the president about their concerns about secularism (Ergin 1997). A columnist mentioned that the military sees Erbakan’s conciliatory actions as a *takiyye* (dissimulation or hidden agenda) (Akyol 1997c). See the *takiyye* section below.

*RP Represents a Minority:* The minority frame was little covered in the news accounts (one percent) but constituted the third most common frame in the opinion columns (11 percent). This framing strategy mainly aimed to depict RP in particular

and/or Refah-Yol government in general as a minority and, therefore, it is not entitled to rule the country. This framing effort even ignored the fact that RP ruled the country with its secular partner, securing a parliamentary majority's vote of confidence (about 40 percent of popular votes and 53 percent of the parliamentary seats (for the details of election results and parliamentary distribution of deputies, see Table 2 above). For example, one columnist put it very straightforward; "The problem in Turkey today is that RP practically in a third place wants to rule the country as if it constitutes a majority by itself" (Ozkok 1997a). Another columnist argued that RP and its supporters want to make Turkey a state of religion but Turkish people would not accept this with an overwhelming majority (Atakli 1997a; 1007b). The editor-in-chief of Hurriyet said in his column, "We need to avoid seeing as an artificial agenda the reactions after the Sincan Affair and the surprising actions by the minister of justice... This reaction is not an artificial agenda but is an expression of self-defense forced upon the 80 percent against this radical core [within RP]" (Ozkok 1997a). Some others even described the RP leader as a dictator that is based on a minority support (Sirmen 1997b; Livaneli 1997a).

*Occupying State Posts:* One of the common anti-RP framing was that the RP uses its power to invade the state offices with its supporters. This was used in two senses: (1) RP government does not follow a common good for majority but immorally seeks a minority and partisan interests and (2) under the assumption that RP members do not respect secularism, the act of occupying state posts poses a threat to the secular regime. Most of the framings on the issue involved the second sense. One columnist interpreted Erbakan agreeing with the NSC decisions as a sign for an effort to extend its stay in power (Sirmen 1997b). Another one argued that the NSC decision of 28 February was to control RP's

occupation of state posts along with its other activities (Mengi 1997d). Some argued that his action also took place in the municipalities under RP control (Hurriyet 1997d).

Other anti-RP framings also took place in the media but with a lesser degree. For example, there were the claims that RP was dishonest (10 percent combined), that RP must leave the government (11 percent), that Refah-Yol government is plagued with corruption (10 percent), that civil society is against the Refah-Yol government (eight percent) and others that I omitted from analysis due to space limitations (see Table 18 for details).

### **Pro-RP Framing in the Media**

The parallel between the news and opinion in anti-RP framing, the pro-RP framing does not involve the same emphasis between the news accounts and opinion columns. In general, the news seemed to provide a direct coverage of what RP said while the opinion columns wanted to defend RP's status and role in a democratic system. That is why we see many frames that expressed in the news and not in the columns, and vice versa. However, the two most common pro-RP framings found coverage both in the news and columns.<sup>28</sup> The first one was that the NSC could only recommend to government, constituting 38 percent of the pro-RP news and 20 percent of the columns (see Table 19). The other one blamed the media for creating, exaggerating, and provoking state institutions for a crisis, constituting 23 percent of the pro-RP news coverage and 40 percent of the pro-RP columns. One interesting finding was that the news accounts covered RP's complaint about oppressive policies toward religion in Turkey (19 percent) while the columnist totally ignored such framings by RP.

Table 19: Pro-RP Framing: NSC Meeting (February 27 - Mar 12, 1997)

Pro-RP Frames	News		Columns	
	Occurrence	Percentage	Occurrence	Percentage
Media exaggerates, provokes	6	23	6	40
MGK can only recommend	10	38	3	20
Bourgeoisie not sincere about Democracy			3	20
Secular Elite is suspicious about people			2	2
Secularism is not the Sole Problem			1	1
Secularism Like in the West	2	8		
Religion is Oppressed	5	19		
No Controversy in the NSC Meeting	2	8		
We appointed to state offices very little	1	4		
<b>Total</b>	26	100	15	100

*Secularism:* Many RP framing efforts emphasized that religious freedom was not sufficient in Turkey due to an oppressive official state policies toward religion. The leader of RP, Erbakan, asked some mercy and understanding for Muslims and demanded a clear definition of secularism, “secularism is not anti-religion... It is an ignorance to position secularism against religion” (Milliyet 1997u). At another time, Erbakan said that there is a system of secularist fascism in Turkey (Hurriyet 1997h; Hurriyet 1997 An RP municipal leader was reported saying that, “Those who say RP is against secularism are the ones that lost their economic interest due to RP government. Secularism is a regime that will collapse due to building a mosque in Taksim square, headscarf...” (Milliyet 1997v).

Another aspect of RP’s countering the charges of antiseccularism was that RP wanted secularism the way it was in the West. They demanded a secularism in Turkey to at least similar to the ones in the West. A prominent minister of the RP government said,

“Americans understand secularism better than the conditioned ones in Turkey”, arguing that RP is more tolerant than the secularists in Turkey (Milliyet 1997x). One RP member went even further by claiming, “the application is not secularism but atheism in Turkey” (Sabah 1997n; see Sabah 1997o). RP did not accept the charge of threat to the regime, “Turkey is a democratic country. There is no problem with the regime. We left behind all of the problems artificially created” (Hurriyet 1997j).

RP blamed the media for creating a tension and crisis against the government. The RP leader blamed the media for making up news to damage the government, especially exaggerating the NSC meeting (Sabah 1997p; Candar 1997d; Cemal 1997). Several columnists argued that the secular intellectuals for not recognizing RP as a part of society, “we see a dirty provocation of intellectuals. Like religious bigots, there are secularist bigots that would sacrifice democracy for secularism” (Tamer 1997b; Candar 1997d).

RP did not accept the charges that RP members occupying the state post, an RP spokesman said that they did the least occupation of state posts (Milliyet 1997t). There were some minor coverage of other pro-RP framings such as blaming the bourgeoisie for not supporting democracy (Ozsever 1997).

## **CHAPTER V: TOWARD THE END OF RP**

### ***SECTION I: Media, Military and the RP Government***

In this chapter, I will look at two critical events that brought about the end of the RP. One was the suit filed against RP (May 21, 1997) and the other was the military briefing to the members of judiciary (June 10, 1997). Both of these events were critical for the future of Refah-Yol government. While the first one was a sign of the state to disqualify as a legitimate political actor, the second one was thought to send an ultimatum to the Refah-Yol government by defining irtija and RP government as the number one threat. In the second section, I will analyze the suit against RP. I will analyze the briefing and the suit by conducting a content analysis on the texts of the briefing and suit from a framing perspective. Then, I will analyze the media coverage of each event independently.

The Refah-Yol government was founded on a slim parliamentary majority constituted by RP and secular DYP led by Mrs. Ciller that agreed with Erbakan on the rotation of the premiership. Under mounting pressure by military and the media, the Refah-Yol government started to lose some of its parliamentary support as some deputies from DYP began to withdraw their support from the government. To avoid further trouble within the parliament and to prevent a military intervention, the Refah-Yol government decided to make a change. That is, Mrs. Ciller would be the new prime minister of Refah-Yol government after Erbakan's resignation. Erbakan submitted his resignation to the president Suleyman Demirel on June 18, 1997 and demanded that Mrs. Ciller should take over the office by declaring the support of a parliamentary majority from three parties (RP, DYP and BBP). Erbakan even called the event "refueling in the

air” (Milliyet 1997as), suggesting the Refah-Yol government would continue the same way under the leadership of Mrs. Ciller. However, it seems that during this period the coalition partners underestimated the executive opposition to the coalition, or more accurately to RP’s presence in the coalition (see Zaman 1997c). When explaining why he resigned from the premiership, Erbakan said “[His] resignation was not as a result of the tension but aimed to exchange the premiership with the DYP” (Zaman 1997d). However, the president did not share this claim by saying that “I have difficulty to understand how the government that resigned as a result of the tension in the country will solve the controversies by maintaining the same government under a different formula” (Zaman 1997d).

Since the beginning, the coalition partners did not think that there was any reason for a discomfort among the state elites, claiming that the crisis is made up by the media and special interest groups (Milliyet 1997as). However, they were aware of the mounting pressure signaled by the military briefing and suit against RP, they thought they could avoid a crisis if the leader of secular DYP (i.e., Ciller) took over the government. However, the president had a different agenda especially after the military defined *irtija* (reactionary Islam) as the number one threat and saw RP as the center of *irtija*.<sup>29</sup> In other words, Erbakan’s resignation followed a military briefing that was seen as an ultimatum to the Refah-Yol government, accusing it supporting and encouraging *irtija* (June 10, 1997).<sup>30</sup> The media covered this event with a strong pro-military attitude as the daily Sabah headlined the event “Turkey is proud of you” (Sabah 1997r). Below I will analyze the military framing and its coverage in the media in detail. Many argued that the days of the government were numbered because the military seemed determined to take over.



After Erbakan's resignation under the mounting pressure, the president chose Mesut Yilmaz, leader of center right ANAP, that was the third party in the parliament to head a coalition government instead of Erbakan's partner, Mrs. Ciller, signaling the end of the Refah-Yol government. The daily *Milliyet* (1997au) reported that the military is against Ciller's premiership. Many saw this a type of a military intervention: a 'postmodern coup' (Alkan 2001; Candar 1997e), a transparent coup (Cerrahoglu 1997), a modern coup (Cemal 1997g), a warning (*Milliyet* 1997z) and a military ultimatum (Dogan 1997c; Civaoglu 1997b; Sabah 1997ac). The media agreed on the seriousness of the event. Politically, this event resembled a military coup because the government resigned due to an unconventional political process (i.e., under the threat of a military coup), rather than loosing its parliamentary support. This crisis led to the breakup of secular DYP as to whether to support a new government or not, causing a split in the party and resignations, signaling the end of Refah-Yol government.

I argued throughout my work that the indirect military intervention in Turkish politics that resulted in the resignation of the prime minister Erbakan on June 18, 1997 was mainly a result of the cooperation between the media and military. Other state institutions and civil society organizations also joined this campaign when needed. The addresses chosen for military briefings easily show the aspects of cooperation and agreement between them. The military briefings were given to the president, to the members of the judiciary, media and academia as a sympathetic audience and possibly cooperators with their agenda. In addition, the military did not invite the Islamic media and secular democratic journalists that opposed military intervention.<sup>31</sup> The president Demirel prevented the continuation of the Refah-Yol government by not allowing Ciller

to head the coalition government. Ciller called any coalition formula that prevents her premiership as a president's government (Zaman 1997a). Academia expressed their discomfort against the RP government, too (Milliyet 1997at; Zaman 1997r; Heper 1997c). The judiciary showed its support to the briefing by participating in the event despite the ban to do so by the minister of justice, Sevket Kazan. As can be seen throughout this work, the media's sympathetic coverage of the military was easy to detect and below I will provide a content analysis of the media coverage of the military briefing as well. The military's preference among the media was also an important sign of the cooperation of between the two institutions. The military's choice to invite what media also has a great implication for what the military sees as legitimate and illegitimate media. The latter included all of the religious media plus the secular democratic media that directly opposed any military intervention in politics<sup>32</sup>. The legal campaign that resulted in the banning of RP can provide a clear perspective on the degree of cooperation between the media and military against RP (for details on the legal campaign against RP, see the section on the suit against RP below p.130ff). The chief office of the general staff even opened suits against the religious media that it thought was damaging the military's image<sup>33</sup> and even applied to the High Council of Radio and Television to shut down Kanal 7, an Islamic-oriented TV channel (see Sabah 1997v).

### **Military's Briefing to the Members of Judiciary:**

The military briefing is the structured process through which military elites articulate the beliefs and desires of the military. They represented the official perspective of the military institution. These briefings are dramatized events, and are carefully scripted and

delivered to audiences perceived to be sympathetic to the military's interpretation of events. This strategy allows the military to set the agenda of the debate, to begin the framing process regarding a critical event that they themselves were intending to create. Other actors, particularly RP, were required to counterframe the situation under the terms set by the briefing.

The Secretariat of the National Security Council (NSC) held a briefing for members of judiciary (i.e., justices and prosecutors) on June 10, 1997. As the decisions of NSC in February 1997 were mentioned eleven times in the NSC briefing, we can easily infer that the briefing was a follow-up on the NSC decisions. In this briefing, the military defined *irtija* as the number one problem in Turkey. As I will analyze its coverage in the media below, the briefing was mostly interpreted as the last warning to the Refah-Yol government<sup>34</sup>. The fact that the Prime Minister Erbakan resigned a week later clearly shows the importance of the message. I conducted a content analysis of this briefing text as it was presented to its audience.<sup>35</sup> Then, I analyzed its coverage in the media. In other words, the first analysis was about how it was presented to the elite audience (judiciary) and the second analysis deciphered how it was communicated to general population through media.

What is *irtija*? As usual, the number one problem called *irtija* was used very casually and ambiguously in the briefing, ranging from radical groups to all religious activity. Before explaining who were thought to be *irtijaic* groups, the text starts with defining goals of *irtijaic* groups: "the ultimate goal for *irtijaic* and radical elements is to establish political Islam and to restructure the state administration of Turkish Republic according to Islamic principles" (Sabah 1997s). The term *irtija* was used in various senses and

Table 20: Various Uses of Irtija in the Military Briefing of June 1997

<b>Irtijaic Agents</b>	<b>Occurrences</b>	<b>Irtijaic Actions</b>	<b>Occurrences</b>
irtijaic camp	34	irtijaic activities	11
proponents of <i>irtija</i>	8	irtijaic threats	2
irtijaic elements	6	irtijaic tendency	1
irtijaic movements	1	irtijaic view	1
irtijaic organizations	1	irtija card	1
		irtijaic symbol	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>17</b>

interchanged with other terms such as political Islam, fundamentalism and Islamic terror. In the briefing, there were 66 occurrences of *irtija* in its noun and adjective forms along with four uses of radical Islamism, two religious fundamentalisms and two political Islam, being used more or less interchangeably. We can easily group the uses of *irtija* as actions and actors (see Table 20). The irtijaic actions were mentioned in the form of *irtijaic activities*<sup>36</sup> (11 occurrences), irtijaic threats (two occurrences), irtija card, irtijaic tendency and irtijaic view. The irtijaic actors involved proponents of *irtija*<sup>37</sup> (eight occurrences), irtijaic camp (34 occurrences), irtijaic elements (six occurrences), irtijaic symbol, irtijaic movements and irtijaic organizations.

Despite the ambiguous use of the term *irtija*, the military briefing involved various clues about the nature and extent of the irtijaic threat that was declared to be the number one security threat in the country and declared the RP government responsible for such developments. The linking of RP to *irtija* was clear in the briefing even though RP's name was not publicly mentioned. Two uses of the political Islam in the briefing clearly pointed to the RP government as it was the sole political party based on a religious agenda. Moreover, the briefing stated that in the last 11 months, the irtijaic threat increased, disrupting peace and confidence in society. The eleven month period mentioned in there clearly overlapped with the time period of RP government. Moreover,

“Irtijaic activities that gained a momentum toward civil rebellion are trying to be camouflaged by the rhetoric of ‘artificial agenda’ (Sabah 1997s). As previous analyses revealed, ‘artificial agenda promoted by the media’ was a main framing strategy used by the RP government to underplay the discomfort on the part of the secular groups against the government. Similarly, this statement was to counter RP’s artificial agenda frame to underplay the crisis. As we have shown above, RP expressed this view in many occasions (see the tables 19 and 24 for pro-RP framing in various critical events we studied in this project; see also Akyol 1997b; Milliyet 1997ac; Birand 1997c; Birand 1997d).

### **The Briefing’s Message Unveiled:**

I tried to break down the messages embedded in the briefing text using framing perspective in social movements. This event fits well to a social movement perspective even though the military is a main state institution. In other words, the military devoted its energy to shape the public opinion in order to make a case for making irtija as the number one and most urgent problem. Of course, the strength of the message is related to the power of its sender, as well. That is, the military’s message was used under the impression that it was determined to show that it meant what it said. The framing theory looks at how a social problem is defined, what causal relation it establishes and what kind of solutions it suggests (Benford and Snow 2000).

Diagnostic Framing: What Snow et al (1986) called “diagnostic frame” involves two dimensions (Benford 1993a): (1) what the problem is, and (2) what and who caused the problem. As the briefing defined the nature of the ‘irtija’ problem, its definition involved various things and activities. For example, the increasing social support for Sufi orders,

religious groups becoming involved in with politics, a *de facto* change in the management of religious affairs by the state, headscarf issue at schools and other state offices, increasing number of religious communication tools (e.g. newspapers, magazines, radio and TV), propaganda against the military and regime, religious financial power, approaching the Kurdish problem with a religious (ummah) perspective, irtijaic camps' alleged contact with Kurdish terrorist organization (PKK), foreign support for irtija (from Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan), occupying state institutions, an increase in the number of students attending the registered Koran seminaries as well as unregistered seminaries<sup>38</sup>, the graduates of religious schools choosing non-religious professions, exploiting religious feelings. As we can see the clear majority of these activities are not radical or violent activities and can be easily seen as normal religious activities by Western standards. The briefing does not provide any specific evidence for the radicalization of religious groups in Turkey.

*Agents:* The briefing identified the agents of this social problem as follows: separatist movements, the RP government, members of the National View sympathetic to RP, some members of the parliament, some religious leaders (i.e., imams working as a state officer), some municipalities under RP control, the graduate of religious high schools, Islamic businessmen, 30 radical organizations tied to *irtija*, municipal leaders (e.g. that of Kayseri and Sincan), religious leaders, and local party administrators. Especially, the last three agents point to the members of RP that was a part of a coalition government. For examples, the speeches by the RP members were mention as an example of RP threat to the regime (Sabah 1997s). The military framed the current number of religious schools (*Imam Hatip Liseleri* or *IHL*) as a problem because 51 thousand graduated from these

high schools were mentioned as surplus and they prefer to go to the professions other than religious goals (Sabah 1997s). While these religious high schools (*IHL*) were framed as a problem due to its inflated number, the briefing blamed what it called ‘irtijaic camp’ for criticizing the military for banning the religious (*IHL*) high schools and for depicting the military institution as anti-religious (Sabah 1997s).

*Causality:* The causes attributed to the emergence of the irtija problem were also expressed in various forms in the briefing. It blamed the transition to democracy for providing an opportunity for fundamentalism to gain a mass character, for encouraging disrespect for Ataturk and his regime<sup>39</sup>. For example, the briefing stated, “Ataturk’s policies of education and culture was quitted in the multi-party period due to political gains. Then, the consequent void was filled well by the irtijaic camp that currently focused on the activities of propaganda, organization and leaking to state institutions in order to create an political Islamist movement that opposes secularism as antireligion” (Sabah 1997s). Another reason for the rise of irtija was seen as the insufficient state control over religious affairs and insufficient state surveillance of religious activities. Moreover, the RP government was accused of encouraging and helping irtijaic activities and the state laws are said to be insufficient to stop irtijaic activities.

*Severity of Problem:* What Benford (1993a) called ‘severity of problem’ emphasizes the seriousness of the problem. The severity of what the NSC briefing called ‘irtija threat’ was expressed in various forms. The examples of the claims to show the severity of problem were as follows. The democratic, secular and social rule of law system is in dander of falling. The country and nation are taken into darkness. Fanatical and

chauvinist fundamentalists have spread unexpectedly. Sufi orders and organizations like National View have taken control of some parts of society. There is an increased number of activities to destroy the secular Republic. Therefore, the Turkish nation is about to dismantle. The democratic, secular and rule of law is in danger of falling. The political Islam spread throughout society with its media power, its economic and civil society organizations. The irtijaic threat reached very serious levels. The government allows its members to occupy the state posts. As can be seen easily, these claims were mostly abstract and general rather than being very specific.

*Urgency of Solution:* Social movements not only define what the problem is but also what the solutions should be (Benford 1993a). In other words, the collective action frames consist of claims about how urgently a solution is needed to fix a problematic situation. The general implication of the briefing was that the regime was in danger of falling and, therefore, it called for action to solve this problem. As a conservative movement, the military called for stopping what it thought dangerous developments. However, the following developments seemed to be emphasized as a priority: Irtija is widespread, that media, economy and government is dominated by them. It is highly probable that radical Islam will commit terrorist activities. Most importantly, the briefing defined irtija to be the number one threat, even greater than the Kurdish separatist PKK that plagued the country politically and economically and led to 30 thousand deaths in terrorist and counterterrorist clashes in the last two decades. The briefing concludes that the problem is very clear and urgent:

To conclude, with regard to the current activities of the irtijaic camp, it is clear that the irtijaic camp aims to destroy the state of Turkish Republic established by Ataturk and described in the constitution by deviating from the idea of democratic, secular and 'rule of law'. Also, it is assessed that the irtijaic threat reached very serious levels as it emerged to realize 'political Islam' in our country" (Sabah 1997s).



The briefing also cautioned about the rising economic power of the religious businesses and the Iranian conspiracy to promote a sharia regime in Turkey (Sabah 1997s).

*Efficacy of Taking Action:* Efficacy of taking action are the kind of frames that focus on the effectiveness of taking action about certain problems. These actions are thought to help solve the problem. In the NSC briefing such frames suggested banning various irtijaic activities by the state. The NSC meeting of February 28 suggested various actions<sup>40</sup> against the rising threat of irtija. The frames about taking action against the perceived threats were defined as follows. In the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Code, the duty of the Turkish Armed Forces is defined as “protecting and defending the Turkish land and the Turkish Republic as defined by the constitution” (Yargitay 2003). The Turkish armed forces justified its military coup of 1980 by this law. To protect the Republic against the internal and external threats, even by force. Internal threats were also seen under the main duties of the Turkish Armed Forces according to the Internal Service Statute (Sabah 1997s).

*Propriety of Taking Action:* The propriety of taking action are the frames that emphasizes The military’s assuming leading role to fight against a perceived threat. Ousting a democratically elected government was, of course, problematic in a democratic system. The military tried to find a legal and moral justification for such an action. It was argued in the briefing that the military institution assumes a duty out of the situation and takes on the job of reevaluating the threat to the regime according the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Code’s article 35. As a result of the military’s definition of irtija as the prime threat, the armed forces is to take on the duty of intelligence, in addition to National Intelligence Organization (MIT), in order to take a picture of this nation-wide

event.<sup>139</sup> The West Study Group take on this job. Another frame asked the civil society to join the campaign:

The fact that the Turkish republic is a state based on democracy, secularism and social law is a moral contract between the state and the nation... Therefore, The main duty for every democratic and secular citizen, who loves the country founded by Ataturk, is to carefully survey, not to remain impartial, and to act against, the irtijaic threat's this aspect that aims to destroy TC and to explain it to all sections of society" (Sabah 1997s).

## GENERAL MEDIA ATTITUDE

While being predominantly an anti-RP in character, the general media attitude toward RP seems to have stabilized in this period, maintaining about the same attitude since the last period (i.e., the process of February 28), it did not change more than two percent. It can be summarized as an overwhelmingly anti-RP attitude in the media. As Table 21 shows, the anti-RP attitude in both news coverage and opinion columns continued to be dominant (57 and 66 percent respectively). The anti-RP attitude even led to an editorial distortion of an otherwise a balanced news reporting. The daily Sabah titled a "RP's Minister Admitted", claiming that RP admitted its wrongdoing. The content of the news objectively report what the minister said and does not imply any wrong-doing, except the title's implication for that.


The exact coverage was as follows: "The minister Sacit Gunbey that is responsible for the fund of social cooperation and solidarity that is known as Fak-Fuk Fon said that they paid 'the poor' [emphasis original] 20 trillion Turkish liras and gave the unemployed 2.5 trillion liras since they came to power" (Sabah 1997u). Even though the minister's words

**Table 21: Media Attitude toward RP: The End of Coalition (June 12 – 18, 1997)**


	News		Columns	
	#	%	#	%
Anti-RP	159	57	102	66
Neutral	80	28	40	26
Pro-RP	42	15	13	8
Total	281	100	155	100

do not imply any partisanship, the title claims that it is by depicting a welfare policy as a wrong-doing. At least, the report does not include any other proof than the minister's speech that cannot be taken an admission of guilt. The neutral attitude was a little more than a quarter in both news and columns (28 and 26 percent, respectively). Like before, pro-RP attitude was limited in this period, constituting only 15 percent of the news accounts and eight percent of the opinion columns. Anti-RP Framing:

RP Government Must End: Anti-RP framing was the dominant framing strategy in the Turkish media. As shown in Table 22, the most common theme in both news and columns was that RP government must end soon (13 percent in the news and 21 percent in the columns). They blamed the Refah-Yol government for the tension and crisis in Turkey and argued that their leaving power would lead to a better environment. From various sectors of society, those who say that RP government must end were reported in both news accounts and opinion columns. For example, the leader of secular leftist DSP, Ecevit, called other parties to form an alternative government: "For such a government, all the parties outside RP must urgently come together before the regime and state is damaged further" (Sabah 1997y). A columnist argued that after the military briefing's strong message, it is a priority that the RP government must leave power (Cemal 1997h). Many of the media accounts also shared this view both in the news and



**Figure 13: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: News Accounts**



**Figure 14: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: Opinion Columns**

columns (see Sabah 1997z; Akyol 1997d). Another columnist argued that the majority of Turkey was against the continuation of Refah-Yol government in another form (Heper 1997c).

*Irtija Threat:* The most common thread throughout my research was that irtija threat was real and eminent and that RP was responsible for this threat directly or indirectly. The ‘irtija threat’ constituted the second most common framing (nine percent of the anti-RP news coverage and 19 percent of the columns). The media seems to have readily accepted a redefinition of irtija as the number one threat along with an ethnic separatist threat. Various journalists accused RP government of encouraging irtijaic activities. One argued, “after the government falls, the irtija threat will be expelled from the decision making mechanisms and the country will pass this critical threshold” (Livaneli 1997b). Another columnist argued, “In the military briefing, irtija and RP was used interchangeably. In other words, there emerged an equation that RP is working to destroy the secular and democratic Republic” (Dogan 1997c).

Table 22: Anti-RP Framing: Toward the End of Coalition (June 12 – 18, 1997)

Anti-RP Framing	News		Columns	
	Occurrences	Percentage	Occurrences	Percentage
Refah-Yol Must End	14	13	21	21
Irtija Threat	9	9	18	19
Military vs. RP Government	18	16	9	10
Support for Briefing	17	16	5	5
New RP Gov. Will Not Reduce the Tension	10	10		
Against the Minister of Justice	5	5	9	10
D-8'e negative	3	3	10	11
Exploiting Religion	4	4	8	9
Blame Ciller	2	2	10	11
RP antidemocratic	7	7	4	4
RP Must Not Join New Gov.	8	8		
Occupying State Posts	6	6	1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>100</b>

*Military Against RP:* The third most common framing in the Turkish media was that the military was unhappy with the Refah-Yol government (16 percent of the anti-RP news and 10 percent of the columns). These framings emphasized various aspects of the last warning to the Refah-Yol government. Military wants civilian opposition to take an initiative against the RP government. Several columnists argued that the tension between the military and the RP government reached to a level of crisis (Gureli 1997b; Heper 1997c). This view that the military holds the RP government responsible for the rise of irtija (Heper 1997b; Cekirge 1997a). A columnist explained the nature of the tension between the military and the government:

The military accuses Erbakan of supporting the activities that aim to base the societal and political system on an Islamic foundation and, therefore, of betraying secular and democratic Turkish Republic... Turkey is experiencing the worst crisis of its history. The military declared that it would perform its duty of protecting the Republic by force if needed. It is obvious that the armed forces started a process of intervention (Elekdag 1997b).

### **Pro-Military Framing:**

The fourth most common framing effort was the ones that supported the military briefing to the members of judiciary (16 percent in the news and five percent in the columns). This support displayed itself in a direct support for the agenda in the briefing and praising the judiciary's participation in the event despite the ban by the ministry of justice. The day after the briefing the daily newspaper Sabah chose a headline that showed a full-hearted support for the briefing: "Turkey is proud of you" (Sahah 1997r). After the briefing, a columnist thought that it confirmed his concerns about the RP government and reminded his earlier warnings, "we have the same response of 'artificial agenda' [emphasis original] when we expressed these concerns about this tension and even their efforts to occupy state posts for four months" (Cegirge 1997a). The leader of the secular CHP, Deniz Baykal, was reported that he was happy with the briefing by saying that "the military helped to unmask RP by working like a democratic mass organization. This result was realized by creating a public opinion pressure without interrupting the democratic regime" (Sabah 1997aa; see also Sabah 1997ab). Another columnist supported the military reaction to the RP government by arguing that the chiefdom of the general staff started to work as a civil society organization in a military uniform (Dogru 1997c).

*Exploiting Religion:* Exploitation of religion frame was also common in this period, constituting four percent of the anti-RP framing in the news and nine percent in the columns. The claim that RP is exploiting religion was a common theme among the secular politicians and journalists (see Gogus 1997). The chief columnist of the daily Hurriyet argued that the meaning of the messages by the Turkish Armed Forces is clear,

“the source of the problem are politicians that asked votes from people by exploiting religion” (Eksi 1997b).

*RP vs. Democracy:* Like the previous periods, RP’s unparallel with democracy found a significant coverage in this period (seven percent of the anti-RP frames and four percent of the opinion columns). Confirming Heper’s (2002) thesis that the journalists in Turkey adopted a views of ‘rational democracy’, the exploitation of religion was twice as common in the opinion columns than the news accounts. One columnist criticized intellectuals that thought RP was a part of democratic system, arguing that RP was not sincere about democracy and seek a hidden agenda (Uluc 1997b). Another columnist was even more blatant in his attack on those who see RP as a democratic party, “to seek a democratic element in RP, you must be either blind or ignorant about what democracy and freedom means...” (Sirmen 1997c).

There were other frames that targeted both RP and its secular coalition partners. Those blaming Mrs. Ciller, a political associated with political corruption, for helping RP to realize its agenda constituted two percent of the anti RP news frames and 11 percent of the opinion columns (see Cerrahoglu 1997; Milliyet 1997y). It was even argued that RP government showed favoritism toward the religious businesses (Milliyet 1997aa). Several accounts criticized the minister of justice, Sevket Kazan, for banning the high justices from participating the military briefing (five percent in the news and 10 percent in the columns) while others criticized Erbakan’s D-8 project, a project of increasing cooperation between developing Muslim countries. Like the previous periods, there were several criticisms that RP was trying to occupy the state posts (see the Table 22 for details).

*Democratic Framing:* What I call ‘democratic framing’ did not belong to either anti- or pro-RP camp as it opposed any military intervention into politics without necessarily supporting the RP agenda. The main concern of democratic framing was to maintain the democratic process and protect it from military intervention. The number of democratic framing was only 15 both in the news and columns combined, compared to 198 anti-RP framings in the same period. As the Table 23 shows, the main focus of the democratic framing was that the West would not support a military coup in Turkey (see Candar 1997f; Cerrahoğlu 1997; Kohen 1997; Sazak 1997b). While it was previously covered in the media that the West did not want a military intervention in Turkey, the day after the military briefing the media only covered the foreign support to RP government from the countries that are considered radical and dangerous by the secular elite (Milliyet 1997ab). The other democratic framings criticized the proponents of a military intervention as well as criticizing the RP government. Barlas of Sabah summarized this view: “Society does not want fighting and instability. Society wants neither a sharia state nor a military regime. Society wants a renewal of the state and a reform realized by the compromising politicians” (Barlas 1997b; see also Altan 1997c; Cemal 1997k). Another columnist criticized the distinction made in the briefing as ‘secular capital’ and ‘religious capital’ (Karsli 1997).

### **Pro-RP Framing:**

Similar to previous period, the pro-RP framing in the news accounts and opinion columns was somewhat disconnected. That is, the focus of the pro-RP framing in the opinion columns was different from the one in the news coverage. The number of pro-RP



**Table 23: Democratic/Neutral Framing: Toward the End of the Coalition Government**

	News Accounts		Opinion Columns	
	Occurrences	Percentage	Occurrences	Percentage
<b>Democratic Framing</b>				
West is Against a Coup	2	100	7	54
Must Not Sacrifice from Democracy			5	38
Boycotting Islamic Businesses is Wrong			1	8
Total	2	100	13	100

**Table 24: Pro-RP Framing: Toward the End of the Coalition Government**

	News Accounts		Opinion Columns	
	Occurrences	Percentage	Occurrences	Percentage
<b>Pro-RP Framing</b>				
Military Must Not Be Provoked	5	27	2	15
Party Must not be Banned	3	17		
No to Military Coup	3	17		
No Problem with Military	3	17		
Media exaggerates	2	11		
RP is a legal Party	2	11	2	15
D-8 Useful			4	31
RP Must Not Be Excluded			5	39
Total	18	100	13	100

frames was a lot less than the anti RP frames (31 pro-RP framing vs. 198 anti-RP framing). Only two frames were shared in both news and columns as the others pointed to a different aspect of the controversy (see Table 24). One, RP was a legal party was (11 percent of the pro-RP news coverage and 15 percent of the columns). Two, the military must not be provoked. This frame was also parallel to the frame that RP must not be excluded and that RP must not be banned. Considered together, the majority of pro-RP framing seemingly focused on keeping RP as part of the institutional politics. For example, Alpay (1997b; 1997c) of daily Milliyet argued that legal arrangements (i.e., banning RP) couldn't destroy a social movement. Another columnist said that democracy is sacrificed for the sake of secularism (Altan 1997d; Akyol 1997e). The RP leader,

Erbakan, was reported saying that, with more than four million members, RP could not be banned from politics<sup>41</sup> (Sabah 1997ad; see also Alpay 1997d).

The pro-RP framing strategy focused on dispelling military shadow from politics (27 percent of the pro-RP framing in the columns). Therefore, there was a conscious effort calling for civilian groups not invoke military by bringing up the issues to which military was sensitive. For example, Arif Emre from the RP leadership argued that the opposition is provoking the military, “the opposition parties in the parliament did not adhere to democracy and provoked military for a coup... I wish they adhere to democracy at least as much as the US president’s spokesman” (Miliyet 1997ad; see also Sabah 1997ae). The leader of a minor secular party YDP, Hasan Celal Guzel, called for an end to provoking military by the civilians (Milliyet 1997ac). The secular partner of the coalition government also had the same concerns; “nobody should try to bring the military into politics. Our military belongs to all of us” (Milliyet 1997ae). Similar views were also found coverage in the opinion columns. For example, a columnist argued “we provoked the military each time. Sometimes, the right wing forced the military for intervention and at other times the left wing. Depending on its tendency, the media gave support for such a campaign and sometimes even led the campaign” (Birand 1997c; see also Birand 1997d). Similarly, some of the pro-RP framing accused the media of creating tension between the government and military, constituting 11 percent of the news coverage. The RP leader, Erbakan, blamed the opposition for creating unrest by cooperating the media, as well (Milliyet 1997af; Sabah 1997ae).

The other pro-RP framing involved disapproving a military coup (see Milliyet 1997ag; Milliyet 1997ah), that RP must not be banned (Milliyet 1997af). Moreover, there

was a support for Erbakan's D-8 project that aimed an increased cooperation among the eight developing Muslim countries. Several columnists found the project very beneficial for Turkey's foreign relations (Birand 1997e).

## ***SECTION II. Filing the Suit against the RP:***

Similar to the Attorney General in the United State, the Chief Republican Prosecutor, Vural Savas, opened a suit against RP on May 21, 1997. The Turkish constitution gives the president more authority in state affairs "than those normally provided in parliamentary regimes" (Heper and Guney 2000) as the president appoints the Republican Prosecutor from among the candidates nominated by the judiciary council and functions as the watchdog of the regime. The suit against RP was a result of the state's efforts to protect the regime from the attempts to change it through democratic means. The secular elites did not see RP as a part of the mainstream politics and wanted to eliminate it by legal action. Of course, the journalists were also a significant part of this secular elite. Consistent with other periods, the media was again at the center of the debate as the prosecutor chose to publicize the case in a press conference. It was the only case that targeted a party in government. The Chief Republican Prosecutor Savas described the basis for the suit as follows:

RP has become the center for the activities that target the secular republic principles whose change cannot even be suggested according to our constitution. It is obvious that it increasingly drives our country into a civil war... Trust the legal system, the Turkish Republic founded by Ataturk will ever live as long as we have our president, judiciary, soldiers, police and, most of all, citizens that appreciate the importance of secularism. I ask God to help those who serve such a cause as this (Milliyet 1997ai).

Some journalists saw the event as a legal coup against the RP government (Barlas 1997c). Other journalists viewed the suit as an operation to remove RP from power,

rather than to avoid a military coup, as it survived a vote of confidence in the parliament (Birand 1997f). Similarly, several journalists saw the suit as politically motivated rather than being purely a legal one (Livaneli 1997c). Initially, the RP did not seem to be worried about the suit and they framed the suit as a baseless and politically motivated attack. Further, RP initially expressed its confidence in the justice system. The RP also tried to in an attempt to avoid punishment by trying to change the laws used as the basis of the prosecutors' allegations. RP sought support from other political parties in the parliament to change the laws that were used against it in the suit. However, the opposition parties refused to change the laws that were used as a basis to outlaw RP (Milliyet 1997aj).

I analyzed the suit against RP in two periods because of a major change in the political context. The first one covers the three-day period following the filing of the suit against RP on May 21, 1997. In this period, the RP was still in government and its leader Erbakan was the prime minister. For that reason, media framing included the issues both about the RP government and the suit against RP. The media displayed a mixed attitude in this period. While overall anti-RP attitude was still evident, their attitude toward the suit was relatively less antagonistic toward RP. In other words, the media did not seem to welcome the banning of RP as much as they welcomed the removal of RP from the government position. The second period covers the closing of RP by the constitutional court. I started two days prior to the result of the suit and five days after the suit (i.e., January 14-20, 1998). This period marks a more relaxed attitude in the media toward the RP after it was already expelled from power and ceased to pose a direct threat to the material interests of the media sector.

### **The Analysis of the *Militant Democracy*:**

Ataturk founded the Republic of Turkey on two modern principles of secularism and nationalism. This was a cultural revolution of Westernization (Gulalp 1999; Duzdag 1996) as it was a major break from the Ottoman tradition that was based on Islam and the notion of *ummah* (religio-political community). The term *irtija* was used by the secular elites to describe the threat of a counterrevolution against the principles of secularism and republic (Duzdag 1996). However, due to the strict interpretation of secularism (Hiro 1995; Yavuz 2000), the term *irtija* has been used to describe about any public manifestation of religious activities (Heper and Toktas 2003; Gole 1998, 2002). Similarly, the notion of democracy was incorporated to the official ideology with the transition to democracy after the World War II. However, the notion of democracy was seen secondary to, and dependent on, secularism. As the main feature of the official ideology in Turkey, the strict interpretation of secularism was also used against RP, a religious-based political party in Turkey. Vural Savas, the chief Republican prosecutor, filed a suit on May 21, 1997 to ban RP from politics on the basis that RP became a center for *irtijaic* activities. As a prosecutor, Savas (2001) gathered his arguments for banning RP and its successor FP (Fazilet Partisi) in a collection called *Militant Democracy* (*Militan Demokrasi* in Turkish). These were the official versions of the files charged in the Constitutional Court against RP. In fact, the sections included in analysis represents the actual framing during the conflict against RP, rather than its retrospective reconstruction at a later time. In short, the book represented the official framing efforts of the state elites

I conducted both a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the book that covered the suit, that is, the part between the pages 35 and 384, excluding the rest of the book that focus on the suits against its successor FP and individual suits. The excluded first 34 pages of the book consist of a short preface and third party writings supportive of Militant Democracy and are not analyzed. Therefore, the term ‘book’ mentioned here on will refer to the analyzed part of the book only. In addition, the remaining two sections of the book I excluded from my analysis consist of an appendix section about British Penal Code Against Terrorism and an article by Sulhi Donmezer on Freedom of Religion, Conscience and Opinion.

I conducted a quantitative analysis of the book by breaking down its message into statistical data. I used both manual and computerized methods to identify the critical elements in the text. For example, I manually identified the citations/quotations and whether they were used as examples of targeted and unapproved opinions as examples of militant democracy to justify the banning of RP. The computer-aided methods involved scanning the whole book into graphics files and converting them to text file by an optical character recognition software (Textbridge) and by a keyword search through Microsoft Word for Windows.

I have identified in the 210 citations and quotations used by the Chief Republican Prosecutor Savas in the book – 169 of them were used to support his thesis and 41 of them were used to give the examples of RP’s problematic views and actions. Most of the citations and quotations were taken from the scholars, national and international intellectuals about banning the political parties that were seen as dangerous to the regime. They were used to argue the dangers of RP and the necessity of banning it. Even though

the Chief Republican Prosecutor Savas blamed the media for giving an opportunity for irtijaic propaganda, a significant portion of the anti-RP citations/quotations in the book came from the media. 48 of 169 anti-RP quotes came from the media (28 percent), constituting slightly less than a third of the Savas' supportive quotations/citations. This can imply that media was more sympathetic Savas's 'militant democracy' approach than seeing RP as part of the democratic system. Of course, this is to provide a sense of the media attitude in the conflict between the media and the state, rather than proving the nature of cooperation. As will see below, the analysis of media coverage of the suit of banning RP will reveal a true picture of how the Turkish press treated the question of banning RP.

My keyword searches also revealed some interesting results. The most common keywords was RP (in both full and abbreviated form) with 204 occurrences; Ataturk and Ataturkculuk (i.e., Kemalism) with 157 occurrences; the terms secular and secularism occurred 151 times total. Irtija was also commonly used in both noun and adjective forms (113 times). Erbakan occurred 47 times and Sufi orders 34 times.

**What is *irtija*?** As the title and the purpose of the book shows, the Prosecutor Savas defined *irtija* as the number one problem<sup>42</sup>. However, the term was used ambiguously in the book, referring to liberal religious groups (e.g. Fethullah Gulen) and to radical ones (Hizbullah). The term *irtija* was used in various senses and interchangeably with other terms such as political Islam, fundamentalism, Islamic terror and RP. In the book, there were a total of 113 occurrences of *irtija*'s noun and adjective forms along with four uses of radical Islamism, two religious fundamentalisms and two political Islam, being used

more or less interchangeably. Its adjective form was used in relation to irtijaic camp, *irtijaic* activities, proponents of *irtija*, irtijaic elements and irtijaic threats and single uses of irtijaic symbol, irtijaic tendency, irtija card, irtijaic view, irtijaic movements and irtijaic organizations.

**The Message Unveiled:** The messages articulated in the book can be examined by using framing perspective in social movements as its author, Savas, aims at defining RP as a social problem and offers a cure for the problem, that is, banning it. In addition to the framing effort that defines a political party as a problem, it also draws a boundary of political opportunity structure for a social movement. As a prosecutor, Savas had provided a legal base for solving the problem. In that sense, he explained the bases for RP's repression. The framing theory looks at how a social problem is defined, what causal relation it establishes and what kind of solutions it suggests (Benford and Snow 2000).

*The nature and scope of the problem:* What Snow et al called "diagnostic framing" involves two dimensions (Benford 1993a): (1) what the problem is, and (2) what and who causes the problem. In the official ideology, irtija was seen as a counterrevolution (Duzdag 1996; Gulalp 1999; Gulalp 1995) against Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's wholesale cultural Westernization project (Hiro 1995; Yavuz 2000; Atasoy 2000; Kadioglu 1998). In that sense, irtija represented a negative value for Turkish society and, therefore, must be avoided. The Chief Republican Prosecutor Savas (2001) defined irtija as 'defending a project of state and society that is based on religion' (p.95). Implying that the irtija is not limited to RP, he described irtija as an old problem (p.46). However, it was obvious that his main purpose was to prove that RP was the center for irtija by arguing that Turkey



surrendered to irtija and exploitation of religion<sup>43</sup> (p.157) and that irtija is the number one enemy (p.322). The prosecutor's examples of irtija consisted of various personalities and actions. For example, RP's occupation of state post (p.71) and headscarf issue (pp.159-60) were even defined as irtija.

*Agents:* As for the personalities, The Prosecutor Savas depicted the religious leaders (e.g. Fethullah Gulen, M. Esat Cosan, Said Nursi) and political figures (e.g. Erbakan and RP ministers) as the examples of irtija (2001). Radical groups such as Hizbullah and IBDA-C were mentioned as the main examples of religious fundamentalism. In addition, the Islamic businesses and media outlets were described as part of the problem. Of course, the main focus of the book was to show RP leadership and members as a threat to the regime.

*Causality:* The causes attributed to the emergence of the irtija problem were also expressed in various forms in the book. It blamed the transition to multi-party democracy for providing an opportunity for the emergence of religious elite (p.243). The Prosecutor Savas argued that democratic system allowed the dissemination of the irtijaic messages to the masses (p.244). He thought the legal arrangements were not sufficient to dispel the irtijaic threat because, for him, the distribution of political parties in the parliament did not allow the necessary changes (pp.209-10). In addition, Savas included the media (p.99), and international charitable foundations and foreign countries (e.g. the USA, Germany and Europe) as a facilitators of irtijaic movement.

*Severity of Problem:* What Benford (1993a) called 'severity of problem' emphasizes the seriousness of the problem. The Prosecutor Savas (2001) expressed his concerns about the severity of irtija in various forms. For example, he said that the religious

community led by Fethullah Gulen would secretly take over the state institutions (p.48) with its biggest share of business potential in Turkey (p.57). He depicted the protests against the ban of headscarf as aiming at disabling the laws and the state (p. 157). Foreign states are said to divide the Republic of Turkey by supporting irtija and separatism in Turkey (p.189). The Prosecutor Savas also argued that the irtija threat had never been so threatening to the Turkish Republic (p.307).

*Urgency of Solution:* Social movements not only define what the problem is but also offer a cure for it. In other words, the collective action frames consist of claims about how urgently a solution is needed to fix a problematic situation (Benford 1993). The book not only suggested solutions for general irtija problem in general but also about RP problem in particular. In general terms, Savas argued that the population demanded the establishment of a public order in Turkish Republic (p.189) and demanded a legal system where the evidence could be gathered easily and the criminals were punished (p.190). Talking about irtija threat and ethnic separatism in a press conference, the Prosecutor Savas said, “their purpose is to destroy the gains of our Republic, Dear fellow citizens, it is time to protect our Republic. If you do not act today, believe me it will be too late” (p.210). As to the threat RP posed to the regime, Savas (2001) said, “RP violated the Constitution more than any other political party banned by the Constitutional Court of democratic nations” (p.307), implying that RP’s ban was already overdue in the standards of democratic countries.

*Efficacy and Propriety of Taking Action:* In terms of banning RP, the Prosecutor Savas did not have a clear argument how banning RP would reduce the irtija threat and whether or not similar parties would stop emerging. Naturally, as a prosecutor, his main

focus was on the propriety of banning RP. The whole book, in a sense, was devoted to provide moral and legal justification for this action. Assigning a historical role for himself (p.206), the Prosecutor Savas showed the cases of banning radical parties in the West as examples of protecting democratic regimes (p.269). He thought that, like other democratic countries that faced terrorism, the current legal system must be made stricter to prevent the threats (p. 207). After outlining the constitutional basis for banning RP, the Prosecutor Savas suggested that the Constitutional Court must cancel the laws about political parties that make it difficult to ban the parties (p.288). Arguing that RP wants a sharia state, banning it would be a natural line of action to protect the regime (p.383).

### **Counterframing and Reframing:**

Counterframing strategies labeled by Iberra and Kitsuse (1993) and Benford and Hunt (2001) can also be applied to the framing strategies used by the Prosecutor Savas, as well. Savas used the strategy of what is called problem denial. For example, against the criticism that the prosecutor sees religious ideas as a crime, Savas countered the charge: what he sees as crime is propoganda and provocations to establish a state structure based on religion (Savas 2001:189). Similarly, he rejected the view of secularism and democracy supported by liberal intellectual, “there is no country that maintains a secular and democratic life the way they explained or suggested” (p.212).

Counter-attribution is a counterframing strategy that accepts the presence of the problem but does not accept the suggested solution to the problem (Iberra and Kitsuse 1993; Benford and Hunt 2001). For example, against the demands that RP framing must be viewed as a freedom of conscience (see Belgenet 2003a for details of RP defense

against the suit), the Chief Republican Prosecutor Savas (2001) argued that there was a boundary for expression of opinions as there were limits for each freedom (p.193). He also mentioned that the Anglo-Saxon legal system prescribes the limitations on freedoms in the case of clear and present dangers (p.193).

### **Attack on Character:**

Attacking the character of opponents is an effective strategy used by both claim-makers and counterframers to disqualify the other's agenda. This strategy represents a moral charge against the opponent, rather than debating the validity of their claims. In the case of a cultural disconnect between the framers and counterframers, the strategy of attacking on opponents' character becomes an effective way of claims-making as each side of the debate probably advocate culturally disparate positions. As the prosecutor Savas and RP operate on culturally different premises (i.e., secularist and religious), the strategies involved various strategies of attack on character. What Benford and Hunt (2001) called treason (or taking enemy's side), insincerity or hidden agenda (Benford and Hunt 2001; Iberra and Kitsuse 1993), naivety (Benford and Hunt 2001) and what I called 'dishonesty' were widely used by the Prosecutor Savas.

*Treason (Enemy's Side):* The Prosecutor Savas argued that foreign states were trying the meddle with Turkish affairs by supporting irtija and separatism in the country. As examples of foreign conspiracy, the Prosecutor Savas identified the United States of America (p.47, 132), Europe (p.145), Germany (p.63, 84), Iran (p.168), Arab states (p.168), Saudi Arabia (p.317). For example, Savas argued that the United States was

against Kemalism in Turkey (p.132) and supported moderate Islam (p.168). For example, he also argued that as a result of foreign support the followers of irtija and separatism cooperate with each other (p.188, 236), “The followers of foreign conspiracy are hiding behind a discourse of democracy” (p.195). Savas blamed Germany for conspiring against Turkey through her charitable foundations (p.63). However, his book included some inconsistent information, as well. At one time the Prosecutor Savas said that Germany saw the radical Islam as a threat (p.84). At another time, he said that Germany supported radical Islam in Turkey (p.149). He also criticized the resolutions of the European Court of Human Rights against Turkey for being partial and intentional (p.188).

*Hidden Agenda (Insincerity):* As we have seen before, the charge of hidden agenda was one of the most common charges against RP and Islamic groups. It was widely used by Savas, as well. He argued that Fethullah Gulen’s religious community would secretly take over the state institutions (p.48, 49) and they adopted a mask of tolerance until they reach a critical strength (58). The Prosecutor Savas commonly used the term *takiyye* (dissimulation) as implying that RP secretly seeks a religious agenda. He even saw a hidden agenda in the religious groups’ defense of headscarf issue: “their goal is neither freedom of religion nor human rights. The Prosecutor Savas describes their goal as destroying the bases of secular state and to conquer the state by exploiting people’s religious feeling under the mask of faith” (p.159). He starkly described Erbakan as the master of the thousand years *takiyye* tradition (359-70). On the other hand, the Prosecutor Savas also used a tactic of “guilt by suspicion’ against RP as he said that a party never declared its real goals related to the Constitution (p.310)

*Naivety:* Naivety is a counterframing strategy that is used to blame the opponent for being emotional and irrational (Benford and Hunt 2001). As to the acceptance of moderate religious movements, Savas (2001) said that naive Turkish people and small bourgeoisie believed in their brainwashing (p.58). As a result of ‘rational democracy’, The Prosecutor Savas viewed liberal democracy and RP’s view of democracy as irrational, “Sevki Yilmaz is democrat, second republicans are democrat and collaborators of foreign countries are also democrat and show great solidarity” (p.195). He even blamed RP’s secular coalition partner for being unconscious (p.284).

*Dishonesty:* The Prosecutor Savas also used what I call the strategy counterframing of dishonesty against RP. This strategy focuses on the immoral nature of the opponents that aim to deceive the targeted people. The difference between the strategies of insincerity and dishonesty is that the latter does not necessarily hide its real agenda. While the former implies that the naivety of the opponents, the latter implies the naivety and irrationality of the targeted population, that is, the whole society. For example, the framing RP as exploiting religion implies the immorality of the RP members and the naivety of its targeted population. For example, Savas (2001) argued that Gulen’s religious community tries to convert the youth and teenagers (p.52). At another place, he mentioned the immorality of RP’s asking for democracy while they declared that they were not democratic themselves (282).

*Media and Militant Democracy:* Savas was not pleased with the media’s treatment of RP despite the media’s relatively sympathetic coverage of Vural Savas and his struggle against RP. Savas (2001) blamed the media for both the publicity that religious movements receive and the ability of religious groups to mobilize their own media. For

example, he warns about the Gulen community's success in using media outlets for its propaganda (p.49, 57). He also blames the general media, "as if there is an unnamed agreement between the media and terrorists. Terrorists provide the media with new readers and audience (pp.61-62, 99). The Prosecutor Savas criticized the media of their pro-European Union attitude in their support for democratic rights of liberal religious groups (p.117). He also criticized the media for using the words of terrorist, guerilla, commando, rebellion casually and interchangeably (p.150). Similarly, he complained about insufficient media coverage of his efforts, "our press, writers and television stations did not give a due attention because they no longer like people that care about our Republic" (p.195). As we found out before, the Prosecutor Savas himself used sympathetic media texts as evidence for his case. About one third of the citations/quotations in his book comes from the media that involved both mainstream media and special interest media.

As we will analyze the other types of particular framing about RP in the section below, the media framing that supported the suit against the RP was prominent in this period (nine percent of the news and 11 percent of the columns). A columnist appreciated that his wish came true (Altayli 1997a). Another columnist said RP deserved to be banned by listing what he described as RP's mistakes, exploiting religion, discriminating people on the basis of religion, cursing Ataturk and Turkish military, disrupting the state mechanism (Colasan 1997b). This kind of direct support was visible among the columnists. However, the majority of the journalist did not directly support the banning of RP while they supported the removal of RP from power.


**Table 25: General Media Attitude: the Suit Filed (May 22-24, 1997)**

	News		Columns	
	#	%	#	%
Anti	32	38	22	38
Neutral	49	58	27	46
Pro	3	4	9	16
Total	84	100	58	100


*The Suit Opened:* I analyzed the media attitude toward RP during a three-day period following the opening of the suit against RP on May 22, 1997. It was a prolific three-day period with an intense framing about the RP agenda, the suit against RP and the debates around Refah-Yol government. The overall attitude of the media in the first phase of the suit showed a distinctive anti-RP tone. As we will see below, most of the media texts were against the RP government though not many suggested the banning of RP. The filing of the suit against RP fell between the two stages of RP government that is, the start of an indirect intervention (the February 28th Process), and the collapse of the RP government.

This time period is unique in its tone with a huge gap between the pro- and anti-RP attitude in the news where the neutral coverage was dominant (58 percent) but the ratio of media coverage between the anti- and pro-RP attitude reached 9.5 times (38 percent vs. four percent). Similarly, as shown in the Table 25, the opinion columns also displayed a unique character with a major neutral attitude toward RP represented the major tone in the opinion columns (46 percent). However, there were substantial number of pro-RP columns (16 percent) and a relatively modest number of incidents showed an anti-RP tone (38 percent, the lowest anti-RP attitude among the periods I examined in my dissertation). I attribute this change to the rational democracy tendency among the





**Figure 15: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: News Accounts**



**Figure 16: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: Opinion Columns**

columnists. In other words, they thought that banning RP would damage democracy even though they opposed to the kind of democracy RP defended. Their rational democracy approach did not welcome the banning of RP as much as it welcomed the end of RP government.

### **Framing and Counterframing in the Media: Filing the Suit against RP**

The media framing about RP and its agenda also revealed a strong anti-RP tendency in the three-day period after filing the suit to ban RP. The anti-RP framing constituted about twice the pro-RP framing (45 vs. 24 in the news). As the Table 26 shows this anti-RP framing found even more room among the opinion columns, constituting a little less than three times the pro-RP framing (68 vs. 25). Even though the media framing is generally unsupportive of banning the RP, the negative approach to the RP was clearly detectable. In other words, even though the media saw the RP as a threat to the democratic system in Turkey, democratic mechanisms are seen as the appropriate way to disqualify RP.

In this period media framing activities were intense which can be attributed to the critical nature of the suit for the Turkish political structure as the questions of removing RP from power and banning RP occupied the agenda. Media framing of the subject covered a great variety of issues about RP such as democracy, religion and politics. After describing the general nature of the media framing, the analysis below will focus on the framing efforts that addressed the suit against RP and the debates as to whether RP should be banned or incorporated into the democratic system. The controversial nature of the suit crystallizes a perspective of the journalists as to the relation between religion and politics as well as democracy.

### **Anti-RP Framing:**

The most common anti-RP framing was that the RP was against the regime, constituting 33 percent of the news accounts and 15 percent of opinion columns (see Table 26). The journalists' concerns about the regime are expressed concerns about secularism, democracy, Kemalist principles, etc. For example, RP was framed as a conflicting with the state (Milliyet 1997ak), is against the secular Republic (Hurriyet 1997k), deviating from the principles of Ataturk (Milliyet 1997al), threatening the regime, threatening secularism. These charges are based on the amplification of various values in Turkish politics such as the state, secularism. Since the Ottoman period that had a strong state tradition (Heper 2000), the state carried a central position in society. The state led the modernization efforts during the Republican period. Ataturk's reforms were realized by the state. Secularism was the main character of Ataturk's reforms as he tried to build a secular nation-state based on the notion of secular nationalism. Therefore, the

Table 26: Anti-RP Framing after the Suit Filed

Anti-RP Frames	News		Columns	
	Occurrences	Percentage	Occurrences	Percentage
RP a Threat to Regime	15	33	10	15
Miscellaneous Negative	12	27	31	46
Refah-Yol Practically Ended	6	13	3	4
Refah-Yol Must End	4	9	6	9
Democratic Struggle Against RP	4	9	4	6
RP Must Be Banned	4	9	5	11
RP Inconsistent	0	0	6	9
Total	45	100	68	100

amplification of state and secularism in the media framing targeted to emphasize these values. There were other indirect implications that RP was a threat to the regime. For example several journalists implied that RP is challenging the regime even though they did not think banning RP was a solution by saying that it is necessary to protect the regime but not by banning political parties (Gureli 1997c).

As shown in Table 26, a stark opposition to the RP government can be seen in the media coverage of the demands for the dissolution of the RP government even though it survived the confidence vote in the parliament. The media frames that the RP government must end or that it is about to end were also dominant in the media. The first sense was used in direct opposition to the RP government but the second sense seemed to be less direct. Combined, the two framing devices were most common statements (22 percent of the news accounts and 13 percent of the opinion columns). Statements directly opposing the continuation of RP government were more common (see Dogan 1997d) than pronouncements amplifying that the RP government is practically over (see Milliyet 1997am).

Other anti-RP framings emphasized the factors about the RP government and RP agenda. Some called for a democratic struggle against RP (nine percent of the news and six percent of the columns). Even though it was not mentioned in the news accounts, some columnists emphasized the inconsistencies of RP framing (nine percent). A columnist reminded its readers of the RP's inconsistencies about democracy, "RP members are describing the suit against RP as 'anti-democratic' but they ignored the questions about their silence during the banning of DEP" (Tinc 1997; see also Eksi 1997c) [i.e., an ethnic-based party banned on the basis of ethnic separatism]. There were miscellaneous specific framing efforts negative to the RP agenda such as the coverage of the negative words by other opposition parties against the RP government.

### **Democratic Frames:**

As I have identified in the previous periods, there were other frames that I labeled as neutral. Even though they were related to the RP Agenda, they did not display a discernible preference for either side of the conflict, that is, the RP government and its secular opposition. These frames rejected any military intervention into politics while they did not approve the RP agenda. There were eleven distinct arguments total detected in this category. For example, some media accounts emphasized that the Constitutional Court will do what is necessary in its decision about banning RP (four occurrences). These statements belonged to the head of the Constitutional Court that argued that the Court would do what is necessary about the suit (Sabah 1997aj). In these types opinions, media sources do not necessarily show a clear preference for either closing RP or allowing it to operate. Three columns expressed a dislike with the tension on both sides

by expressing that they were against both a military coup and a sharia regime (3 occurrences). For example, Livaneli (1997c; see also Altan 1997e) of Sabah argued that he opposed to the idea of preventing a sharia regime through a military coup. Several articles opposed to the idea of banning RP and suggesting to defeat RP through democratic methods (three occurrences). For example, it was argued that RP saw democracy as a tool rather than a goal but banning it should not be the method to deal with RP (Cemal 1997l). One media source amplified the belief that the West is against a military coup (Candar 1997g).

### **Pro-RP Framing in the Media:**

*RP Must Not Banned:* The most common pro-RP framing in the Turkish media was an unconditional opposition to banning RP, represented by the idea that democratic measures must be found to solve the problems with democracy. As shown in Table 27, it was the most common argument presented in both the news and opinion columns (28 percent of both news accounts and opinion columns, as shown in Table 27). Combined with the conditional opposition to banning RP, we can say a significant portion of the media framing opposed to banning RP in this period. However, as we will see below, the conditional opposition to banning RP generally contained a negative tone against RP.

As I explained before, the rational democracy approach was widely shared among Turkey's journalists and other secular elite groups that see democracy as mainly an elite enterprise and suspects about the popular demands and involvement in politics (Heper and Demirel 1996). This democracy perspective was the main reason for media's general reluctance to outlaw the RP despite the fact that some journalists displayed a fierce

**Table 27: Pro-RP Framing after the Suit Filed**

Pro-RP Frames	News		Columns	
	Occurrences	Percentage	Occurrences	Percentage
RP Must Not Be Banned	7	28	7	28
The Accusations Irrelevant	6	25	2	8
RP Must Not Be Banned (Conditional)	4	17	5	20
Suit Politically Motivated	3	13	3	12
Other Positive	4	17	8	32
Total	24	100	25	100

opposition to the RP. The democratic value was amplified more clearly in the event of the suit against the RP. Both the news and columns contained the argument that political parties must not be banned. The news accounts generally covered RP's own statements about the impropriety of banning political parties. For example, various RP's members said that political parties must not be banned since the Constitution sees the political parties as the inseparable part of democratic system (Milliyet 1997an). They also condemned the suit as an anti-democratic operation, "those who could not twist RP's arm are applying to these methods [i.e., banning it]" (Milliyet 1997an). Several members of the mainstream media expressed their opposition to banning political parties. After explaining the futility of previous actions of banning political parties, Tamer (1997c) of Sabah said that banning RP would be a mistake. Other columnists shared similar concerns by arguing that banning political parties would only worsen the problems (see Birand 1997f; Akyol 1997f; Asik 1997d).

Those who opposed the banning of RP conditionally also constituted a significant place on this camp (17 percent of the pro-RP news coverage and 20 percent of the pro-RP opinion columns). These conditions were that RP must obey the rules (Hurriyet 1997c), that RP must reconcile with the regime (Ozkok 1997c); that the regime must protect itself

(Gureli 1997c; Dogan 1997d); that RP must protect democracy (Sabah 1997ag). For example, Bayram Meral, leader of a leading trade union, said, “we do not support any party to be banned but we want RP to change its perspective on the principles of secular, democratic and rule of law” (Hurriyet 1997l). As the main focus of these arguments was an opposition to the banning, I considered this type of framing as part of the pro-RP framing rather than neutral (or democratic) framing.

*A Politically Motivated Suit:* Other pro-RP framing emphasized that the suit was politically motivated. Of course, a legal suit must be based on legal requirements but most of the pro-RP framing in the media saw the prosecutor and the suit as politically motivated. 13 percent of the pro-RP news coverage and 12 percent of the columns framed the suit and the prosecutor as politically motivated (see Table 27). An RP minister, Abdullah Gul, criticized the Prosecutor Savas for being politically motivated, “the prosecutor used the issues that were previously denied by RP, the issues that were proven not-guilty in the courts based on wrong information” (Milliyet 1997ap). Mr. Gul also criticized the civil society institutions for being ideologically motivated in their demand for ending RP government (Sabah 1997ah). Against these charges, the Prosecutor Savas had to defend his motive for such as suit by denying any political agenda, denying the claims that the suit was opened after the failure of parliamentary efforts to disable the Refah-Yol coalition within the parliament (Milliyet 1997a).

There were other miscellaneous pro-RP framings that were covered in both the news (17 percent) and the columns (32 percent). For example, one columnist criticized the legitimacy of the suit, saying that it might fit the law but would not fit the notion of

justice (Barlas 1997d). Another columnist blamed the system for the problems, not RP, “The transition to a capable democracy that is based on direct election by the population is a solution for the problems of Turkey and democracy” (Akyol 1997g). Others blamed the media, as well. For example, a columnist condemned the univocal nature of the Turkish media (Oktay 1997). One media account cited an RP member saying that the court will do its due job in the trial (implying that it would not be banned), and this example was coded among the miscellaneous pro-RP frame.

### ***SECTION III: The Banning of the RP***

RP was removed from power in June 1997. Six months later (January 16, 1998), the Constitutional Court reached a verdict by banning RP. The event became a milestone in the Turkish politics and marked the repression of a major social movement organization by redefining the rules of game for religion and politics. The banning of RP was a sign of a very strict interpretation of secularism by defining any public manifestation of religion as a threat to the secular nature of the regime (Heper and Toktas 2003). The verdict emerged parallel to the prosecutor’s claims whose analysis was provided in the previous section. Since the RP was removed from power earlier, RP no longer posed a direct threat to the material interests of the media in this period and the banning provided a clear perspective on the media commitment to democracy and the relation between religion and politics. I analyzed one week in the media coverage of the RP suit, starting two days prior to the Court resolution (i.e., January 14-20, 1998).

I compared the media coverage of the RP suit with the coverage of previous events and also compared the two phases of the suit within the initial filing suit against RP and





the banning thereof. That is, I compared the media coverage of the initial filing of the suit against RP during the RP government (May 21, 1997) and the conclusion of the suit after the collapse of the RP government (January 15, 1998). The media coverage of the conclusion of the suit banning RP showed different tendencies in the news accounts and opinion columns. The general tone of the news coverage of RP suit was similar to the one during the electoral coverage of December 1995 elections. As the Figure 1 shows above, this period marked the most common neutral attitude of the periods in both the news accounts (66 percent) and opinion columns (46 percent). This can be explained with two main factors: (1) the RP was no longer in power and, therefore, not a threat, and (2) the media's rational democracy approach that did not strongly support the banning of RP. However, the news coverage of RP in this period displayed a very limited pro-RP attitude (11 percent) and a low anti-RP attitude (23 percent). However, the general tone in the opinion columns was similar to the period where RP was getting ready for a coalition government in June 1996. This attitude can be characterized by a relatively higher pro-RP attitude (17 percent) by splitting the rest between the neutral and anti-RP attitude. While the neutral attitude marked one of the highest scores (41 percent), the anti-RP attitude was one of the lowest (42 percent) among the coverage of events (see Figures 1 and 2).

The major difference between the news accounts and opinion columns between the first and the last phases of the suit was that the news coverage had become more balanced (see Table 28 and Figure 1). The anti-RP attitude in the news accounts significantly dropped from 38 percent to 23 percent. As a result, both neutral news coverage and pro-RP attitude increased. The neutral attitude of the news coverage increased from 58

**Table 28: General Media Attitude: RP Banned (Jan 14-20, 1998)**

	News Accounts		Opinion Columns	
	#	%	#	%
Anti	31	23	43	47
Neutral	88	66	32	35
Pro	15	11	17	18
Total	134	100	92	100

**Figure 17: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: News Accounts****Figure 18: Content Analysis of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Depiction of RP over Time: Opinion Columns**

percent to 66 percent while the pro-RP attitude increased from four percent to 11 percent. There was a similar trend at work in the opinion columns, as well (see Figure 2). While the pro-RP columns remained about the same, the even split between the neutral and negative coverage in the opinion columns replaced by the anti-RP columns in this period and vice versa. One possible explanation for this increase was the conclusion of a long-hauled conflict between a religious-based view of politics and secular democratic view forced the journalists to defend one position and they chose to defend the regime rather than RP. In other words, upon the conclusion of the suit as an unusual repression of the RP possibly led the journalist to the defend one of the two irreconcilable positions. Not




Figure 19: News Accounts on RP Suit




Figure 20: Opinion Columns on RP Suit

surprisingly the columnists seemed to support the state position over that of RP.

Supporting the previous studies (e.g. Heper and Demirel 1996), their preference of the state over civilian politicians confirms the journalists' rational democracy approach.

### Framing and Counterframing in the Media: RP Banned

The framing and counterframing showed a different emphasis in the news coverage and opinion columns. About half of the anti-RP framing that appeared in the opinion columns did not appear in the news accounts. This was probably because of the difference of orientation in political figures (e.g. politicians) covered in the news coverage and the columnists that have their own perspective on the event. The most common anti-RP theme in this period was that the Court's decision must be respected (see Table 28). This theme constituted 38 percent of the news coverage and nine percent of the columns. They generally emphasized that it was a legal matter. Many civil society

Table 29: Anti-RP Framing - Banning of RP

Anti-RP Framing	News		Columns	
	#	%	#	%
Must Respect the Decision	18	38	7	9
Decision is Correct	9	19	10	13
RP Exploited Religion	5	11	8	11
RP is against the Regime	4	9	8	11
RP led to this Decision			12	15
RP Inconsistent			12	16
Must Take a lesson from Decision			11	14
RP World-View Must Change			5	7
Other	11	23	9	4
Total	47	100	76	100

leaders emphasized that the decision must be respected (see Sabah 1998a; Milliyet 1998a; Heper 1998; Colasan 1998a).

Other anti-RP framings were more direct in their opposition to RP. The second most common anti-RP theme was that the decision by the Court to ban RP was correct (19 percent of the news and 13 percent of the columns). Many columnists found the decision as a correct one (see Colasan 1998a; Ozkok 1998a; Mengi 1998a). Others (e.g. Sirmen 1998; Akbal 1998) also blamed RP for the result of the suit (15 percent of the columns). RP was accused for exploiting religion (11 percent of the news and columns each) (see Altaylı 1998; Colasan 1998b), for being against the secular regime (nine percent of news and 11 percent of the columns) (see Colasan 1998c; Heper 1998a) and for other reasons (23 percent of the columns) and for being inconsistent about democracy (16 percent of the columns) (see Sirmen 1998; Donat 1998). Some reminded the RP to take a lesson from this event (14 percent of the columns) (Ozkok 1998b; Mengi 1998a; Cemal 1998a), implying that RP caused to the problem. There were even some suggestions that RP must change its world-view to operate in Turkish political arena (Civaoglu 1998).

### **Pro-RP Framing:**

As the Table 30 shows, the most common pro-RP framing emphasized the impropriety of banning RP. Some defined the court decision that banned RP as antidemocratic (11 percent of the news and 54 percent of the columns). The RP leadership framed the decision as an antidemocratic one (see *Milliyet* 1998b). Several journalists expressed the same view (see Alpay 1998; Akyol 1998; Livaneli 1998). The other most common pro-RP framing that mostly appeared in the news (25 percent) emphasized that the decision was not legitimate as it lacked a legal basis for such a decision. Many civil society leaders thought that the legal system was manipulated to ban RP (see *Milliyet* 1998c; *Milliyet* 1998d). Some columnists (e.g. Sazak 1998) also argued that the problems with political parties must be solved with democratic methods rather than policing (11 percent).

Another pro-RP framing emphasized the futility of banning RP. It was claimed that it would not change anything (six percent in the news and seven percent in the columns) (See *Hurriyet* 1998a; *Hurriyet* 1998b). Some RP members argued that the result would not change their world-view (eight percent of the news) (see *Hurriyet* 1998c). Another pro-RP framing suggested that the banning might even have a reverse effect and strengthen RP support in the country (nine percent of the news) (see Cemal 1998b). For example, the RP leader, Erbakan, said, “The decision will not affect the RP that is the biggest community of Turkey... The RP mission will certainly grow and advance” (*Milliyet* 1998e).

Table 30: Pro-RP Framing - Banning of RP

Pro-RP Framing	News		Columns	
	#	%	#	%
Decision is not Legitimate	18	25	1	2
RP Must Not Be Banned	16	22		
Decision is Anti-Democratic	8	11	25	54
Decision will not Change our World-View	6	8		
Decision will Strengthen RP	5	7		
Decision will not Change Anything	4	6	4	9
Must Not into Provocation	3	4	3	7
Must Solve Problems through Democracy			5	11
Other	12	17	8	17
Total	72	100	46	100

## CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION

This project examines mainstream press framings of the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi – RP*) in Turkey during the three significant phases of its history. As a moderate political party (Heper 2001) with a religious agenda (Yildiz 2003), the RP won the plurality of votes in the 1995 parliamentary elections. At first, it was excluded from coalition formulas by the secular center-right parties (namely, *Anavatan Partisi – ANAP* and *Dogru Yol Partisi – DYP*). However, after the collapse of the ANAP-DYP coalition in July 1996, the RP managed to form a coalition with the secular DYP, marking the first religiously-oriented government in secular Turkey. I divided this period into three phases in terms of the status of the RP in Turkish political arena: (1) the RP's electoral victory of 1995, (2) its coming to power in July 1996, and (3) its repression by toppling its government (June 1997) and its banning (January 1998). These phases marked a critical period in the nature of Turkish politics with regard to the relations between religion and politics, between the civilian government and the military, and especially between the media and politics.

This project empirically tested several hypotheses about the ideological structuring of Turkish politics: (1) Appeals to a "rational democracy" master frame among state elites and journalists will lead to opposition to the RP-dominated coalition and to the RP's political inclusion (Heper and Guney 1996; Heper and Demirel 1996). In addition, because of commercial settings or state-sponsorship, when the media arena is dominated, the media generally support the elite perspectives (Schudson 2002); (2) Compared to opinion columns, the news coverage in the Turkish media will be less negative in its portrayal of the RP across the events (Uysal 2001); (3) Editorial intervention will

make news reporting more volatile than the opinion columns (Finkel 2001) – swinging from neutral to negative across particular events in its portrayal of the RP.

To test these hypotheses I measured media and state elite framing about the RP across three periods of its history (i.e., before founding the government, during the government and toward the end of the RP government). I conducted a content analysis of the news accounts and opinion columns of three mainstream newspapers (namely, *Hurriyet*, *Milliyet*, and *Sabah*), along with military briefs and judicial briefs. These periods included nine critical events that led to the intensification of debates about the relations between the religion and politics in general and about the RP's inclusion in particular. In each period three critical events were selected for analysis. The analysis was conducted on two levels. First, the general media orientation was measured by identifying media texts that addressed the issues related to the RP. This was done for the news accounts and opinion columns separately. To determine the overall tone of a news account or an opinion column, each text was reduced into one or two propositions about the RP agenda, and were coded neutral, negative or positive. Keywords were also used to identify its attitude toward the RP. The results are summarized as percentage for each event. I also examined specific framings about the RP-related issues. In this stage, I broke down each text into various propositions about the RP and its agenda. Then, I analyzed the relevance of each framing in its context by presenting their distribution during the coverage of the event analyzed.

With regard to the RP, the overall tone of news accounts showed substantial differences from that of opinion columns (see Figure 1). News accounts and opinion columns differed most substantially in that news accounts were more neutral and opinion



columns were more negative in their treatment of the RP. In line with the second hypothesis, the high incidence of negative presentations of RP provided different insights for the news coverage and opinion columns in the Turkish media. In the news accounts the neutral coverage (48 percent) was considerable more common than negative coverage (37 percent) and pro-RP coverage (15 percent). Opinion columns displayed a substantially negative attitude toward RP in their coverage. More than one half of the opinion columns (55 percent) displayed a negative presentation of RP and only 13 percent was supportive of it while one-third displayed an ideally neutral attitude (32 percent). My analysis clearly showed that news coverage in the mainstream media in Turkey was more neutral.

In line with the first hypothesis, the fact that the anti-RP orientation across each period examined was higher than the pro-RP coverage can be explained by the ideological and material interests among the journalists (Heper and Demirel 1996) and perhaps their embrace of rational democracy master frame. Rational democracy can be defined as an elitist and idealist view of democracy, rather than simple majority rule represented by popular demands. In the Turkish case, rational democracy meant defining politics according to the modern ideals of nationalism and secularism. In cases where the ideal view of democracy conflicted with popular demands, it meant to prefer a top-down approach to politics and democracy. As the Turkish elites see religion contradictory with the ideals of nationalism and secularism, the popular religious demands are sacrificed for the sake of rational (or ideal) democracy. Of course, this approach is detectable in both news coverage and opinion columns, but columnists display a stronger commitment to




Figure 21: Standardized Odds Ratio between Negative and Neutral Media Coverage of RP




Figure 22: Average Media Attitude toward RP




Figure 23: The Difference of Negative RP Attitude from and Pro-RP Attitude

this approach. In that respect, many columnists in the Turkish press clearly positioned themselves against RP.

Similar to the overall, tone, my analysis of specific framings about the RP displayed a predominantly anti-RP orientation. As shown in Table 31, the anti-RP framing was

significantly higher than the pro-RP framing in both the news accounts (34 percent vs. 13 percent) and opinion columns (42 percent vs. 11 percent). The anti-RP framing in the opinion columns quadrupled the pro-RP framing. However, this contrast was less than three times between the anti-RP framing and pro-RP framing in the news accounts.

I hypothesized that the Turkish media emerged as an oppositional force against the RP government. Similarly, the media attitudes toward the RP changed in relation to the perceived level of threat posed by the RP. The attitude of both news accounts and opinion columns changed during the course of nine critical events in relation the RP and its status in Turkey. As the Figure 1 shows, the ratio of negative coverage to neutral coverage was generally low, meaning that a balanced coverage outweighed the negative framing in the news accounts. This orientation in the news remained about the same even after RP came to power in July 1996. However, this changed during the escalation of the conflict that resulted in the removal of RP from power. As shown in the Figure 1, relative to the neutral coverage, the negative media coverage of RP increased during the Sincan affair and remained high until the RP was removed from government. The news coverage returns to a more balanced coverage during the filing and the conclusion of the RP suit.

A dominantly anti-RP attitude in the opinion columns showed a similar trend by increasing even further during the period of the ‘postmodern coup’. In other words, the opinion columns that were generally more negative toward the RP actually became more evenly distributed during the period where the RP was preparing for power, i.e., June 8 to 15, 1996 (see Figure 2 for details). A relatively balanced treatment of RP in the opinion columns might imply a wait-and-see approach during this period. However, this neutral

**Table 31: Overall Distribution of Anti- and Pro-RP Framings by the News Accounts and Opinion Columns**

	<b>News (%)</b> <i>f</i>	<b>Columns (%)</b> <i>f</i>	<b>Subtotal (%)</b> <i>f</i>
<b>Anti-RP Frames</b>	<b>34</b> 610	<b>42</b> 747	<b>76</b> 1357
<b>Pro-RP Framing</b>	<b>13</b> 226	<b>11</b> 202	<b>24</b> 428
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>47</b> 836	<b>53</b> 949	<b>100</b> 1785

framing of RP in opinion columns turned more negative when the RP founded a coalition government (July 1996) while the news coverage still remained mostly neutral.

The degree of opposition to RP in opinion columns remained higher than the news accounts throughout the periods. This implies that my thesis that the columnists of the Turkish media are more concerned with the ideological interests of the regime because their opposition to RP seemed to have increased as soon as RP came to power. Since the news accounts are subject to an editorial control more than the opinion columns (Finkel 2000), the news coverage turned against the RP government in the face of perceived threats posed by the RP government to the big bourgeoisie with whom the media were closely tied.

Another difference between the news and opinion columns was that anti-RP attitudes in the news accounts peaked during the National Security Council meeting (February 28th, 1997) while the opinion columns peaked earlier, that is, during the Sincan Affair. The fact that both news coverage and opinion columns return to their usual approach to the RP during the coverage of the suit against the RP suggest that the mainstream Turkish

media maintained a mixed attitude toward RP, changing between strong opposition to soft opposition.

Even though the mainstream media seems to welcome the RP's removal from power, we do not witness the same enthusiasm in the media for the banning of RP. For several reasons expressed in the media, many journalists expressed opposition to the state action to ban RP as a political party. In fact, the negative toward the RP softened during both phases of the suit (i.e., its filing and conclusion). While the first phase took place during the heat of the opposition to the RP government, the second phase occurred six months after the RP government was removed from power. First, by amplifying the value of democracy, journalists typically argued that a democratic system is better off if it solves its problems within the rules of democratic process rather than through policing actions. This value was shared by both those who saw RP as part of the mainstream politics and those who saw it as a part of fundamentalism. As the chapter about the suit against RP revealed, many journalists emphasized the practical futility of banning a political party. This orientation is probably related to the journalists' adherence to rational democracy master frame. They opposed RP's coming to power as they saw it as a threat to their vision of secular and democratic regime. However, they also opposed the state's repression of RP by banning it completely. A significant portion of specific framings defined the RP as a threat to democratic system out of their rational democracy approach. In other words, the journalists' opposition to RP softened in face of state crackdown, confirming the rational democracy hypothesis as they opposed RP within the terms of rational democracy.

**Table 32: Fluctuation in the Attitudes of News Accounts and Opinion Columns toward the RP**

	<b>Negative (S)</b>	<b>Neutral (S)</b>	<b>Positive (S)</b>
<b>News Accounts</b>	15.01	14.17	7.05
<b>Opinion Columns</b>	14.84	9.64	4.51

My third hypothesis expects editorial intervention will make the news coverage more volatile (Finkel 2000), swinging from its originally neutral position to a more negative approach to the RP. My findings supported this expectation, as I found the news accounts showed a greater change in its neutral, negative and positive approach to the RP. Even though the nature of our data does not allow us to make a full statistical analysis such as significance test, the fact that all three types of news coverage (i.e., neutral, negative and positive) higher standard deviation clearly imply that the news accounts were more volatile (see Table 32). The change of attitude was more visible in the news accounts than in the opinion columns, supporting my third hypothesis that the news reporting is subject to editorial intervention more than opinion columns.

The results of my study supported my hypothesis that the media opposed the RP-led government during the process of its toppling from power and even contributed to the campaign against the RP. Many popular journalists (Ozkok 2002; Akman 2002b; Ergin 2001; Turgut 2003) later on admitted their support for this campaign against the RP government that is called the ‘postmodern coup’ (Candar 1997e; Alkan 2001; Cevizoglu 2001). For example, the editor-in-chief of Hurriyet said “I will proudly defend our style of publication in the February 28 process throughout my life. However, I cannot say the same thing about the Andic affair” (Ozkok 2003) where the media was manipulated by the military to eliminate the journalists who publicly opposed the military intervention

into politics (for details of the Andic affair, see page 130). Another journalist identified the media's role in the campaign against the RP government in more stark words, "If there had not been the Turkish media, the process called February 28 would have never happened in Turkey... More importantly, if some newspapers had not been very open for cooperating practices [i.e., manipulation], the military could not carry out such a process even if they wanted" (Turgut 2003).

The level of media opposition to the RP depended on the level of perceived threat to the regime based on the interpretation of rational democracy<sup>44</sup> perspective adopted by most of the journalists (Heper and Demirel 1996). The view of rational democracy was not limited to the media, the military also maintained its rational democracy approach (Heper and Guney 2000). The military and judiciary intervened in politics three times until 1980 as the coups of 1960 and 1980 physically dispelled the democratically elected governments from power while a military ultimatum led to the collapse of a democratic government in 1970. Some saw a similarity between the 1970 coup and the 'postmodern coup' of 1997 (Candar 1997e; Cevizoglu 2001). The latter was different in the use of media and public communication tools under the threat of a military take-over in order to remove a democratically established government from power. Therefore, the media's role in this campaign served to magnify the messages of the secular groups while the RP's messages are heavily filtered and sometimes distorted (for the examples of the pro-RP framing the mainstream media did not cover, see Zaman 1997f; 1997i; 1997j; 1997l; 1997m).

The analysis of the specific framings of the RP in the mainstream press revealed a clear picture of media orientation of the RP. In coverage of all events, anti-RP framing

was more prevalent than pro-RP framing. Specifically, about half of the anti-RP framings emphasized that the RP posed a kind of threat to the secular democratic regime in Turkey. Negative framing of the RP took various forms: that RP is anti-secular, has a hidden agenda; will infiltrate state posts; is radical; exploits religion; causes conflict, and/or supports violence, and that RP coalition must end. Each of these framings emphasized a certain aspect of the perceived controversy between the RP and the regime, each also relates to counterframing and reframing.

Three Turkish terms (namely, *irtija*, *takiyye* and *din istismari*) were frequently used in the media to depict the RP and its followers as a threat to the secular nature of the regime. The most common one was the pejorative term *irtija* that literally meant backwardism. It always carried a negative connotation and was used in the sense of religious fundamentalism, radicalism or religious movement. Its target varied considerably. In some occasions, *irtija* was used to imply the violent religious groups and sometimes less radical ones. In other cases, it was used to condemn any kind of religious group or activity. In parallel to the Iberra and Kitsuse's (1993) counterframing strategy of 'irrationality', secular actors that opposed public manifestations of religion, used *irtija* as a negative value to counterframe the rationality of the RP. *Takiyye* (or dissimulation) also carried a negative, implying that the RP has a hidden agenda to change the nature of the regime. This counterframing strategy noted by both Iberra and Kitsuse (1993) and Benford and Hunt (2001). Across the periods under study, the hidden agenda frame implied that RP sought a sharia regime and used the democratic system to reach its goal.

Both Iberra and Kitsuse (1993) and Benford and Hunt (2001) did not identify a counterframing strategy that implied a movement's position was naïve; and mislead the



naïve people. In my study, media and state counterframing argued that manipulative RP politically deceived a naïve people. The Constitution bans exploiting religious beliefs and feelings, considering religion as a private matter (Erdogan 1999). However, *din istismari* implies that the movement elites are knowingly trying to mislead naïve people. This frame was also frequently used against the RP in the media. In fact, the prosecutor and the Constitutional court based the banning of the RP mostly on this argument.

The frames that appeared in the media provide a picture of the media framing. However, as Gamson (1992) warned, not just the ones covered, but also the media's noncoverage of RP attempts at counterframing and reframing is sociologically significant to understand media framing. My examination of the liberal religious newspaper Zaman revealed significant degree of missing frames in the mainstream press. Since I could not examine the whole Islamic press, one can assume that the frames that were not covered in the mainstream press are more than I identified here.

Along with unsympathetic media coverage of the RP I have analyzed so far, some of the RP-related framing did not find any coverage in the mainstream press. My brief examination of the liberal religious newspaper Zaman revealed various examples of noncoverage. For example, the RP's responses to the charges it replaced 67,000 ministerial offices were covered only in the daily Zaman. The RP's minister of state denied the accusations that the RP government appointed 67,000 members to the state offices by saying that it only appointed about 20,000 personnel (Zaman 1997f). Another RP officer replied to such charges by arguing that it is normal that a political party place its representatives in administrative posts (Zaman 1997l).

Another example would be the Sincan Affair that received sensational coverage in the mainstream press did not allow the RP to sufficiently explain its view. It tried to make their case in *Zaman*. A state minister of the RP, Abdullah Gul, said, “we did not approve what happened in Sincan and we opened an investigation within the party but we could not get the press to listen to us” (Gulerce 1997g). Similarly, an RP officer denied any wrongdoing of the participants in the Sincan meeting, “Did the participants of Sincan event curse the flag, pointed arm to the police? No” (Zaman 1997i), implying that the event meant no harm.

There were other minor parties’ framings that supported the RP as a legitimate political actor. For example, upon the RP’s electoral victory in December 1995, the leader of the Grand Union Party (BBP), a minor party in the parliament, said that “the citizens’ message was to recognize the RP as a reality” (Zaman 1996b). Against the negative propaganda that implicitly suggested the military should expel the RP government. These minor parties expressed their concerns for such actions. A BBP official said that “there were some people calling for a military coup but their party will be against these demands” (Zaman 1997i). At another time, the BBP member said that some groups that failed within democracy are now trying to gain the same result that by using the military (Zaman 1997j). Similarly, Mustafa Kupeli, an officer from the National Action Party (MHP), said that it is treason the antidemocratic suggestions and implications to the Turkish nation (Zaman 1997k). An RP deputy was reported in the religious daily *Zaman* saying, “those who tolerated the Refah-Yol coalition now want to destroy it” (Zaman 1997f). None of these counterframings of these events by significant political actors in Turkey received coverage in the mainstream press.

One of the controversial decisions imposed by the NSC (National Security Council) on the RP government was to make the compulsory education typical and continuous for an eight-year period, rather than making it diverse after the fifth year. This suggested the closing the middle parts of the religious high schools, rather than allowing the pupils to go to these schools after the fifth year. As the secular camp saw these religious schools as the source of the popular support for the Islamic movement in general and the RP in particular, they strongly supported the continuous education, as opposed to the optional eight-year. The Alumni Association for the religious (Imam-Hatip) high schools (ONDER) chairman said that they are not against the eight-year compulsory education but to make this education continuous is a conspiracy to close down the middle part of these religious high schools (Zaman 1997m). The framing of similar social movement organization such as AIMDER that were covered in the daily Zaman (1997o) was not covered in the mainstream media. The media coverage mostly ignored the framing by the supporters of these high schools, and I could only find these counterframings through the daily Zaman.

To better understand the media role in the repression of the RP by the state, the dominance of perceived threat in the media can provide a good perspective on the subject-matter. When a regime feels that cultural limits of dissident is challenged, repression is likely as a “means of reestablishing defined parameters of acceptable behavior” (Davenport 1995:689). The amplification of the threat posed by the RP constituted a major part of the media framing of the RP and its agenda throughout the periods. Forty seven percent of the anti-RP framing suggested that the RP’s thoughts, actions, and policies are a threat to the regime. All of these framings aim to condemn the

RP government for undermining the bases of the secular democratic regime in Turkey. For example, the framings in both the military briefing to the members of judiciary and the suit against RP and their coverage sympathetic to the elite framing revealed that the RP was perceived as a 'serious threat' to the nature of the regime.

The media's contribution to the repression of RP can be analyzed at various levels: (1) the media as a resource (Rohlinger 2002) or a part of the political opportunity structure (McAdam 1996b); (2) as part of the claims-making process (Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Gusfeld 1989; Best 1990); (3) as affecting the public discourse (Gamson 1992; Haller 2001; Callaghan and Schnell 2001) or representing the public itself (Mules 1998; Carpignano 1999; Mules 1998); (4) in terms of the proximity between the media and the elite groups as a result of the media's attitude in controversial issues (Gitlin 1980; Ryan 1991), due to power relations (Spector and Kitsuse 1987; Paletz and Entman 1981), due to mutual dependence (Hess 1984), or as a mechanism where elite perspectives are shaded on the public (Jasperson and Watts 1998; Zaller and Chui 1996; Iyengar and Kinder 1987) or cultural hegemony (Exoo 1994).

Throughout this project I hypothesized that the media acted as a countermovement against the RP government, not because of negative media coverage of the RP but also by providing a platform for secular elite communications against the RP (Lang and Lang 1980; Schudson 2002). Of course, the state elites hold the ultimate power of using force but, prior to repression, they focused on claims-making through media. As countermovements tend to focus their framing strategies on the construction of threat posed by a social movement (Isaac 2002), the threat frame was the focus of the media and elite framings.

First, whether as a resource (Rohlinger 2002) or a part of the political opportunities (McAdam 1996b), media access is critical for the success of the social movements as it limits or supports the movement's ability to reach the population. My findings revealed that the mainstream press in Turkey consistently displayed unsympathetic coverage of the RP, limiting its chances to affect public opinion. Second, the media's active role in framing activities (Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Gusfeld 1989; Best 1990) also fits the RP case, as my research revealed that the RP-related framing was represented differently or insufficiently in the mainstream press. Third, some scholars viewed the media as (a) affecting the public discourse (Gamson 1992; Haller 2001; Callaghan and Schnell 2001) or (b) even representing the public itself (Mules 1998; Carpignano 1999). However, the second option (i.e., the media as the public) is not supported by our findings because, as a political party in government, the RP had its own public and more or less maintained its popular support even after it was banned by founding a successor political party (Fazilet Partisi – FP). Fourth, my findings support the close proximity between the media and elites (Gitlin 1980; Ryan 1991; Spector and Kitsuse 1987; Paletz and Entman 1981; Jasperson and Watts 1998; Zaller and Chui 1996; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Hess 1984). Accordingly, the elite groups and the media cooperated to oust the RP as its coalition government was perceived as a threat to the established political and economic system in Turkey.

### **Implications for Media Studies Field:**

Various social science fields such as media studies, social problems and social movements address the critical importance of the media in mediating the messages

between the creators of a meaning and its consumers. In my research, a social constructionist perspective was adopted to examine the effects of a conservative media framing on the fate of a challenging social movement (i.e., RP). In a context where both parties' framing strategies are based on disparate cultural premises, the power relations are likely to determine whose framing will dominate the public sphere. I expected that my research contribute to the understanding of the role played by the media in shaping public debates.

Habermas (1996) defined public sphere as “a sphere in which the public as a vehicle of public opinion is formed” (p.56). However, this view of public sphere is criticized for viewing the public sphere as a uniform one and for disregarding varieties of power relations and culture that shape the public sphere (Calhoun 1992; Curran 1991; Fraser 1993). Similarly, Ku (2000) emphasized “the structural, institutional, and discursive levels of the public sphere” (p.216). My study implies support for the ‘multiple public sphere’ thesis because, as a political party in government, the RP had its own public and more or less maintained its popular support even after it was banned, and maintained popular support for its organizations operating under new names. In the elections, the RP’s successor, the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi* - FP) garnered a 16 popular support when the winner of the election received only 21 percent of the votes cast.

Despite controversies over its extent, the effect of the media framing is well established in the previous literature (Joslyn and Haider-Markel 2002; Gamson and Meyer 1996; McAdam 1996; Entman 1993) by a function of agenda setting (Winter & Eyal 1981) and shaping public policy debates (Mules 1998). My research’s contribution lies in that the media help determine what is discussed in the public sphere even though

the media may not have a strong direct effect on the perception of its audience (Hubbard et al 1975; Patterson and McClure 1976 cited in Nelson and Clawson 1997). In other words, the media help control the public discourse by determining what is debated in the public sphere. Even in a purely democratic context, what the population thinks does not perfectly translate into what is discussed in the public sphere. Especially in a semi-authoritarian context such as Turkey where the official ideology is protected by law, what is discussed in the public might well be different from what the actual public thinks (i.e., public opinion).

As a secondary claims-maker (Best 1990; Kuran 1995), the media play a gate-keeping role in this process by magnifying certain frames, ignoring, filtering and distorting others (see Ericson et al 1991). Paletz and Entman (1981) said that the US media “help preserve the legitimacy of America’s political, economic, and social system” (p.6). “It is not necessarily the relative merits of various arguments for and against a proposal that most influences its legislative fate. Rather, it is the relative success of proponents and opponents in framing the overall terms of the debate”(Menashe and Siegel 1998: 311). The same can definitely be argued for the Turkish media that see themselves as the guardian of the secular and democratic regime as it successfully determine the terms of the debate as to the inclusion/exclusion of the RP into the institutional politics in Turkey.

My research partially supports a direct media effect when the audience shares the same cultural premises as the one endorsed by the media. While the RP ignored the media unsympathetic framings as an artificial agenda and a deliberate opposition (see tables 18 and 20), the secular members of the Refah-Yol coalition (i.e., DYP’s) who initially supported the coalition government began to withdraw their support from the coalition

under the influence of media framing, making the fate of the coalition uncertain.

Probably under the influence of the negative media coverage, more and more members of the DYP denied their support for the Refah-Yol government. In the last two months of the coalition government, five DYP ministers<sup>45</sup> of the cabinet resigned from their posts. Moreover, including two deputies that were expelled from the party, around forty deputies left the DYP before and after the collapse of the coalition government. Along with one deputy expelled from the DYP, only four of these resignations happened before the collapse of the coalition and most of them followed the resignation of the Prime Minister Erbakan to maintain the coalition. However, after the President's decision not to authorize the DYP leader, Mrs. Ciller, for prime minister, the resignations from DYP made the continuance of the RP coalition government impossible.

Similarly, following the media and military's lead, secular elite groups that were previously of different views on the status of RP in Turkish politics came to an agreement in dispelling the RP from power. For example, the chairman of the Constitutional Court, Yekta G. Ozden publicly supported this decision by the President not to allow the RP coalition to continue on power (Zaman 1997c). In line with the fact that the resignations from the DYP came from the deputies that are affiliated with the establishment<sup>46</sup> (Zaman 1997e), the elite reaction to the RP coalition can be observed more clearly. Similarly, some civil society leaders (such as industrial capitalists and trade unions, see Milliyet 1997av; Hurriyet 1997e; Sabah 1997ag) that previously tolerated the RP's coming to power expressed their opinion for the removal of RP from power during the heightened debates between the RP and the secular camp led by the media.



### **Implications for Social Movement Field:**

The unity or division among the elite groups were defined as a sign of closure or openness of the political opportunity structure (Brockett 1991; Tarrow 1994; McAdam 1996). The disunity among the Turkish elites as to the inclusion and exclusion of the RP before their coming to power probably allowed the RP to take part in the coalition government. However, in the process that led to the end of the RP government the elite groups seemed to have united on the idea that the RP must go (for the examples of the opinion leaders support for the anti-RP camp, see Hurriyet 1997e; Sabah 1997ag; Milliyet 1997av). Some secular elite groups that previously defended RP's participation in government mostly became united against the RP government. For example, trade unions such as Turk-Is supported this idea (Sabah 1996a). Even some military generals reportedly thought that the RP government must be given a chance to show it was part of the system (Milliyet 1996p). In January 1997, the industrial bourgeoisie that supported giving a chance to the RP government even suggested the abolition of National Security Council (NSC) as a barrier before a complete democratization in a report endorsed the association of major industrial capitalists, TUSIAD (Tusiad 1997). However, the bourgeoisie later joined the secular opposition camp led by the media and military in condemning RP and requesting its removal from power.

The cooperation of secular groups against RP can also be related to the debate of countermobilization in social movements literature. A social movement's unexpected success can cause a fast countermobilization that might neutralize the movement success (Voss 1996). As a result of a surprising coalition deal struck realized with DYP, RP's surprising accession to power caused concerns among the secular groups. With a strict

interpretation, the leader Erbakan's association of RP with Islam was perceived as a sign of religious discrimination and a threat to the secular regime. For example, Erbakan said, "a just order will be established, peacefully or with bloodshed" (Belgenet 2003a), "God will not accept your prayers if you do not serve RP" (Belgenet 2003a), and "when the RP comes to power, the university administrators will salute the students with headscarf [rather than banning it]" (Belgenet 2003a). These words were repeatedly cited in the media and were widely perceived as a sign of RP's religious agenda and, therefore, were criticized by many secular groups (see Mengi 1995a; Sabah 1997a; Mengi 1997g; Sabah 1995d; Colasan 1997b; see also Table 14). Moreover, the Constitutional Court used these statements as a basis for banning the RP (Belgenet 2003a). Additionally, the two feuding social democratic parties began to cooperate against the RP government (Zaman 1997h). To sum up, social movements affect the nature of the countermovements, creating grievances and opportunities (Gamson 1990; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Zald and Useem 1987; Voss 1996). Similarly, RP's quick success and provocative framing of cultural issues led to a decisive elite countermobilization.

The availability or lack of a creative master frame can be considered a part of the cultural opportunities for social movements (McAdam 1994). Accordingly, where an effective master frame is not accessible for a social movement (or the movement is not aware of it), the movement is not likely to make a successful case for its agenda. Since the beginning, the RP's narrow religious agenda did not establish a strong connection with democracy. At the same, the RP did not see the media as sincere about democracy. Rather, it saw them as the puppets of interest group politics (Zaman 1997e). If the RP had

understood the rational democracy framework that undergirded media and state opposition, it might have found more room to operate with a democratic discourse.

Various students of social movements (e.g. Tarrow 1994; Tilly 1978) emphasized that the political opportunities must be perceived before they can be effective. However, the perceived threat of repression is different from perceived political opportunities. The awareness of new political opportunities encourages collective action and the unawareness thereof will discourage it. However, the awareness of repression leads to similar results for a social movement, that is, an actual repression or a concession to repression by a social movement. That is because, as part of the political opportunity structure (Brockett 1991), repression is unpredictable (della Porta 1996), and emerges in a cultural context (Jasper 1997). Regardless the state's intention for repression, a threat of repression brought about the same result, that is, accepting the defeat or being actually repressed. In both cases, the social movements face a failure voluntarily or by force. Erbakan's untimely resignation under the increasing threat of a military coup implies that a perceived threat of repression is an important aspect of repression itself. That is, perceived political opportunities affect the strategies of social movements (Kurzman 1997).

The analysis of the relations between movement framing and counterframing is still underdeveloped in the social movement literature (see Ellingston 1997).. As Benford and Snow (2000) mentioned, the analysis of movement and countermovement success represented a tautological reasoning that attributes the success to mainly the most resonant framing used by either the social movement or its countermovement. My research supports the argument that the power background of the claims-maker has a

major impact on the outcome of the framing struggles between competing groups. Even though the Islamic movement in general and the RP in particular reached a significant popular support in Turkey due to the failure of secularist cultural Westernization project (Gulalp 1995; Yavuz 2000; Atasoy 2000; Kadioglu 1998), the RP's repression by the secular elites was mostly through counterframing methods that were enhanced by their power background as these elites control the public debate by controlling the media access and through a threat of ultimate use of force.

Even though the movement leadership might focus on moderate framing, the constituents of the movement might extend the framing to a level that cannot be acceptable to the leadership (Babb 1996). This was the case for RP as some of the RP members expressed more radical claims that were taken by the secular elite to justify their suspicion about the RP's hidden agenda. As Heper (2000) said, the RP could not prevent provocative speech by some of its radical members. Combined with a radical discourse by other religious groups that were perceived as the RP's allies, the outcome was very consequential for the RP. A negative radical flank effect occurs when the presence of radical groups weakens the bargaining power of moderates (Hains 1997). Similarly, the radical flank effect was negative for the RP as the radical religious groups weakened the bargaining power of the RP as a moderate social movement (Atasoy 2000).

### **Future Research and Limitations of this Research:**

Current social movements literature emphasizes the impact of political opportunity structures on social movements' framing (Noonan 1997; Benford and Snow 2000) but relatively little research has been done on the opposite direction of the relations, i.e., the

effects of the framing and counterframing on the political opportunities. The banning of the RP definitely represented a repression and shrinking political opportunities for the Islamic movement in general and for the RP in particular. The RP's framing might have contributed to the fact that secular groups perceived the RP as a threat, leading to its eventual repression. This study provides a background for a future research that investigates the effects of political opportunity structure on framing strategies and vice versa. It seems that the RP's framing based on a religious agenda in a secularist regime gained itself more opposition than support. However, further research is needed to support this insight.

Turner and Killian (1972) predicted that a long-haul struggle between a social movement and a countermovement would generally transform the initial movement toward moderation. I have witnessed a parallel development in the struggle between the Islamic movement and the secular regime, forcing the former into a more moderate stance. At present, the Justice and Development Party (JDP) as a successor of RP became very popular after it toned down its religious discourse and its framing of its political agenda emphasized values of democracy. By winning a landslide victory in the November 2002 Elections, JDP came to power and became a major actor in the Turkish political arena. As with many failing framing efforts, JDP realized the movement established a frame extension to incorporate democracy with their early religious frames. Noonan (1997) argued that "using the same discourse and frame as the state may be the most effective, and certainly the safest, mobilization strategy" (p.255). Unlike the RP that did not emphasize its loyalty to the democratic system and opposed the Turkey's membership of the European Union and Customs Union (Zaman 1995a), the JDP

emphasizes its loyalty to the democratic principles and endorsed Turkey's membership within the European Union. Therefore, JDP was welcomed by some secular groups and was tolerated by others. Even though some secularist elite groups, including the military and some members of the media maintained their suspicion about the JDP's real agenda, they could not easily disqualify it for being a religious movement as it emphasizes democracy and human rights more often than religion. Depending on the sincerity of both sides about democracy, Turkey can become the first working example that can reconcile Islam and democracy, and Islam and the separation of church and state.

Whether this movement will succeed or not should become clear in a couple of years. Then, research that compares both RP and JDP in terms of political opportunity structure, their framing strategies before and after their accession to power in relation their success or failure would make a significant contribution to my understanding of the complex relations between political opportunity structure, culture, framing strategies of social movements.

My research can provide a background for a larger project to explore the dynamic processes that lead to the success, or failure of, the Islamic movement in Turkey. Such a project might involve the analysis of the political opportunity structure for longer periods. For example, the factors that shape the opportunities such as the elite alignment and the likelihood of repression can be measured and be related to specific frames in a time-scale (e.g. during the 1960, 1970, and 1980 military coups). In my research I mentioned some major aspects of these relations. For example, before RP came to power the political elites were divided and economic and state elites did not have a clear agreement as to whether accept or exclude RP. Therefore, the RP managed to come to power due to such

an elite disunity. However, in the last period of RP coalition, the elite groups in Turkey seems to have come to an agreement on excluding RP from the institutional political process. Gamson (1990) argued that movement groups seeking to displace extant elites rarely succeeded. Similarly, the RP was repressed because it was seen as a movement that seeks to replace extant elites and the cultural codes of the Turkish society according to a religious doctrine. Of course, my research mainly focused on the framing processes in various phases of RP government, the scope of this dissertation did not allow establishing all facets of the process that led to the repression of RP. I definitely believe my research can provide a basis for such a future project.

As an early insight, a greater popular support that helped its electoral victory and relative tolerance toward JDP by various elite groups can be attributed to its ability to relate itself to a more effective democracy master frame that is resonant to both elites and to the population. Despite the secular establishment's continuing distaste toward any overt manifestation of Islam (Heper 1999), my personal expectation is that the Turkish elite's and JDP's commitment to democracy will provide a context for reconciliation of Islam and democracy.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> The author classified the dailies *Turkiye*, *Zaman*, *Akit*, *Yeni Safak*, *Milli Gazete*, *Ortagogu*, *Selam*, and *Yeni Asya* (generally in this order of circulation) as the religiously affiliated press.

<sup>2</sup> For example, Mesut Yilmaz was cited for saying that “Hodja [Mr. Erbakan] says that ‘if you don’t vote for us, you will go to Hell’, this is a discrimination” (*Hurriyet* 1995g: 22). Similarly, Ms. Ciller, the leader of the other central right party DYP, said that “Erbakan call as Muslims those who vote for him, as Non-Muslims those who do not for him” (*Sabah* 1995f: 18).

<sup>3</sup> The news also cited similar views from secular politicians claiming that “80 percent of the population did not accept the RP... RP defines itself outside the system” (*Milliyet* 1995d: 14).

<sup>4</sup> Many others also thought that RP was successful in the election (Ulagay 1995a; Candar 1995a; Birand 1995a).

<sup>5</sup> Some news accounts also suggested that RP is related/parallel to radical religious groups as Hamas or Hizbullah in the Muslim world (2 percent).

<sup>6</sup> Similar views were abundant in the media. Another example of such views is the following: “If the president authorize the RP leader to form the government, the parties must not accept to be coalition partners with RP” (*Eksi* 1995c).

<sup>7</sup> ANAP and DYP were two major political parties with a secular but respectful of traditional values and market economy. These two center right parties were competing for the leadership of the center-right (conservative) wing of political arena that constitutes around 60-70 percent of Turkish society. When they formed a majority coalition after the elections of December 1995, the two parties agreed to take turns for the post of prime minister ship in the coalition government they formed. First, the leader of ANAP, Mesut Yilmaz, became the prime minister but he tried use his power to eliminate his counterpart, Mrs. Ciller, by backing up the corruption charges by the opposition. This caused a big distrust between the coalition partners and broke up the government. Then, the president nominated Erbakan for prime minister as the leader of the biggest group in the parliament to form a government.

<sup>8</sup> Another columnist found both RP and his associates as “not promising any confidence” (*Toker* 1996a: 17).

<sup>9</sup> The dispute over the eight-year compulsory education has been a major issue about the secularist agenda and the Islamic movement. Secular groups and elite groups aimed to curtail the effect of the state-controlled religious high schools as they see it as a major engine for the Islamic movement. The project of eight-year compulsory education was seen as an opportunity and excuse to cancel the middle schools parts of these religious schools. The underlying thinking was that it would limit both the actual period of religious education in these schools as well as curtail the overall demand for these schools while preventing the graduates of these schools to seek a college degree in a non-religious areas. I will analyze this issue in the section of post-Refah-Yol period.

<sup>10</sup> Another stark example of this charges is voiced by Akbal (1996b) of *Milliyet*: “A government is established. [RP] struggled to shift Turkey from Ataturk’s principles and ignored modern civilization and culture and tried to bring sharia to the country for a quarter century unfortunately. The came to power in the end. Do not believe in their lip service to Ataturk, modernity and secularism, remember what they said just a couple of weeks ago. Then, you will realize this deception” (p.19).

<sup>11</sup> Similarly, some columnists pointed the same concern: “RP’s attempts to take over the state posts may increase in this period and this may cause the worries to grow on the part of sensitive groups” (*Ulagay* 1996a: 9).

<sup>12</sup> For supportive coverage of business sector, see *Milliyet* 1996r; *Tamer* 1996, *Sabah* 1996g.

<sup>13</sup> For example one columnist claimed that “Turkey started to become the country of sheiks, dervishes, imams and psychics” (*Bila* 1997a). Similarly, “RP is invading state cadres along with its agenda by using its government power” (*Dogan* 1997a).

*Milliyet* cites the Socialist Labor Party campaign for the application of revolutionary Republican Laws. These are radically secularist laws enforced by the state to modernize the population. These laws quitted due to the inapplicability. Here are some selection from the suggested application:



- Closing all the foundations, association, Sufi convents and other establishments that are founded for religious purposes, lifting the titles such sheik, dervish etc. from those who lead these establishments, and nationalization of their schools, hostels, seminaries by converting them into secular institutions of education. At the same time, Masonic communities should be banned.
- Converting the religious schools that long ago deviated from educating religious leaders into technical schools, professional schools and conservatories.
- Abolishing the Quran seminaries that destroyed our secular education system.
- Disallowing the dressings such as turban, robe, black burka that are a sign of various religious factions and the laws must be applied.

Then the columnist adds that after reading these lines, it is obvious that we fall very far from the principle of Republic . (Asik 1997b). In a clear sense his idea of Republic requires that all the above-mentioned prohibitions are strictly applied regardless of personal freedoms and human rights.

<sup>14</sup> The word *takiyye* comes from Arabic and means dissimulation. Historically, it was used by minority religious groups to hide their true identity among the majority, fearing negative consequences. However, the word was transferred to the political arena to blame the Islamic party for using the democratic system by hiding their religious agenda. However, the word was written in three different forms (e.g. *takiye*, *takiyye*, *takiyye*).

<sup>15</sup> The same columnist blames the democratic journalists criticism of other journalists applauding the military's prominence:

Some people's perspective is very interesting or disoriented. They see the due reactions about secularism as provocation for a military coup. They say that raising too much dust is not necessary. For whatever reason, they do not show as much tolerance to defenders of secularism as they show it to Islamic currents that are anti-secularism. (Cemal 1997b).

<sup>16</sup> "Erbakan and his associates' forcing the issues with questionable priority (e.g. mosque and headscarf) brought the military to the forefront and disrupted the democratic nature of the regime" (Sazak 1997a).

<sup>17</sup> Especially, the military's involvement in politics causes an unfair competition in the marketplace of ideas (Gokturk 2001).

<sup>18</sup> In a retrospective framing, the second chief of general staff, Cevik Bir, that was the master mind behind the operation called the event as "Turkish people's integration with the Turkish Armed Forces' societal engineering project" (Donat 2001). Of course, this must be viewed a retrospective account of a main actor in the process.

<sup>19</sup> This fact was revealed after a controversial event took place in the media. After the energy minister of the time, Cumhur Ersumer, said he launched a corruption investigation of an energy contract, a unanimous general's statement was headlined in a popular newspaper, *Hurriyet* (2001a) as "We Pushed the Button, Not Him". The statement created a controversy and the prime minister asked the newspaper to release the name of the general (*Hurriyet* 2001b). Even the office of general staff released an official statement that they did not make a statement to the media (*Hurriyet* 2001c). However, the newspaper editor said that he cannot release his source, citing an example from the process of February 28: "A general was criticizing the Refah-Yol government. The next day *Hurriyet* came out with the headline of 'This Time Unarmed Forces Must Solve the Problem'. The day the news was published the secretary of the general staff, Erol Ozkasnak, called to find out who the owner of the statement was... But we do not release our source" (Ozkok 2001a). However, rejecting that he made the call, the then secretary of general staff, Erol Ozkasnak, was furious about the news but said he knew that the general in question was going to make a statement and, therefore, did not need to make any call (*Milliyet* 2001a). Ozkasnak even said that they would not dare (*Milliyet* 2001a), depicting a dire picture of the media attitude and the relation between the media and military in the process of February 28: "In this period, the pens [journalists] who claimed that I investigated the sources are the same journalists that tried to please the generals by bring to headlines small pieces of news coming from military sources in order to work the command center of general staff. In the process of February 28, the Turkish Armed Forces spend a great effort to enlighten the civil dynamics of society and to mobilize them against the threat to the Republic. We cannot ignore our media's contribution in this matter. However, after this threat is avoided, the news that aim to belittle that process and its generals does not fit the journalistic ethics" (*Milliyet* 2001a). Here I conclude that because the secretary said the other military statements were planned in his office it is probable that called the journalist to find out how the unplanned statement made it to the newspaper. As Ergin admitted this phone call had happened

(Sabah 2001), this statement was probably made out of a casual and private conversation between the journalists and the general and made it into the headline. The general's admission of media contribution to the process also supports my thesis of the cooperation between the media and military in the February 28 process.

<sup>20</sup> Ergin said that he opposed to the Refah-Yol government and supported the February 28 process (Ergin 2001).

<sup>21</sup> The document named all of the targeted people and the list of journalists included M. Ali Birand, Cengiz Candar, Yalçın Küçük, Yaşar Parlak, Mahir Kaynak, Mahir Sayın (Yeni Safak 2000a).

<sup>22</sup> As the conspired journalists mostly worked in daily Sabah, its Director of Printing, Ergun Babahan, of Sabah explained the background of this event: "In our agreement with the daily Hurriyet, we were not going to put the news in the first page but after the news take place in the prime time TV news... The process of February 28 was the period the civilian politics was the weakest, where the press dominated politics. The press is generally biased all over the world but we past the line... Unfortunately, the emerged a media aristocracy... We must move the NSC's central position the former president Demirel brought to" (Akman 2002c).

<sup>23</sup> Upon a news report that appeared in Milliyet about the former US secretary of state Mrs. Albright's statement that they supported democratic Turkey (Sazak 2002b), the owner of Milliyet admitted that the second chief of general staff (Cevik Bir) was upset about the coverage (Akman 2002d).

<sup>24</sup> This indirect military intervention is called a "postmodern coup" because it realized an undemocratic result through democratic methods. In other words, the Refah-Yol government was forced to resign by the media and military through an intense public opinion building and with a threat of military intervention. Other secular political parties in the parliament consented with this anti-democratic efforts through a lack of confidence vote within the parliament. Some others labeled the process resulting in the collapse of the Refah-Yol government differently: a transparent coup (Cerrahoglu 1997), a modern coup (Cemal 1997g), a warning (Milliyet 1997z) and a military ultimatum (Dogan 1997c; Civaoglu 1997b; Sabah 1997ac). Like Dervisoglu, chief of the navy during the Refah-Yol government, some said "28 February is a legal reaction, not a mil. coup" (Cevizoglu 2001: 17) because he argued that "the NSC meeting of February 28 did not demand the resignation of the government but expressed its concerns about government policies on certain issues" (Cevizoglu 2001: 18).

<sup>25</sup> Eight year continuous compulsory education requires closing middle sections of religious high schools that were sponsored by the state.

<sup>26</sup> The Decisions of the February 28 NSC Meeting (Sabah 1997t):

- The principle of secularism (laicite) must be protected with sensitivity, the law must be applied and new legal arrangements must be made, if needed.
- The private dormitories and schools under the control of tarikats must be turned over (*devredilmeli*) to the Ministry of Education (MOE according to the Unity of Education Act.
- 8 year compulsory education must be introduced and the Kuran seminaries must be turned over to the ministry of education.
- In order to grow the religious personnel loyal to Ataturk's reforms, the educational institutions must be kept at the level of need that is consistent the spirit of the Unity of Education Act.
- Religious establishments (activities) must be conducted by the Diyanet
- There must be put an end to the activities of tarikats prohibited by the Act No. 677.
- The activities of the media broadcasting (and publication) must be controlled that depict the military as anti-religion by taking advantage of the issue of the personnel dismissed from the military because of their Irtijaic activities.
- The personnel dismissed from the military due to Irtija must not be employed in other government offices (*kurulus*)
- The measures taken to prevent the leaks from the Islamist (*dinci*) community into the military must be applied in other government offices (*kurulus*).
- This article was about the relations with Iran (so was not released)
- The activities by the extreme Islamists (*dinci*) must be prevented that may divide our nation by invoking sectarian divisions.

- The perpetrators must be persecuted that are responsible for the events that are contrary to the Municipal Law.
- The practices must be prevented that are against the dress code.
- The licenses for guns must be rearranged; the demand for pomp guns must be carefully evaluated.
- The collection of the sacrificed animal skins by the organization that are anti-regime.
- The legal proceedings must be quickly completed against the body guards who wear special uniforms and those who responsible for this.
- The attempts to bring the notion of ummah instead of nation must be prevented through legal and administrative means.
- The opportunity to abuse the law about the crimes against Ataturk must not be provided.

<sup>27</sup> As an project of modernization, the laws of reform introduced by Ataturk in the 1920s outlaw the institution of Sufi orders and other traditional titles. This law was later softened in practice after the transition to democracy after the World War II. However, the establishment still does not recognize the Sufi orders but many political parties contact with, seeks support of, the Sufi orders that work unofficially, organized around various civil society organizations. However, Erbakan's action was seen as officializing the Sufi orders that were seen as the enemies of secular regime by the establishment. Therefore, it created a great controversy as to the status of religious organizations and secularism.

<sup>28</sup> See the section above.

<sup>29</sup> The relation between *irtija* and RP was very ambiguous. As we explained later, the *irtija*'s definition was not provided by its users. RP's relation to *irtija* was expressed in various dimensions. Some saw RP as a representative of *irtija* (Cemal 1997g; Livaneli 1997b) while some others thought that RP government encourages *irtija* (Milliyet 1997y).

<sup>30</sup> Similar briefings were given to the members of the media and academia earlier. Considered together, we can easily identify the main actors that were mobilized and cooperated against the RP government: the military, the media, the judiciary and academia.

<sup>31</sup> A columnist reported the answer from a military general about the subject: "We have an accredited and non-accredited press. The criteria for accreditation is being loyal to the principles of Kemalist, secular and democratic republic (Dogan 1997c).

<sup>32</sup> The media outlets that were excluded from the military briefing due to their accreditation among the media: (a) secular democratic media outlets such as HBB, Kanal 6, Kent TV, and Aksam Gazetesi and (b) all religious media with national and local coverage (Balci 2000:162).

<sup>33</sup> For example, a suit was opened against Sadik Albayrak, a columnist in the RP's semi-official newspaper, *Milli Gazete* (Sabah 1997u).

<sup>34</sup> Even though the Sincan Affair was the first visible sign of military's dislike against the Refah-Yol government, the chief of the navy during the Refah-Yol government, Dervisoglu, argued that the February 28 process started with a similar *irtija* briefing by the military to the president Demirel on January 11, 1997 (Cevizoglu 2001:62).

<sup>35</sup> The text was taken from a daily newspaper Sabah on June 12, 1997 (Sabah 1997s).

<sup>36</sup> The examples of *irtijaic* activities as stated in the briefing include the following: the governments occupying state offices with its members, its invitation of Sufi leaders for dinner, defending the headscarf issue, the Sincan Affair, the words against Ataturk, leaking into the police organization and the military, unregistered Koran seminaries, the graduates of religious schools choosing non-religious professions, religious business (Sabah 1997s).

<sup>37</sup> The pro-*irtija* adjective is used to describe some agents such as municipal leader, religious leaders, local party administrators (Sabah 1997s).

<sup>38</sup> For example, without stating the criteria for the necessity and excessiveness of Koran seminaries, the briefing stated, "Currently there are 1,685,000 attendants of the registered Koran seminaries. As a result of investigation, it was inferred that this number will increase five times in every five years, predicting this number to reach seven million in 2005" Along with this ambiguous statement that defines the Koran seminaries under state control as a problem, later it defined unregistered seminaries as a problem as well. "If we add the number of attendant in unregistered seminaries to the numbers above mentioned above, the seriousness of the number is left for your judgment" (Sabah 1997s).

<sup>39</sup> For the military, the regime was a secular republic and "secularism is the main character of the Turkish Republic" (Cevizoglu 2001: 77).

<sup>40</sup> The decisions of NSC in February 1997 were mentioned eleven times in the NSC briefing. Therefore, we can easily infer that the briefing was a follow-up on the NSC decisions.

<sup>41</sup> Some civil society institutions also opposed to the military intervention into politics. For example, 10 trade unions is reported to prepare a declaration against a military intervention (Sabah 1997af).

<sup>42</sup> Militant Democracy against Irtija and Separatism.

<sup>43</sup> At another place, Savas (2001) argued that the Turkish Republic was faced with the irtija threat as never seen before (p.306). Similarly, he said “today’s irtija is damaging traditional beliefs of Turkish nation and is pushing the state into a dangerous situation more than before by exceeding the boundaries of Ataturk’s principles” (161).

<sup>44</sup> Heper and Guney explained rational democracy as “taking democracy as an intelligent debate among the educated for the purpose of deciding upon the best policy option” (2000).

<sup>45</sup> The DYP ministers that resigned from the coalition cabinet were as follows: Isilay Saygin, Bahattin Yücel, Ufuk Soylemez, Yalım Erez, and Yıldırım Aktuna. They expressed their concern about the policies of the government about secularism. For example, Aktuna framed his resignation on blaming the coalition government: “DYP used to be the security of the secular Republic... However, the coalition partnership began to play a role that prevent it from playing such a role.” (Zaman 1997b).

<sup>46</sup> Prior to the 1995 Elections, the leader of DYP, Mrs. Ciller, transferred various popular figures from the state bureaucracy such as a retired general, former police chiefs, governors, diplomats, etc. However, most of them showed an obvious discomfort with the RP coalition and eventually resigned from the DYP to prove impossible to maintain the coalition.

## REFERENCES

- Akbal, Oktay. 1996a. "Sonra Aglamayin (Do Not Cry Later)." *Milliyet* July 30, p.17.
- Akbal, Oktay. 1997a. "Uyari Ustune Uyari (Warning After Warning)." *Milliyet* February 2. Retrieved December 22, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/02/yazar/akbal.html>).
- Akbal, Oktay. 1997b. "Gaflet hatta Hiyanet (Insensitivity even a Treason).", *Milliyet* Feb. 9. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/09/yazar/akbal.html>).
- Akbal, Oktay. 1998. "Karar Ve Inancımız Kesindir (Our Decision and Belief Certain)." *Milliyet* January 20. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1998/01/20/yazar/akbal.html>).
- Akman, Nuriye. 2002a. "Yayın Yönetmenleri, Güzel Gazeteciyi Görsel Unsur Olarak Kullanıyor (Editors Use Beautiful Journalist as a Visual Element) [Interview with Nurcan Akad]." *Zaman* December 15. Retrieved December 31, 2002. (<http://www.zaman.com.tr/2002/12/15/roportaj/default.htm>).
- Akman, Nuriye. 2002b. "Türkiye'yi Yönetmeye Kalktık, Burnumuz Sürtüldü (We Attempted to Rule Turkey but Took our Lesson) [Interview with Ergun Babahan – Part 1]." *Zaman* December 29. Retrieved December 31, 2002. (<http://www.zaman.com.tr/2002/12/29/roportaj/default.htm>).
- Akman, Nuriye. 2002c. "Sabah'ın Genel Yayın Müdürü Ergun Babahan: 28 Şubat'ta Ölçüyü Kaçırdık, Kendi Arkadaşlarımızı Haber Yaptık (Ergun Babahan, Editor-in-Chief of Sabah: We Past the Line in February and Made News about our Colleages) [Interview with Ergun Babahan – Part 2]." *Zaman* December 29. Retrieved December 31, 2002. (<http://www.zaman.com.tr/2002/12/30/roportaj/default.htm>).
- Akman, Nuriye. 2002d. "Aydın Doğan: Asıl İmparatorluk Koçlar, Ben Onlarla Boy Ölçüşemem (Adin Dogan: The Real Empire are the Koc Family, I cannot be Compared with them). [Interview with Aydın Doğan]" *Zaman* September 10. Retrieved May 23, 2003. (<http://www.zaman.com.tr/2002/09/10/roportaj/default.htm>).
- Akyol, Taha. 1996a. "RP'li Koalisyon (Coalition with RP)." *Milliyet* June 8, p.17.
- Akyol, Taha. 1996b "Hükümsüz Türkiye (Turkey Without Government)." *Milliyet* June 11, p.15.
- Akyol, Taha. 1997a. "Catisma Tehlikesi (Danger of Conflict)." *Milliyet* February 2. Retrieved December 22, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/02/yazar/akyol.html>).
- Akyol, Taha. 1997b. "RP ve DYP (RP and DYP)." *Milliyet* February 4. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/04/yazar/akyol.html>).
- Akyol, Taha. 1997c. "Demirel'in Gorevi (Demirel's Duty)." *Milliyet* March 4. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/03/04/yazar/akyol.html>).
- Akyol, Taha. 1997d. "Çiller, İrtica, Asker (Ciller, İrtija, and Military)." *Milliyet* June 11. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/11/yazar/akyol.html>).
- Akyol, Taha. 1997e. "Sağdaki Çıkmaz (Dilemma on the Right)." *Milliyet* June 17. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/17/yazar/akyol.html>).
- Akyol, Taha. 1997f. "RP'yi Kapatmak (Banning RP)." *Milliyet* May 22. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/05/22/yazar/akyol.html>).

- Akyol, Taha. 1997g. "Demokraside Çare? (Solution in Democracy?)." *Milliyet* May 21. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/05/21/yazar/akyol.html>).
- Akyol, Taha. 1998. "Yumuşak Geçiş (Soft Transition)." *Milliyet* January 17. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1998/01/17/yazar/akyol.html>).
- Alkan, Turker. 2001. "Postmodern Atatürkçülük (Postmodern Kemalism)." *Radikal* January 16. Retrieved May 20, 2003. (<http://www.radikal.com.tr/2001/01/16/yazarlar/turalk.shtml>).
- Alpay, Sahin. 1996a. "Refah'siz Hükümet (Government Without RP)." *Milliyet* June 11, p.18.
- Alpay, Sahin. 1996b. "Bu Hükümet Güven Oyu Almalı (This government Must Win the Confidence Vote)." July 2, p.18.
- Alpay, Sahin. 1997a. "İslam'ın Yıldızı Ne Alemde? (What about the Islam's Star)." *Milliyet* February 8. Retrieved December 22, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/08/yazar/alpay.html>).
- Alpay, Sahin. 1997b. "Refah'ı Kapatmak (Closing RP)." *Milliyet* June 12. Retrieved December 22, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/12/yazar/alpay.html>).
- Alpay, Sahin. 1997c. "İslam'ın Protestanlaşması (Protestantization of Islam)." *Milliyet* June 14. Retrieved December 22, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/14/yazar/alpay.html>).
- Alpay, Sahin. 1997d. "Refah'ı Kapatmak (Closing RP)." *Milliyet* June 12. Retrieved December 22, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/12/yazar/alpay.html>).
- Alpay, Sahin. 1998. "Refah Dışlanamaz (RP Cannot be Excluded)." *Milliyet* January 20. Retrieved December 22, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1998/01/20/yazar/alpay.html>).
- Altan, Mehmet. 1996a. "Darbe Sozunu Garipsemeden Demokrat Olunabilir Mi? (How can One be a Democrat Without Being Bothered by the Word of Military Coup?)." *Sabah* June 10, p.18.
- Altan, Mehmet. 1997a. "Refah'ı Susurlukta Vurdular (They Hunted Refah at Susurluk)." March 01. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9703/01/t/y13.html>).
- Altan, Mehmet. 1997b. "Refah'ı Susurlukta Vurdular (They Hunted Refah at Susurluk)." March 01. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9703/01/t/y13.html>).
- Altan, Mehmet. 1997c. "Demokrasinin De Savcılara İhtiyacı Var (Democracy Also in Need of Prosecutors)." *Sabah* June 12. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/12/t/y13.html>).
- Altan, Mehmet. 1997d. "Durumdan Vazife Çıkarmak (Ascribing a Duty from the Situation)." *Sabah* June 14. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/14/t/y13.html>).
- Altan, Mehmet. 1997e. "Hanımlar yarın Sultanahmet'e geliyor musunuz? (Ladies, Are You Coming to the SultanAhmed Square Tomorrow)." *Sabah* May 24. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9705/24/t/y13.html>).
- Altayli, Fatih. 1997. "RP Kapatılırsa (If RP is Closed)." *Hurriyet* May 22. p. 23.
- Altayli, Fatih. 1998. "Nasıl Bir Çarpma (What Kind of Strike)." *Hurriyet* May 22. p. 14.

- Anderson, Alison. 2002. "In Search of the Holy Grail: Media Discourse and the New Human Genetics." *New Genetics and Society* 21(3):327-339. (12 pages). Retrieved June 7, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.
- Asik, Melih. 1996a. "Komisyon Ortakligi (Partnership of Commission)." *Milliyet* July 2, p.13.
- Asik, Melih. 1997a. "Kameramanin İkilemi (Dilemma of the Cameraman)." *Milliyet* February 5. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/05/yazar/asik.html>).
- Asik, Melih. 1997b. "Cumhuriyet Yasasi (Republican Law)." *Milliyet* February 10. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/10/yazar/asik.html>).
- Asik, Melih. 1997c. "İki Ucu Pis Degnek (A Stick with Both Ends Dirty)." *Milliyet* February 28. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/28/yazar/asik.html>).
- Asik, Melih. 1997d. "Savcıya İki Bakış (Two Views of the Prosecutor)." *Milliyet* May 24. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/05/24/yazar/asik.html>).
- Atakli, Can. 1996a. "Yılmaz'la Ciller Gitsin, Peki Demirel, Ecevit ve Erbakan Kalsınlar Mi? (Yılmaz and Ciller Must Go, What About Demirel, Ecevit and Erbakan?)." *Sabah* June 10, p.6.
- Atakli, Can. 1996b. "Refah'ı Neden Deneyelim ki (Why Should We Try RP Government)." *Sabah* June 12, p.6.
- Atakli, Can. 1997a. "Erbakan'ın Isi Artık Çok Zor (Erbakan's Job is No Longer Easy)." *Sabah* March 2. Retrieved on November 7, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9703/02/t/y05.html>).
- Atakli, Can. 1997b. "Onursuz ve sorumsuz (Without Honor and Responsibility)." *Sabah* June 16. Retrieved on November 7, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/16/t/y05.html>).
- Atasoy, Yildiz. 2000. "Muslim Politics in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century World-Economy: Remaking Development Ideology in Turkey." A paper presented at the 95<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Washington, DC, August 12-16, 2000.
- Babb, S. 1996. 'A True American System of Finance': Frame Resonance in the U.S. Labor Movement, 1866 to 1886. *American Sociological Review* 61:1033-52.
- Balci, Muharrem. 2000. *MGK and Demokrasi: Hukuk, Ordu, Siyaset (NSC and Democracy: Law, Military, and Politics)*. 2nd edition. Istanbul: Izlenim.
- Barkey, Henri. 2000. "The Struggles of a 'Strong' State." *Journal of International Affairs* 54(1):87. (19 pages). Retrieved June 22, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.
- Barlas, Mehmet. 1996a. "Erbakan Agziyla Kus Tutmalidir (Erbakan Must Catch a Bird with His Mouth)." *Sabah* June 14, p.15.
- Barlas, Mehmet. 1996a. "Erbakan'lı Koalisyon Aklın Gereği (A Coalition with Erbakan is Result of Rationality)." *Sabah* June 16, p.17.
- Barlas, Mehmet. 1996b. "Yılmaz mi Daha Tutarlı Erbakan mi? (Which One is More Consistent: Yılmaz or Erbakan?)." *Sabah* June 29, p.15.
- Barlas, Mehmet. 1996c. "Temcit Pilavi Yine Aynı Sofrada (The Same Menu on the Table)." *Sabah* June 30, p.17.

- Barlas, Mehmet. 1996d. "Refah-DYP Koalisyonu Tarihi bir Uzlasma Firsatidir (The RP-DYP Coalition is a Historical Opportunity for Reconciliation)." *Sabah* July 3, p.15.
- Barlas, Mehmet. 1997a. "Bugun Neyi ve Kimi Tahrik Etsem (I Wonder What and Who Should I Provoke Today)." *Sabah* February 2. Retrieved on November 7, 1997. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9702/02/t/y10.html>).
- Barlas, Mehmet. 1997b. "Hepimiz Bazi Gerçekleri Biliyoruz (We All Know Some Truth)." *Sabah* June 17. Retrieved on November 7, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/17/t/y10.html>).
- Barlas, Mehmet. 1997c. "İşin Tadını Kaçırmaalım!..NEW YORK (We Should Not Overdo It... New York)." *Sabah* May 22. Retrieved on November 7, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9705/22/t/y10.html>).
- Barlas, Mehmet. 1997d. "Kapi Kapatir Gibi Parti Kapatilir Mi? (Is it Possible to Close a Party Like You Close a Dor?)." *Sabah* May 23. Retrieved on November 7, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9705/23/t/y10.html>).
- Bayer, Yalcin. 2001. "Aydın Doğan'a Pijama Olayını Sordum (I asked Aydın Dogan' About the Pijama Event)." *Hurriyet* July 21. Retrieved May 23, 2003. (<http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/yazarlar/yazar/0,,sid~9@tarih~2001-07-21-m@nvid~10747,00.asp>).
- Belgenet 2003b. "Siyasi Partiler Yasası'nın 103. Maddesinin 2. Fikrasinin iptali (Cancellation of the Article 103 the Item 2 of the Political Parties Law)." Retrieved June 8, 2003. (<http://www.belgenet.com/dava/iptal103.html>).
- Belgenet 2003. "Anayasa Mahkemesi'nin Gerekçeli Kararı (The Justified Decision by the Constitutional Court)." Retrieved June 8, 2003. ([http://www.belgenet.com/dava/rpdava\\_g01.html](http://www.belgenet.com/dava/rpdava_g01.html)).
- Benford, Robert D. and Scott A. Hunt. 2001. "Cadrage en Conflit: Movements Sociaux et Problèmes Sociaux (Social Movements and the Counterframing and Reframing of Social Problems)." Pp. 163-194. In Daniel Cefaï and Danny Trom (eds.) *Les Formes de L'Action Collective: Mobilisations dans des Arenas Publiques (The Forms of Collective Action: Mobilizations in Public Arenas)*, Paris: École de Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales.
- Benford, Robert and David Snow. 2000. "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment." *Annual Review of Sociology* 26:611-39.
- Benford, Robert D. 1993a. "You Could be the Hundredth Monkey: Collective Action Frames and Vocabularies of Motive Within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement." *The Sociological Quarterly* 34(2): 195-216.
- Benford, Robert. 1993b. "Frame Disputes within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement." *Social Forces* 71(3): 677-701.
- Benford, Robert. 1987. *Framing Activity, Meaning, and Social Movement Participation: The Nuclear Disarmament Movement*. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Texas Austin.
- Best, Joel. 1990. *Threatened Children: Rhetoric and Concern about Child-victims*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bila, Fikret. 1995a. "Hoca Kimin Rakibi? (Whose Opponent is Erbakan?)." December 17, p.14.
- Bila, Fikret. 1996a. "Ecevit'in Cagrisi (Ecevit's Call)." July 1, p.12.



- Bila, Hikmet. 1997a. "RP, Ordu, DYP, Basin..(RP, Military, DYP and Press)." *Milliyet* February 3. Retrieved December 22, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/03/yazar/bila.html>).
- Birand, M. Ali. 1995a. "Refah Bizi Zingir Zinger Titretemedi (RP Could Not Shake Us)." *Sabah* December 26, p.12.
- Birand, M. Ali. 1996a. "Refah Bu Firsati Kullanabilecek mi? (Will RP be Able to Use this Opportunity?)." *Sabah* June 30, p.16.
- Birand, M. Ali. 1997a. "Radikallari Ancak Refah Kontrol Edebilir (Only RP can control the radicals)." March 05. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9703/05/t/y09.html>).
- Birand, M. Ali. 1997b. "MGK Neden TV'den Naklen Yayinlanmiyor (Why Not Broadcast the NSC Meeting on Live TV)." February 28. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9702/28/t/y09.html>).
- Birand, M. Ali. 1997c. "Siyasiler, Müdahaleyi Durdurmak Sizin Elinizde (Politicians, It is up to You to Stop the Intervention)." June 13. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/13/t/y09.html>).
- Birand, M. Ali. 1997d. "Askeri Bu İşin Dışında Tutun (Keep Military out of this Thing)." June 14. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/14/t/y09.html>).
- Birand, M. Ali. 1997e. "D-8 Toplantısını Küçümsemeyelim (We Should Not Underestimate the D-8 Meeting)." June 17. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/17/t/y09.html>).
- Birand, M. Ali. 1997f. "Refah Kapatılırsa Sorun Halledilecek Mi? (Will the Problem Be Solved If RP Banned)." May 23. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9705/23/t/y09.html>).
- Birand, M. Ali. 2001. "28 Subat Sendromu (February 28 Syndrome)." Pp.221-26. In Cevizoglu 2001.
- Boulton, Leyla. 2001. "Inside Track: A media Magnate strikes back for his Empire." *Financial Times* June 6, 2001.
- Bozdemir, Mevlut. 1985. "Ordu-Siyaset Iliskileri (Civil-Military Relations)." Pp. 2648-60 In *Cumhuriyet Donemi Turkiye Ansiklopedisi*, Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari.
- Brinton, Crane. 1957. *The Anatomy of Revolution*. New York: Vintage.
- Brockett, Charles D. 1991. "The Structure of Political Opportunities and Peasant Mobilization in Central America" *Comparative Politics* 253-74.
- Bugra, Ayse. 2002. "Labour, Capital, and Religion: Harmony and Conflict among the Constituency of Political Islam in Turkey." *Middle Eastern Studies* 38(2):187-204. Retrieved June 22, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.
- Bulut, Faik. 1999. *Tarikat Sermayesi: Yesil Sermaye Nereye? (Sufi Capital: Where is the Green [Religious] Capital Headed?)* vol. 2. 4th edition. Istanbul: Su Yayinlari.
- Calhoun, Craig. (ed.) 1992. *Habermas and the Public Sphere*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

- Calhoun, Craig. 1989. "Tiananmen, Television and the Public Sphere: The Internationalisation of Culture and the Beijing Spring of 1989". *Public Culture* 2(1): 54-71. Retrieved June 22, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.
- Callaghan, Karen and Frauke Schnell. 2001. "Assessing the Democratic Debate: How the News Media Frame Elite Policy Discourse." *Political Communication* 18:183–212. Retrieved June 22, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.
- Candar, Cengiz. 1996a. "Krizin Cikis Yollari (Exit Strategies Out of Crisis)." *Sabah* June 9, p.22.
- Candar, Cengiz. 1997a. "Ciller Kazancli, Yilmaz Basarisiz (Ciller Had Some Gains, Yilmaz Had Losses)." *Sabah* December 25, p.23.
- Candar, Cengiz. 1997aa. "Paletlerin Altında Kalan... (What is Gone Under the Palettes)." *Sabah* February 6. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9702/06/t/ y12.html>).
- Candar, Cengiz. 1997b. "Hukuk Kaosu (Legal Chaos)." *Sabah* March 6. Retrieved on October 12, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9703/06/t/ y12.html>).
- Candar, Cengiz. 1997c. "Rejim Tehlikede Mi? (Is the Regime in Danger?)." *Sabah* February 27. Retrieved on October 12, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9702/27/t/ y12.html>). Cavli, Yildirim. 1995. "Hic Biri Sevinemedi (None of them Could Laugh)." *Hurriyet* December 27, p.14.
- Candar, Cengiz. 1997d. "Erbakan'la Dün ve Yarın (Past and Future with Erbakan)." *Sabah* March 8. Retrieved on October 12, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9703/08/t/ y12.html>).
- Candar, Cengiz. 1997e. "Post-Modern Darbe (Postmodern Coup)." *Sabah* June 28. Retrieved on October 12, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/28/t/y12.html>).
- Candar, Cengiz. 1997f. "Amerika ve Darbe (America and Military Coup)." *Sabah* June 15. Retrieved on October 12, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/15/t/y12.html>).
- Candar, Cengiz. 1997g. "Washington'da Şaşırarak (Being Surprised in Washington)." *Sabah* May 24. Retrieved on October 12, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9705/24/t/y12.html>).
- Carpignano, Paolo. 1999. "The Shape of the Sphere: The Public Sphere and the Materiality of Communication." *Constellations: An International Journal of Critical & Democratic Theory* 6(2):177. (13 pages). Retrieved June 22, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.
- Cavli, Yildirim. 1995. "Hic Biri Sevinemedi (None of them Could Laugh)." *Hurriyet* December 27, p.14.
- Cekirge, Fatih. 1995. "Erbakan: Mesut Bey Bizi Taklit Ediyor (Erbakan: Mr. Mesut is Imitating Us)." *Sabah* December 20, p.20.
- Cekirge, Fatih. 1997a. "Son Uyarı! Ve Yolun Sonu (Last Warning and the End of the Road)." *Sabah* June 12. Retrieved on October 12, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/12/t/y15.html>).
- Cemal, Hasan. 1995. "Ne Türkiye Batacak, Ne De Kurtulacak (Turkey will Neither Collapse Nor Liberate)." *Sabah* December 16, p.19.

- Cemal, Hasan. 1996a. "Refah... Sorumsuzluk.. Yada Yasayarak Ogrenme (RP, Irresponsibility, Or, Learning by Trying)." *Sabah* June 14, p.23.
- Cemal, Hasan. 1996b. "Hangisi Sayin Ciller: Yalan mi Ihanet mi? (Which One Ms. Ciller, Lie or Treason?)." *Sabah* July 2, p.19.
- Cemal, Hasan. 1997a. "Davos Manzaralari, Sincan Manzaralari (Davos Scenes, Sincan Scenes)." *Sabah* February 6. Retrieved on November 7, 1997. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9702/06/t/y01.html>).
- Cemal, Hasan. 1997b. "Laiklik, Demokrasinin Alt Yapısıdır (Secularism is a Foundation for Democracy)." *Sabah* Feb. 7. Retrieved October 10. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9702/10/t/y01.html>).
- Cemal, Hasan. 1997c. "Asker Kompleksi ve Demokratlik [Military Complex and Being Pro-Democracy]. Feb. 14. Retrieved October 10, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9702/14/t/y01.html>).
- Cemal, Hasan. 1997d. "Ilk Adim Ilk Hukümet (First Step is a First Government). March 4 Retrieved October 10, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9703/04/t/y01.html>).
- Cemal, Hasan. 1997e. "Allah Akil Versin (May Allah Give Them Reason). March 6. Retrieved October 10, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9703/06/t/y01.html>).
- Cemal, Hasan. 1997f. "Hoca'yla Faşist Laikler! (Erbakan's Secular Fascists). February 27. Retrieved October 10, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9702/27/t/y01.html>).
- Cemal, Hasan. 1997g. "Durumdan Vazife Çıkarmak (Self-Assigning a Duty from the Situation). June 12. Retrieved October 10, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/12/t/y01.html>).
- Cemal, Hasan. 1997j. "Vakit Kaldıysa (If We had More Time). June 12. Retrieved October 10, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/13/t/y01.html>).
- Cemal, Hasan. 1997k. "Avanak (Naïve)." June 12. Retrieved October 10, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/15/t/y01.html>).
- Cemal, Hasan. 1997l. "Sabır ve Zaman (Patience and Time)." May 22. Retrieved October 10, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9705/22/t/y01.html>).
- Cemal, Hasan. 1998a. "Ders Çıkarmak, Özeleştiri (Taking a Lesson and Self Criticism)." January 20. Retrieved October 10, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9801/20/t/y01.html>).
- Cemal, Hasan. 1998b. "Yeni dönem (New Period)." January 17. Retrieved October 10, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9801/17/t/y01.html>).
- Cerrahoğlu, Nilgün. 1997. "Şeffaf Darbe (Transparent Coup)." *Milliyet* June 15. Retrieved December 22, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/15/yazar/cerrah.html>).
- Cevizoglu, Hulki. 2001. *Gerenalinden 28 Subat Itirafı: Postmodern Darbe (February 28 Admission by its General: Postmodern Coup)*. Ankara: Ceviz Kabugu Yayinlari.
- Civaoglu, Güneri. 1996a. "Istihare (Vision)." *Milliyet* June 15, p.19.
- Civaoglu, Guneri. 1996b. "Dogum Gunu 29 Ekim (His Birthday is October 29)." *Milliyet* June 30, p. 15.

- Civaoglu, Guneri. 1996c. "Evet/Hayır (Yes or No)."
- Civaoglu, Guneri. 1997a. "Uc Perde (Three Curtains)." *Milliyet* February 4. Retrieved December 22, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/04/yazar/civaoglu.html>).
- Civaoglu, Guneri. 1997b. "Esik (Threshold)." *Milliyet* June 6. Retrieved March 22, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/16/yazar/civaoglu.html>).
- Civaoglu, Guneri. 1998. "Zihniyet (World-View)." *Milliyet* January 18. Retrieved March 22, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1998/01/18/yazar/civaoglu.html>).
- Colasan, Emin. 1995a. "Sorunlu Bir Koalisyon (A Problematic Coalition)." *Hurriyet* December 25, p.5.
- Colasan, Emin. 1996a. "Yazik Koskoca DYP'ye, Yazik (Shame on the Great DYP, Shame)." *Hurriyet* June 30, p.5.
- Colasan, Emin. 1996b. "Kolay Gelsin Tansu (Take It Easy Tansu)." *Hurriyet* July 5, p.5.
- Colasan, Emin. 1997a. "Bu da Gecer (This will Pass, Too)." *Hurriyet* February 4, p.5.
- Colasan, Emin. 1997b. "Refah'a Kapatma Davası (The Suit to Ban RP)." *Hurriyet* May 22, p.5.
- Colasan, Emin. 1998a. "Refahyol'un Kara Cuması (Refah-Yol's Dark Friday)." *Hurriyet* January 17, p.7.
- Colasan, Emin. 1998b. "İftar Sömürüsü (Exploitation of Breakfast)." *Hurriyet* January 15, p.5.
- Colasan, Emin. 1998c. "Biz De Ne Yazacağımızı Şaşırдық (We Also We Are Confused)." *Hurriyet* January 14, p.5.
- Coskun, Bekir. 1996a. "Mac (Match)." *Hurriyet* June 12, p.3.
- Coskun, Bekir. 1996b. "Yazgiya Bakin (See this Misfortune)." *Hurriyet* June 13, p.3.
- Coskun, Bekir. 1997. "Soru (Question)." *Hurriyet* February 7, p.3.
- Coskun, Bekir. 1997a. "Gulu Gulu Dansi (Gulu Gulu Dance)." *Hurriyet* February 6, p.3.
- Curran, J. 1991. 'Rethinking the media as public sphere' in Dahlgren, P. and Sparks, C. (eds), *Communication and Citizenship*. London: Routledge.
- Davenport, Christian. 1995. "Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions." *American Journal of Political Science* 39(3): 683-713. Retrieved June 17, 1997. Available Jstor Database.
- Deacon, David, Michael Pickering, Peter Golding and Graham Murdock. 1999. *Researching Communications: A Practical Guide to Methods in Media and Cultural Analysis*. Oxford University Press: New York.
- della Porta, Donatella. 1996. "Social Movements and the State: Thoughts on the Policing of Protest." Pp. 62-92. in McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy and Meyer N. Zald. (eds.) 1996. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- della Porta. 1996. "Social Movements and the state: The Political Structuring of Social Movements." Pp. 62-92. In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing*

*Structures, and Cultural Framings*. Edited by McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy and Meyer N. Zald. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Dogan, Yalcin. 1996a. "Erbakan'in Suresini DYP ile ANAP Uzatti (DYP and ANAP extended Erbakan's Period)." *Milliyet* June 11, p.13.
- Doğan, Yalçın. 1996b "İki Nikah Töreni (2 Wedding Ceremony)." *Milliyet* June 30, p.11.
- Dogan, Yalcin. 1997a. "Her Yerde Refah Var! (RP Everywhere!)." *Milliyet* February 2. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/02/yazar/dogan.html>).
- Dogan, Yalcin. 1997b. "Iranli, Kuveyt'ten Kovulmustu. (The Iranian was expelled from Kuwait)." *Milliyet* February 4. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/04/yazar/dogan.html>).
- Dogan, Yalcin. 1997c. "İhtilal Bildirisi Gibi (Like a Coup Declaration)." *Milliyet* June 12. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/12/yazar/dogan.html>).
- Dogan, Yalcin. 1997d. "RP'de 1.5 Milyon Kişi (RP Represents 1.5 Million People)." *Milliyet* May 23. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/05/23/yazar/dogan.html>).
- Dogru, Necati. 1995a. "Habil, Kabil ve Erbil (Habil, Kabil and Erbil)." *Sabah* December, 28, p.7.
- Dogru, Necati. 1995b. "Surprizi Ciller Yapti (Ciller Made a Surprise)." *Sabah* December, 25, p.7.
- Dogru, Necati. 1996a. "Realite (Reality)." *Sabah* June 15, p.9
- Dogru, Necati. 1997a. "Tank mı, sandık mı? (Tank or Ballot?)." February 7. Retrieved on October 2. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9702/07/t/y06.html>).
- Dogru, Necati. 1997b. "Hasan Ali Yucel Anlatiyordu (Hasan Ali Yucell Was Explaining)." March 6. Retrieved on October 2. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9703/06/t/y06.html>).
- Dogru, Necati.. 1997c. "Askerler Birifingde...Peki Siviller Nerede (Soldier are at Briefing, Where are the Civilians)." June 14. Retrieved on October 2. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/14/t/y06.html>).
- Donat, Yavuz. 1995a. "Secmenin Mesajlar (Voters' Messages)." *Milliyet* December 25, p. 13.
- Donat, Yavuz. 1998. "Hoca Makas Değiştiriyor (Hoja is Changing Lane)." *Milliyet* January 20. Retrieved June 4, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1998/01/20/yazar/donat.html>).
- Donat, Yavuz. 2001. "Cevik Bir: 28 Subat Halk Hareketidir (Cevik Bir: February 28 is a Popular Movement)." *Sabah*, August 14. Retrieved June 4, 2003. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9808/14/t/y00.html>).
- Duzdag, Ertugrul. 1996. *Aman İrtija Olmasin*. Istanbul: Iz Yayicilik.
- Eksi, Oktay. 1995a. "Birkac Gozlem (Several Observations)." *Hurriyet* December 19, p.25.
- Eksi, Oktay. 1995b. "Ya Refah Ya Refah (Either Refah or Refah)." *Hurriyet* December 26, p.17.
- Eksi, Oktay. 1995c. "Durum Degerlendirmesi (An Assessment of the Situation)." *Hurriyet* December 26, p.25.
- Eksi, Oktay. 1996a. "Bu Neyin Ortakligi? (What Kind of Parnership is This?)." *Hurriyet* June 30, p.25.

- Eksi, Oktay. 1997a. "Hani Refah Oyle Degildi (Who said RP is not Like That)." *Hurriyet* February 4, p.23.
- Eksi, Oktay. 1997b. "Def Olup Gidecekler They Will Leave with Disgrace)." *Hurriyet* June 13, p.25.
- Eksi, Oktay. 1997c. "Evdeki Hesap (Accounting Account)." *Hurriyet* May 22, p.37.
- Elekdag, Sukru. 1997a. "Sivil Toplum Darbesi (A Coup by Civil Society)." *Milliyet* February 3. Retrieved December 22, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/03/yazar/elekdag.html>).
- Elekdag, Sukru. 1997b. " Onursuz ve sorumsuz (Dishonorable and Irresponsible)." *Milliyet* June 16. Retrieved June 12, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/03/yazar/elekdag.html>).
- Ellingston, Stephen. 1997. "Understanding the Dialectic of Discourse and cColelctive Action: Public Debate and Rioting in Antebellum Cincinnati." Pp. 268-80. In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*. Edited by McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy and Meyer N. Zald. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Entman, Robert M. 1993. "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm." *Journal of Communication* 43(4): 51-58.
- Erdogan, Mustafa. 1999. *28 Subat Sureci (February 28 Process)*, Ankara: Yeni Turkiye Yayinlari.
- Ergin, Sedat. 1997. "RP'yi Başbakan'a Şikayet Etmek (Complaining to the Prime Minister About RP)." February 28, p.26.
- Ergin, Sedat. 2001. "Mor Üniforma'nın Gerçek Öyküsü (The Real Story of Purple Uniform). *Hurriyet* January 15. Retrieved May 20, 2003. (<http://arsiv.hurriyetim.com.tr/hur/turk/01/01/15/yazarlar/57yaz.htm>).
- Ericson, R.V., P.M. Baranek, and J.B.L. Chan. 1991 *Representing Order: Crime, Law, and Justice in the News Media*. Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press.
- Exoo, Calvin F. 1994. *The Politics of the Mass Media*. Minneapolis: West Publishing Company.
- Finkel, Andrew. 2000. "Who Guards the Turkish Press? A Perspective on Press Corruption in Turkey," *Journal of International Affairs* 54 (1): 147-???
- Fraser, N. 1993; "Rethinking the Public Sphere: Towards a Critique of Actually Existing Democracy," *Habermas and the Public Sphere*. edited by C. Calhoun. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Gale, Richard. 1986. "Social Movements and the State: The Environmental Movement, Countermovements, and Government Agencies." *Sociological Perspectives* 29: 202-40.
- Gamson, William A. 1990. *The Strategy of Social Protest*, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Gamson, William A. 1992. *Talking Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gamson, William and DS. Meyer. 1996. "Framing Political Opportunity." Pp. 275-290. In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*. Edited by McAdam, D., JD. McCarthy and MN. Zald. Cambridge Univ. Press.
- Gamson, William A. and Andre Modigliani. 1989. "Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power." *American Journal of Sociology* 95: 1-38.

- Gelgenet. 2003. "Evren'in Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'ne Yayınladığı Mesaj (The Message Sent to the Armed Forces by Evren)." Retrieved June 6, 2003. ([http://www.belgenet.com/12eylul/12091980\\_06.html](http://www.belgenet.com/12eylul/12091980_06.html)).
- Gitlin, Todd. 1980. *The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left*. Berkeley, LA: University of California Press.
- Goffman, Erving. 1974. *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
- Gogus, Zeynep. 1997. "Ata Sahne'ye Yeni Oyun Ve Yeni Aktör Aranıyor (A New Play and Actor Wanted to the Ata Scene)." <http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/15/t/y04.html>
- Gokmen, Yavuz. 1996a. "Refah-Yol'dan Korkmuyorum (I am not Afraid of Refah-Yol [Government])." *Hurriyet* July 2, p.22.
- Gokmen, Yavuz. 1997. "Cami Ama Nasil? (Mosque but How?)." *Hurriyet* February 3, p.24.
- Gokturk, Gulay. 2001. "Ordunun Siyaset Yapmasi: An Unfair Competition in the Marketplace of Ideas." *Sabah* August 15. Retrieved June 6, 2003. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah2001/0108/15/t/y32.html>).
- Gole, Nilufer. 1998. "Istanbul to Hong Kong: Notes on non-Western modernities." *NPQ: New Perspectives Quarterly* 15(2): 40-43.
- Gole, Nilufer. 2002. "Islam in Public: New Visibilities and New Imageries." *Public Culture* 14(1): 173-190.
- Gole, Nilufer. 1997. "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-Elites." *Middle East Journal* 51 (1): 46-58.
- Gönensin, Okay. 2001. "Postmodern Cadı Kazanı (Postmodern Witch Bowl)." *Sabah* January 16. Retrieved May 20, 2003. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah2001/0101/16/t/y62.html>).
- Gray, Herman. 1993. "Cultural Theory, Social Construction, and Social Problems." Pp. 181-91. In Miller, Gale, and James A. Holstein (eds). *Constructionist Controversies: Issues in Social Problems Theory*, NY: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Groc, Gerard. 1994. "Journalists as Champions of Participatory Democracy." In Heper, Metin, and Ahmet Evin (eds.) *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*, Boulder: Westview Press.
- Guclu, Abbas. 1997. "Bravo for Erbakan and Ciller." *Milliyet* February 7. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/07/yazar/guclu.html>).
- Gulalp, Haldun. 1995. "The crisis of westernization in Turkey: Islamism versus nationalism." *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Sciences* 8(2):175. (8 pages). Retrieved June 22, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.
- Gulalp, Haldun. 1999. "Political Islam in Turkey: The Rise and Fall of the Refah Party." *The Muslim World* 89(1):22 (20 pages) Retrieved July 2001. Available Proquest Database.
- Gulerce, Huseyin. 1997g. "Turbanistan Kurtulmak Uzerine (To Get Out of Turbulance)." *Zaman* February 17. Retrieved July 13, 2003. (<http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/1997/02/17/kose/zamandan/index.html>).
- Gureli, Nail. 1997a. "Once Bagimsiz Yargi (Autonomous Justice First)." *Milliyet* March 07. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/07/yazar/gureli.html>).

- Gureli, Nail. 1997b. "Fırsat (Opportunity)." *Milliyet* June 13. Retrieved March 17, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/13/yazar/gureli.html>).
- Gureli, Nail. 1997c. "Madalyon (Coin)." *Milliyet* May 23. Retrieved March 17, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/05/23/yazar/gureli.html>).
- Gusfeld, J.R. 1989. "Constructing the Ownership of Social Problems: Fun and Profit in the Welfare State." *Social Problem* 36:431-41.
- Habermas, Jurgen. 1996. "The Public Sphere." Pp. 55–59. In *Media Studies: A Reader*. Edited by Marris, P. and S. Thornham Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Haines, Herbert H. "Black Radicalization and the Funding of Civil Rights: 1957-1970." Pp.440-449. In McAdam and Snow. 1997.
- Haller, Beth. 2001. "Not Worth Keeping Alive? News Framing of Physician-Assisted Suicide in the United States and Great Britain." *Journalism Studies* 2(3):407–421.
- Halman, Talat. 1996a. "Devrime Dogru (Toward a Revolution)." *Milliyet* June 12, p.23.
- Halman, Talat. 1997a. "Cami ve Parsa (Mosque and Interest)." *Milliyet* February 5. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/05/yazar/halman.html>).
- Hann, Chris. 2000. "Problems with the (De)privatization of Religion." *Anthropology Today* 16(6):14. (7 pages). Retrieved July 12, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.
- Hartley, John. 1988. *Understanding News*, New York: Pantheon.
- Heper, Dogan. 1996a. "Turkiye Yanarken Politikacilar Keman Caliyor (Politicians Playing Violin While Turkey is Burning)." *Milliyet* June 11, p.12.
- Heper, Dogan. 1997a. "Yanlis Hesap (Wrong Judgement)." *Milliyet* February 2. Retrieved December 22, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/02/yazar/heper.html>).
- Heper, Dogan. 1997b. "Hemen Istifa (Resign Right Now)." *Milliyet* June 13. Retrieved December 22, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/13/yazar/heper.html>).
- Heper, Dogan. 1997c. "Hayal De Olsa (Even If it is a Dream)." *Milliyet* June 18. Retrieved December 25, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/18/yazar/heper.html>).
- Heper, Dogan. 1997d. "Kazanç ve Kayıp (Gain and Loss)." *Milliyet* May 23. Retrieved December 25, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/05/23/yazar/heper.html>).
- Heper, Dogan. 1998. "Dönüm Noktası (A Turning Point)." *Milliyet* January 18. Retrieved December 25, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1998/01/18/yazar/heper.html>).
- Heper, Metin and Tanel Demirel. 1996. "The Press and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey." *Middle Eastern Studies* 32 (2): 109 (15 page). Retrieved January 21, 2002 Available: InfoTrac OneFile.
- Heper, Metin and Aylin Guney. 2000. "The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent Turkish Experience." *Armed Forces and Society* 22 (4): 619 (23 pages). Retrieved June 7, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.



- Heper, Metin and Aylin Guney. 1996. "The Military and Democracy in the Third Turkish Republic." *Armed Forces and Society* 22 (4): 619.
- Heper, Metin and Sule Toktas. 2003 "Islam, Modernity, and Democracy in Contemporary Turkey: The Case of Recep Tayyip Erdogan." *Muslim World* 93(2):157 (29 pages) Retrieved June 12, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.
- Heper, Metin. 1997. "Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a Reconciliation?" *Middle East Journal* 51 (Winter): 37.
- Heper, Metin. 1999. "Islam, Nationalism and the Military: Prospects for the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey." A Paper Presented at OSCE Summit' 99. Retrieved June 8, 2003. (<http://www.turkishdailynews.com/1999osce/osce4.htm#o40>).
- Heper, Metin. 2000. "The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics." *Journal of International Affairs* 54 (1): 63 (20 (pages). Retrieved June 7, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.
- Heper, Metin. 2001. "Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 1(3): 1-19. Retrieved June 22, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.
- Heper, Metin. 2002. "The Military-Civilian Relations in Post-1997 Turkey." A Research paper presented at the IPSA Armed Forces and Society Research Committee Conference, 'Globalization of Civil-Military Relations: Democratization. Retrieved May 30, 2003. ([http://www.msubillings.edu/dzirker/Romania/Metin%20Heper/The%20Military-Civilian%20Relations%20in%20Post-1997%20Turkey\\_files/The%20Military-Civilian%20Relations%20in%20Post-1997%20Turkey.htm](http://www.msubillings.edu/dzirker/Romania/Metin%20Heper/The%20Military-Civilian%20Relations%20in%20Post-1997%20Turkey_files/The%20Military-Civilian%20Relations%20in%20Post-1997%20Turkey.htm)).
- Hess, Stephen. 1984. *The Government/Press Connection*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Hiro, Dilip. 1995. *Between Marx and Muhammed: The Changing Face of Central Asia*, London: HarperCollings.
- Hoover, Dean and David Kowalewski. 1992. "Dynamic Models of Repression." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36(1):150-182. Retrieved June 17, 1997. Available Jstor Database.
- Hubbard, J.C., L.B. DeFleur, and M.L. DeFleur. 1975. "Mass Media Influences on Public Perceptions of Social Problems." *Social Problems* 23:22-34.
- Hurriyet. 1995a. "Turkiye'yi Dusunun (Think About Turkey). *Hurriyet* December 23, p.28.
- Hurriyet. 1995c. "RP'nin Defterini Durmeliyiz (We Have to Close RP's Account)." *Hurriyet* December 22, p. 26.
- Hurriyet. 1995d. "RP Sertlesiyor (RP is Radicalizing)." *Hurriyet* December 17, p.25.
- Hurriyet. 1995e. "Refah'ta ANAP Telasi (RP's Worries About ANAP)." *Hurriyet* December 18, p.22.
- Hurriyet. 1995f. "RP Dini Alet Ediyor (RP Exploiting Religion)." *Hurriyet* December 19, p.25.
- Hurriyet. 1995g. "Bes Gun Sonra ANAP Iktidar (ANAP Will Come to Power in Five Days)." *Hurriyet* December 20, p.22.
- Hurriyet. 1995h. "Bati: RP Ortak Bulamaz (the West: RP Cannot Find a Partner)." *Hurriyet* December 26, p.23.

- Hurriyet. 1995i. "Hoca'ya HADEP'I Sormayın (Don't Ask Hoja About HADEP)." *Hurriyet* December 19, p.26.
- Hurriyet. 1996a. "Çiller: RP, PKK Gibi (Çiller: RP is Like PKK)." *Hurriyet* June 16, p.28.
- Hurriyet. 1996b. "Tek Yol Seçim (The Only Way Out is Elections)." *Hürriyet* June 12, p.24.
- Hurriyet. 1996c. "Ecevit'ten Hoca'ya Ret (No to Erbakan from Ecevit)", *Hürriyet* June 13, p.24.
- Hurriyet. 1996d. "Çiller 6 Erbakan 6 (Çiller 6 and Erbakan 6)." *Hurriyet* June 11, p.21.
- Hurriyet. 1996e. "50 DYP'li RP'li Ortakliga Oy Vermez (50 DYP Member Would Not Vote for a Coalition with RP)." *Hürriyet* June 15, p.28.
- Hurriyet. 1996e. "Yılmaz: Refah Komünistler Gibi (Yılmaz: RP is Like Communists)." *Hurriyet* June 9, p.26.
- Hurriyet. 1996f. "ABD'den Bekle Gör Politikası (A Wait-and-See Policy from the USA)." *Hurriyet* June 29, p.25.
- Hurriyet. 1996g. "Karanlığa Goturmeyin (Do Not Take Us into Darkness)." *Hurriyet* July 1, p.25.
- Hurriyet. 1996h. "Turizmde İptaller Yağıyor (Huge Cancellations in Tourism)." *Hurriyet* July 3, p.7.
- Hurriyet. 1996i. "Yılmaz: Refah Komünistler Gibi (RP is Like Communists)." *Hurriyet* June 29, p.26.
- Hurriyet. 1996j. "Artık Hattı Mudafaa Yok, Sathı Mudafaa Var (Now is the Time for the Defense of the Whole Land, Not the Defense of a Front)." *Hurriyet* June 29, p.25.
- Hurriyet. 1996k. "Sorusturmalarından Kacıs Protokolü (The Protocol of an Escape from Corruption Charges)." June 29, p.22.
- Hurriyet. 1996l. "İlk Tavizi Laiklikten Verdi (She Gave the First Concession from Secularism)." *Hurriyet* June 30, p.26.
- Hurriyet. 1996m. "Laiklikten Söz Etmedi (He did not Mention about Secularism)." *Hurriyet* June 30, p.24.
- Hurriyet. 1996n. "Birbirleri İçin Ne Demislerdi? (What Did They Say About Each Other?)." *Hurriyet* June 28, p. 24.
- Hurriyet. 1997a. "Askerler: İşte Gerçek Yüzleri (Soldiers: Here is their Real Face)." *Hurriyet* February 3, p.25.
- Hurriyet. 1997b. "Ayaklanma Provası (A Rehearsal for Rebellion)." *Hurriyet* February 3, p.25.
- Hurriyet. 1997c. "Bayramda 240 Tank Geciyor (In the festival, 240 Tanks Marching)." *Hurriyet* February 5, p.24.
- Hurriyet. 1997d. "Tensikatta MHP ve RP Şampiyon (RP and MHP are Champions of Job Reduction)." *Hurriyet* March 11, p.22.
- Hurriyet. 1997e. "Sabancı: Önemli Olan Kararların Uygulanması (What is important are the Applications)." *Hurriyet* March 02, p.7.
- Hurriyet. 1997f. "Güzel: Demokratik Değil (Guzel: It is not Democratik)." *Hurriyet* March 02, p.22.

- Hurriyet. 1997g. "Tibuk: Tarihi Bir Hata (Tibuk: A Historical Mistake)." *Hurriyet* March 02, p.23.
- Hurriyet. 1997h. "Siyasiler Mektubu Takmamış (Politicians did not Mind the Letter)." *Hurriyet* March 01, p.25.
- Hurriyet. 1997i. "Komutanlarla Uyum İçindeyiz (We Are in Agreement with the Military)." *Hurriyet* March 03, p.24.
- Hurriyet. 1997j. "Bütün Meseleler Arkada Kalmıştır (All Problems Left Behind)." *Hurriyet* March 05, p.26.
- Hurriyet. 1997k. "Baydur: İrticanın Kaynağı Kurutulsun (The Source of İrtija Must be Removed)." *Hurriyet* March 22, p.7.
- Hurriyet. 1997l. "Meral: Parti Kapatılmasın (Meral: Parties Should Not Be Banned)." *Hurriyet* March 22, p.7.
- Hurriyet. 1998a. "RP'lilerden Tepkiler: Sakalımızı Traş Etiler (Reactions from RP Members: This only Cut Our Beard)." *Hurriyet* January 17, p.31.
- Hurriyet. 1998b. "Sadece Tabelamız Değişecek (Only Our Label Will Change)." *Hurriyet* January 18, p.25.
- Hurriyet. 1998c. "Medya Islah Edilmeli (Must Correct the Media)." *Hurriyet* January 16, p.26.
- Hurriyet. 2001a. "Ersümer'i çizim (Scratch Out Ersumer)." *Hurriyet* January 08. Retrieved May 20, 2003. (<http://arsiv.hurriyetim.com.tr/hur/turk/01/01/08/turkiye/01tur.htm>).
- Hurriyet. 2001b. "O Komutan Bulunacak (Find that General)." *Hurriyet* January 09. Retrieved May 20, 2003. (<http://arsiv.hurriyetim.com.tr/hur/turk/01/01/09/turkiye/01tur.htm>).
- Hurriyet. 2001c. "Genel Kurmay Patladı (The Office of General Staff Exploded)." *Hurriyet* January 12. Retrieved May 20, 2003. (<http://arsiv.hurriyetim.com.tr/hur/turk/01/01/12/turkiye/01tur.htm>).
- Ibarra, Peter and John I. Kitsuse. 1993. "Vernacular Constituents of Moral Discourse: An Interactionist Proposal for the Study of Social Problems." Pp.25-58. In Holstein, James A. and Gale Miller (eds.) 1993. *Reconsidering Social Constructionism: Debates in Social Problems Theory*, Aldine de Gruyter: New York.
- Ilicak, Nazli. 2000a. "Çevik Bir'in Güçlü Eylem Planı (Cevik Bir's Strong Action Plan)." *Yeni Safak* October 21. Retrieved May 20, 2003. (<http://www.yenisafak.com/arsiv/2000/ekim/21/nilicak.html>).
- Isaac, Larry. 2002. "To Counter 'The Very Devil' and More: The Making of Independent Capitalist Militia in the Gilded Age." *American Journal of Sociology* 108(2):353. (53 pages). Retrieved June 22, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.
- Iyengar, Shanto & Donald Kinder. 1987. *News that Matters: Television and American Opinion*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Jasper, James M. and Jane D. Poulsen. 1997. "Fighting Back: Vulnerabilities, Blunders and Countermobilization by the Targets in Three Animal Rights Campaign." Pp. 397-406 in *Social Movements: Readings on Their Emergence, Mobilization and Dynamics*, edited by D. McAdam and David A. Snow. LA: Roxbury Publishing Co.
- Jasper, James M. and Jane D. Poulsen. 1997. "Fighting Back: Vulnerabilities, Blunders and Countermobilization by the Targets in Three Animal Rights Campaign." Pp. 397-406 in *Social*

- Movements: Readings on Their Emergence, Mobilization and Dynamics*, edited by D. McAdam and David A. Snow. LA: Roxbury Publishing Co.
- Jasper, M. Jasper. 1997. *The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Jasperson, Amy E. and Mark Watts. 1998. "Framing and The Public Agenda: Media Effects on the Importance of the Federal Budget Deficit." *Political Communication* 15: 2 (20 pages) Retrieved June 9, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.
- Joslyn, Mark R. and Haider-Markel, Donald P. 2002. "Framing Effects on Personal Opinion and Perception of Public Opinion: The Cases of Physician-Assisted Suicide and Social Security." *Social Science Quarterly* 83(3): 690-706 (17 pages). Retrieved June 7, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.
- Kadioglu, Ayse. 1998. "Republican Epistemology and Islamic Discourses in Turkey the 1990s", *The Muslim World*, 88 (1): 1-21.
- Kamrava, Mehran. 1998. "Pseudo-Democratic Politics and Populist Possibilities: The Rise and Demise of Turkey's Refah Party." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 25(2):275-286 (12 pages) Retrieved July 2001. Available Proquest Database.
- Karaman, M. Lutfullah and Bulent Aras. 2000. "The Crisis of Civil Society in Turkey." *Journal of Economic and Social Research* 2(2): 39-58.
- Karsli, Muharrem. 1996a. "Refah ve Borsa (RP and Stock Exchange)." *Milliyet* June 10, p.8.
- Karsli, Muharrem. 1997. "Tanrılar Çıldırılmış Olmalı (Gods Must be Crazy)." *Milliyet* June 16. Retrieved December 22, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com/1997/06/16/yazar/karsli.html>).
- Klandermans, P. B. 1990 "Linking the "Old" and the "New": Movement Networks in the Netherlands." Pp. 122-136. In *Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies*. edited by R. Dalton & M. Kuechler. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Klandermans, Bert and Sjoerd Goslinga. 1996. "Media discourse, Movement Publicity, and the Generation of Collective Action Frames: Theoretical and Empirical Exercises in meaning construction." Pp. 312-37. In McAdam *et al* 1996.
- Kohen, Sami. 1995a. "Partiler Dis Politikaya Nasil Bakiyorlar? (How Parties Look at Foreign Policy)." *Milliyet* December 17, p.16.
- Kohen, Sami. 1995b. "Turkiye Model Olabilir (Turkey Can Become a Model)." *Milliyet* December 29, p.16.
- Kohen, Sami. 1996a. "Dis Tepki Dis Politikaya Bagli (Foreign Reaction Depends on Foreign Policy)." *Milliyet* June 30, p.14.
- Kohen, Sami. 1997. "Batı Tavrını Ortaya Koydu (The West Show its Attitude)." *Milliyet* June 16. Retrieved May 18, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/16/yazar/kohen.html>).
- Kuran, Timur. 1995. *Private Truths, Public Lies : The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995.
- Kurzban, Charles. 1997. "Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in Social-Movement Theory: The Iranian Revolution of 1979." Pp. 66-79. In McAdam, D. and David A. Snow. (eds.) 1997. *Social Movements: Readings on Their Emergence, Mobilization and Dynamics*, LA: Roxbury Publishing Co.

- Lang, Gladys E. and Kurt Lang. 1980. "Polling on *Watergate*: The Battle for Public Opinion." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 44(4): 530-567. (18 pages). Retrieved June 7, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.
- Lawrence, Regina G. 2000. *The Politics of Force: Media and the Construction of Police Brutality*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Lawrence, Regina. 1996. "Accidents, Icons, and Indexing: The Dynamics of News Coverage of Police Use of Force." *Political Communication* 13:437-54. Retrieved June 12, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.
- Lewis, Bernard. 1961. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Livaneli, Zulfu. 1997a. "Demokartik Diktatorluk (Dictatorship Through Democracy)." *Milliyet* February 27. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/27/yazar/livaneli.html>).
- Livaneli, Zulfu. 1997b. "Siyasi cücelik (Political Weakness)." *Milliyet* June 17. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/17/yazar/livaneli.html>).
- Livaneli, Zulfu. 1997c. "Refah Partisi Kapatılmı Mi? (Should RP be Banned?)." *Milliyet* June 17. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/05/23/yazar/livaneli.html>).
- Livaneli, Zulfu. 1998. "Tanrım Beni Kendimden Korum (My Lord, Protect me From Myself)." *Milliyet* January 20. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1998/01/20/yazar/livaneli.html>).
- Lo, Clarence Y. H. 1982. "Countermovements and Conservative Movements in the Contemporary U.S." *Annual Review of Sociology* 8:107-34.
- Mardin, Serif. 1991. "The Just and the Unjust", *Daedalus*, 120 (3): 113-130.
- McAdam, Doug. 1994. "Culture and SMS." In *New Social Movements : from Ideology to Identity*. Edited by Enrique Laraña, Hank Johnston, and Joseph R. Gusfiel. Philadelphia : Temple University Press.
- McAdam, Doug. 1996. "Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions." Pp. 23-40. In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*. Edited by McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy and Meyer N. Zald. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- McCarthy, John D., Clark McPhail, and Jackie Smith. 1996. "Images of Protest: Selection Bias in Media Coverage of Washington, D.C. Demonstrations." *American Sociological Review* 61:478-99. (21 pages). Retrieved June 22, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.
- Menashe, Claudia L and Michael Siegel. 1998. "The Power of a Frame: An Analysis of Newspaper Coverage of Tobacco Issues - United States, 1985-1996." *Journal of Health Communication* 3(4):307-325. (17 pages). Retrieved June 7, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.
- Mengi, Gungor. 1995a. "Kan Mi, Ne Kani? (Blood, What Blood?)." *Sabah* December 17, p.3.
- Mengi, Gungor. 1996a. "Ciller'in Tercihi 12 Haziran (Ciller's Preference)." *Sabah* June 12, p.3.
- Mengi, Gungor. 1996b. "Altın Elma (Golden Apple)." *Sabah* June 9, p.3.
- Mengi, Gungor. 1997a. "Fazilet Ölmedi (Wisdom Have Not Died)." February 3. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9702/03/t/y02.html>).

- Mengi, Gungor. 1997b. "Celiskiler (Inconsistencies)." March 10. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9703/10/t/y02.html>).
- Mengi, Gungor. 1997c. "Gene Oynuyor (It is Playing Again)." March 07. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9703/07/t/y02.html>).
- Mengi, Gungor. 1997d. "Laiklik Hapi (Secularist Medicine)." March 03. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9703/03/t/y02.html>).
- Mengi, Gungor. 1997e. "Artik Ciddi Olun (Be Serious Now)." March 02. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9703/02/t/y02.html>).
- Mengi, Gungor. 1997f. "Tarihi Kavsak (Historical Turning Point)." February 28. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9702/28/t/y02.html>).
- Mengi, Gungor. 1997g. "Yargı Darbesi (Judicial Coup)." May 22. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9705/22/t/y02.html>).
- Mengi, Gungor. 1998a. "Yeni Dönem (New Period)." *Sabah* January 17. Retrieved on June 4, 2003. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1998/9801/17/t/y02.html>).
- Meyer, D. S. & S. Staggenborg. 1996. "Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity." *American Journal of Sociology* 101: 1628-1660.
- Midilli, Zeliha. 1997. "Medyaya Igne (Niddle for the Media)." *Milliyet* February 8. *Milliyet* Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/08/yazar/midilli.html>).
- Miller, Leslie. 1993. "Claims-Making from the Underside: Marginalization and Social Problems Analysis." Pp. 349-76. In Holstein, James A. and Gale Miller (eds.) *Reconsidering Social Constructionism: Debates in Social Problems Theory*, Aldine de Gruyter: New York.
- Milliyet. 1995a. "Ataturk'un Verdigini Erbakan Alacak (Erbakan will Take Back what Ataturk Gave Before)." *Milliyet* December 17, p.14.
- Milliyet. 1995a. "Turban Seriatciligin Simgesi (Headscarf is a Symbol of Shariah)." *Milliyet* December 19, p.10.
- Milliyet. 1995b. "Ecevit: RP Artik Ciddiye Alinmiyor (Ecevit: RP is no Longer Taken Seriously)." *Milliyet* December 19, p.24.
- Milliyet. 1995c. "Dunya Secimi Konusuyor (The World is Talking about the Election)." *Milliyet* December 26, p.16.
- Milliyet. 1995d. "Zeybek: Refahla Olmaz (Zeybek: It will not Happen with RP)." *Milliyet* December 29, p.14.
- Milliyet. 1995e. "RP İktidarına Ordu Sevinir (Military Would Like an RP Government)." *Milliyet* December 17, p.14.
- Milliyet. 1996a. "Baykal'dan Hoca'ya Hayor (No to Erbakan from Baykal)." *Milliyet* June 12, p.18.
- Milliyet. 1996b. "Erbakan'a Le Pen Benzetmesi (The Comparison with Le Pen)." *Milliyet* June 12, p.19.
- Milliyet. 1996c. "Alaton: Refah İktidar Yasanmalidir (Alaton: We Must Experience RP Government)." *Milliyet* June 12, p.11.

- Milliyet. 1996d. "ANAP'a Son Çağrı (Last Call to ANAP)." *Milliyet* June 12, p.18.
- Milliyet. 1996e. "Kadınlardan Ciller'e Dava (A Suit to Ciller from Women)." *Milliyet* July 4, p.13.
- Milliyet. 1996f. "Refah'ın Adil Düzeni Yola Geldi (RP's Just Order Came to Terms)." *Milliet* June 29, p.7.
- Milliyet. 1996g. "Para Piyasalarında Refah-Yol Soku (RP Shock in Money Markets)." *Milliet* June 30, p.8.
- Milliyet. 1996h. "Pir Sultan Abdal Derneginden Kinama (Blame from the Association of Pir Sultan)." *Milliet* July 2, p.13.
- Milliyet. 1996i. "Refah Partisi Laikliğin Garantisi (RP is a Guarantee for Secularism)." *Milliyet* July 1, p.7.
- Milliyet. 1996j. "Yabancı Sermaye Simdilik Serinkanlı (Foreign Capital is Calm for Now)." *Milliyet* July 3, p.7.
- Milliyet. 1996k. "4 Temmuzda Huzun ve Nese (Happiness and Sadness in July 4)." *Milliyet* July 4, p.15.
- Milliyet. 1996l. "İmam Nikahlı Evlilik (Marriage with a Religious License)." *Milliyet* July 3, p.19.
- Milliyet. 1996m. "Ciller Boynunu Kurtardı (Ciller Saved Her Neck)." *Milliyet* June 30, p.10.
- Milliyet. 1996n. "Baykal Hattı Mudafaa Yok (Baykal: Not the Defense of the Front)." *Milliyet* July 1, p.14.
- Milliyet. 1996o. "Birbirlerine Neler Soylemişlerdi? (What Did They Say About Each Other?)." *Milliyet* June 28, p.16.
- Milliyet. 1996p. "Ordu RP'ye Yumuşuyor (Military Softening to RP)." *Milliyet* June 9, p.15.
- Milliyet. 1996r. "Bekdik: Türkiye RP'yi de Deneyecek)." *Milliyet* June 2, p.7.
- Milliyet. 1997a. "Bilgin: Askerler Daha Demokrat (Bilgin: Soldiers are More Democratic)." *Milliyet* February 11. Retrieved December 22, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/11/index.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997a. "Emniyet'ten Tarikat Raporu (A Sufism Report from the General Directorate of Security)." *Milliyet* January 17. Retrieved May 15, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/01/17/siyaset/emniyek.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997aa. "Kombassan Teşvik Zengini)." *Milliyet* June 12. Retrieved May 14, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/12/siyaset/kombas.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997ab. "Dış Destek (Foreign Support)." *Milliyet* June 12. Retrieved May 14, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/12/siyaset/dis.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997ac. "Milli Görüş'e Refah Desteği (RP Support for National View)." *Milliyet* June 16. Retrieved May 14, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/16/haber/milli.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997ad. "Hoca Umudu Kesti (Hoja [Erbakan] Lost Hope)." *Milliyet* June 15. Retrieved May 14, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/15/siyaset/hoca.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997ae. "Çiller: Ordu Hırpalanmasın (The Military must not be Damaged)." *Milliyet* June 15. Retrieved May 15, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/15/siyaset/ciller.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997af. "Erbakan Ağlattı (Erbakan Saddened)." *Milliyet* June 18. Retrieved May 15, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/18/haber/erbakan.html>).

- Milliyet. 1997ag. "Türkiye Demokrasi Sınavında Başarılı (Turkey is Successful in Democracy Test)." *Milliyet* June 14. Retrieved May 15, 2003. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/14/t/r03.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997ah. "ABD'den 'Bir Haftada Darbe' Mesajı (US Message for 'A Military Coup Within A Week')." *Milliyet* June 14. Retrieved May 15, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/14/haberframe.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997ai. "RP'ye Kapatma Davası (Suit to Ban RP)." *Milliyet* May 22. Retrieved May 15, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/05/22/rpye.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997aj. "Kurtarma Yasası Mahkeme Yolunda (The Rescue Law is to the Court)." *Milliyet* June 11. Retrieved May 15, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/11/siyaset/refah.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997ak. "Ecevit: Refah'ın Yıkılması An Meselesi (It is a Matter of Time that RP Government Will Collapse)." *Milliyet* May 23. Retrieved May 15, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/05/23/siyaset/ecevit.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997al. "Gensoru Gerilimi (Tension for Lack of Confidence)." *Milliyet* May 21. Retrieved May 15, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/05/21/siyaset/gensoru.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997am. "Ecevit'ten Hükümete Yeni İsim: Refah'ın B (A New Name for the Government from Ecevit)." *Milliyet* May 22. Retrieved May 15, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/05/22/haber/ecevit.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997an. "Hoca: Sürpriz Oldu (It was a Surprise)." *Milliyet* May 22. Retrieved May 15, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/05/22/haber/hoca.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997ap. "Refah Özden'e Övgü Yağdırıyor (RP Pouring Praises for Ozden)." *Milliyet* May 24. Retrieved May 15, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/05/24/haber/refah.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997ar. "Başsavcı Savaş: Hedef Gösterildim (Prosecutor: I am Shown as a Target)." *Milliyet* May 24. Retrieved May 15, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/05/24/haber/savci.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997as. "Erbakan Ağlattı (Erbakan Made [Them] Cry)." *Milliyet* June 18. Retrieved May 15, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/18/haber/erbakan.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997at. "Rektörlerden, 'İrtica' Uyarısı ('İrtica' Warning from the University Presidents)." *Milliyet* June 18. Retrieved May 15, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/14/haber/ректор.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997au. "Cankaya Devrede (The President Took an Initiative)." *Milliyet* June 14. Retrieved May 15, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/14/anaframe.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997av. "Sabancı: Laiklik Olmadan Yaşanmaz (Sabancı: You cannot Live without Secularism)." *Milliyet* March 3. Retrieved May 15, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/03/03/haber/sabanci.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997ay. "Din Eğitimi Sıkıntısı (Problem with Religious Education)." *Milliyet* August 12. Retrieved July 16, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/08/12/haber/din.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997b. "Bagheri Türkiye'yi Terk ediyor (Bagheri Leaving Turkey)." *Milliyet* February 7. Retrieved December 22, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/07/siyaset/bagheri.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997c. "Kazan: 'Medyayı Temizleyeceğiz' (Kazan: We'll Clean Up the Media)." *Milliyet* February 7. Retrieved December 22, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/07/siyaset/bagheri.html>).



- Milliyet. 1997d. "ABD'den Uc Uyarı (Three Warnings by the USA)." *Milliyet* February 8. Retrieved December 15, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/08/siyaset/turkiye.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997e. "Kalemli: Cizmeyi Asmislar (Kalemli: They Passed the Boundary)." *Milliyet* February 4. Retrieved December 15, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/04/siyaset/kalemli.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997f. "Kazan'a Basından Sert Yanıt (A Hard Response to Kazan)." *Milliyet* February 4. Retrieved December 15, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/06/siyaset/kazan.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997g. "RP'nin Yıldız'a ikinci ziyareti (RP's Second Visit to Yıldız)." *Milliyet* February 4. Retrieved December 15, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/06/siyaset/kazan.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997h. "İşte MGK'nın tarihi bildirisı (Here is the Historical Statement of National Security Council)." *Milliyet* March 3. Retrieved March 6, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/03/02/siyaset/iste.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997i. "Ecevit: RP sistem dışı (Ecevit: RP is Outside the System)." *Milliyet* March 6. Retrieved March 6, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/03/06/siyaset/ecevit.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997j. "Öymen'den demokrasi dersi)." *Milliyet* March 5. Retrieved March 6, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/03/05/siyaset/oymen.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997k. "Saygın'dan RP'li kadınlara öğüt (Saygın's Advices to RP's Female Members)." *Milliyet* March 5. Retrieved March 6, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/03/05/siyaset/iste.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997l. "Güreş: Uymazlarsa bozulur (Gures: If they do not Follow it, the Coalition will Break Up)." *Milliyet* March 4. Retrieved March 6, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/03/05/siyaset/gures.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997m. "Baykal: Kabine, MGK'ya karşı çıkamaz (Baykal: Cabinet Cannot Oppose the NSC)." *Milliyet* March 12. Retrieved March 6, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/03/12/siyaset/kabine.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997n. "Gul Secim Istedi (Gul Demanded Elections)." *Milliyet* March 07. Retrieved March 13, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/03/07/siyaset/rp.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997n. "Yılmaz: ANAP Ortak Olmayacak (Yılmaz: ANAP Will Not Share the Responsibility)." *Milliyet* March 6. Retrieved March 13, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/03/06/siyaset/anap.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997o. "Bayazıt: Erbakan laikliğe bıçak çekti (Bayazıt: Erbakan Drew a Sword to Secularism)." *Milliyet* February 28. Retrieved March 13, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/28/siyaset/bayazit.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997p. "RP'li Candan: MGK ultimatom veremez)." *Milliyet* March 04. Retrieved March 13, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/03/04/haber/rp.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997r. "RP'li Ulucak: Hükümet MGK'nın taşeronu değil (RP's Ulucak: MGK will not Submit to NSC)." *Milliyet* March 09. Retrieved March 13, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/03/09/siyaset/rp.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997s. "Erbakan: MGK Istişari Bir Organ (Erbakan: NSC an Counseling Organ)." *Milliyet* March 06. Retrieved March 13, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/03/06/siyaset/mgk.html>).

- Milliyet. 1997t. "Kadrolaşmaya 9 gün Sonra Yalanlama (Refusal for Occupation Nine Days Later)." *Milliyet* March 10. Retrieved March 13, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/03/10/siyaset/kadro.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997u. "Erbakan `şefkat' istedi (Erbakan Demanded Mercy)." *Milliyet* March 12. Retrieved March 13, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/03/12/siyaset/erbakan.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997v. "RP'li Baskan Kara: En Fazla Oldururler (The Worst They can Do is to Kill us)." *Milliyet* March 03. Retrieved March 13, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/03/03/haber/rp.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997x. "Gül: Hoşgörüsüz olan, laikler (Gul: Secularists are Intolerant)." *Milliyet* February 28. Retrieved March 13, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/28/siyaset/gul.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997y. "Çiller, ülkeyi karanlığa sürüklüyor)." *Milliyet* June 14. Retrieved March 13, 2003. Retrieved March 13, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/14/haber/cillerin.html>).
- Milliyet. 1997z. "Yılmaz: Çiller'i Yok Etmek İstiyorum (Yılmaz: I Want to Destroy Ciller)." *Milliyet* June 15. Retrieved May 14, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/15/siyaset/yilmaz.html>).
- Milliyet. 1998a. "Sezgin: Karara Saygı Duyulmalı (Sezgin: Must Respect the Decision)." *Milliyet* January 20. Retrieved May 14, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1998/01/20/siyaset/sez.html>).
- Milliyet. 1998b. "Esengün: Üç Eksildik (We are Only Minus Three)." *Milliyet* January 17. Retrieved May 14, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1998/01/17/siyaset/esengun.html>).
- Milliyet. 1998c. "Demokratlar Birliği Önerisi (A Suggestion for Democratic Union)." *Milliyet* January 17. Retrieved May 14, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1998/01/17/siyaset/demokrat.html>).
- Milliyet. 1998d. "RP'de Karar Gerilimi (Tension of Decision within RP)." *Milliyet* January 15. Retrieved May 14, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1998/01/15/siyaset/rp.html>).
- Milliyet. 1998e. "Hoca: Kararı Avrupa'ya Götüreceğiz (Hoja: We Will Take the Decision to the European Court)." *Milliyet* January 17. Retrieved May 14, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1998/01/17/siyaset/hoca.html>).
- Milliyet. 2000. "Karanlık Düşünceli, Kötü Emelli (Dark Minded and Bad Intentioned)." *Milliyet* November 03. Retrieved May 14, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2000/11/03/siyaset/siy01.html>).
- Milliyet. 2001a. "Özkasnak Paşa Patladı (The General Ozkasnak Blew Up)." *Milliyet* January 14. Retrieved May 14, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2001/01/14/guncel/agun.html>).
- Milliyet. 2002. "Kamusal Alanda Başörtüsü Olmaz (Headscarf Not Allowed in the Public Area)." *Milliyet* November 25. Retrieved May 27, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2002/11/25/guncel/agun.html>).
- Milliyet. 2003. "Turban Dosyası (The Headscarf Report)." *Milliyet* May 27. Retrieved May 27, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com/2003/05/27/guncel/agun.html>).
- Mottl, T. L. 1980. "The analysis of countermovements." *Social Problems*, 27(5), 620–634.
- Mules, Warwick. 1998. "Media Publics and the Transnational Public Sphere." *Critical Arts Journal* 12(1/2):24-35. Retrieved June 22, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.
- Neftci, Salih. 1996a "Takiyye mi Gerçek mi (Is it Pretention or Real)." *Hurriyet* June 5, p.7.
- Neftci, Salih. 1996b. "RP-DYP Koalisyonu ve Dis Piyasalar (RP-DYP Coalition and Foreign Markets)." *Hurriyet* June 29, p.7.

- Neftci, Salih. 1996c. "Takiyye Mi, Gercek Mi? (is it a Concealment or Real?)." *Hurriyet* July 5, p.7.
- Neftci, Salih. 1997 "RP Duzeni Silahla Degistirecek (RP Will Change the System with Arms)." *Hurriyet* February 14, p.7.
- Nelson, Thomas E. and Clawson, Rosalee A. 1997. "Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and its Effect on Tolerance." *The American Political Science Review* 91:567 (15 pages) Retrieved June 10, 2003 Available Proquest Database.
- Noonan, Rita K. 1997. "Woman Against the State: Political Opportunities and Collective Action Frames in Chile's Transition to Democracy." Pp. 252-67. In *Social Movements: Readings on Their Emergence, Mobilization and Dynamics*. Edited by McAdam, D. and David A. Snow. LA: Roxbury Publishing Co.
- Oguz, Seref. 1997. "Camikondü Mafyasi (Fast Mosque Construction Mafia)." *Milliyet* February 3. February 4. Retrieved December 22, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/04/yazar/oguz.html>).
- Oktay, Ahmet. 1996. "Yenildik (We Lost)." *Milliyet* June 13, p.21.
- Oktay, Ahmet. 1997. "TV'de Haber (The News on TV)." *Milliyet* May 22. Retrieved May 14, 2003. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2001/05/22/yazar/oktay.html>).
- Ozel, Mustafa. 1997. *Refahli Democracy (Democracy with RP)*. Istanbul: Iz Yayıncılık.
- Ozkok, Ertugrul. 1995a. "RP Birinci Parti Olmamli (RP Should Not Be the Number One Party)." *Hurriyet* December 20, p.27.
- Ozkok, Ertugrul. 1995b. "Ilk Isaretler Gelmeye Basladi (We Received the Initial Signs)." *Hurriyet* December 21, p.27.
- Ozkok, Ertugrul. 1996a. "Zitlari Birlestiren (What Combined the Opposites)." *Hurriyet* July 1, p.25.
- Ozkok, Ertugrul. 1997a. "RP is the Party Number Three)." *Hurriyet* March 5, p.27.
- Ozkok, Ertugrul. 1997b. "Maksat Hasil Oldu (The Goal was Realized)." *Hurriyet* March 2, p.23.
- Ozkok, Ertugrul. 1997c. "Refah'ı Kapatmak Yanlıř Olur (It would be a Mistake to Ban RP)." *Hurriyet* May 23, p.33.
- Ozkok, Ertugrul. 1998a. "Ne Zafer Çıđlıđı Ne Ađıt (Neither a Victory Scream nor Resentment)." *Hurriyet* January 17, p.29.
- Ozkok, Ertugrul. 1998b. "Bu Defa Bu Tarihi Fırsatı Kaçırmanın (Do Not Miss the Opportunity This Time)." *Hurriyet* January 19, p.25.
- Ozkok, Ertugrul. 2001a. "Ertugrul Özkök: Beyazlı mı, Mavili mi? Hayır Morlu)." *Hurriyet* January 11. Retrieved May 20, 2003. (<http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/anasayfa/0,,tarikh~2001-01-11-m,00.asp>).
- Ozkok, Ertugrul. 2002. "Küresel 28 Şubat, İkinci Sođuk Savaşı Bitiriyor (Global February 28 is Endind the Second Cold War)." *Hurriyet* January 02. Retrieved May 20, 2003. (<http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/yazarlar/yazar/0,,sid~9@tarikh~2002-01-02-m@nvid~79791,00.asp>).
- Ozkok, Ertugrul. 2003. "Ne iyi, Hepimiz Ders Almıřız (How Nice We All Took Our Lesson)." *Hurriyet* May 27, 2003. Retrieved May 27, 2003. (<http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/yazarlar/yazar/0,,sid~9@nvid~272309,00.asp>).

- Ozsever, Atilla. 1997. Burjuvazinin Demokratlığı 'Muhtıra'ya Kadar (Bourgeoisie's Democratship till the Military Ultimatum)." *Milliyet* March 10. Retrieved December 22, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/03/10/yazar/ozsever.html>).
- Paletz, David L. and Robert M. Entman. 1981. *Media, Power, Politics*. New York: The Free Press.
- Peksen, Yalcin. 1996a. "Siradan Vatandasın Aklından Gecenler (What an Ordinary Man Thinks)." *Hurriyet* July 3, p.15.
- Pulur, Hasan. 1996a. "Laiklik ve Ucuzluk (Secularim and Ordinariness)." *Milliyet* July 3, p.3.
- Rohlinger, Deana. 2002. "Framing the Abortion Debate: Organizational Resources, Media Strategies, and Movement-Countermovement Dynamics." *Sociological Quarterly* 43(4):479. (29 pages). Retrieved June 7, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.
- Roshco, Bernard. 1975. *Newsmaking*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rouleau 2000. "Turkey's Dream of Democracy." *Foreign Affairs* 79(6):100. (14 pages). Retrieved June 22, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.
- Rouleau, Eric. 1996. "Turkey: Beyond Ataturk." *Foreign Policy* no.103: 70ff.
- RP vs. Turkey. 2001. "Judgment in the Case of Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) Erbakan, Kazan and Tekdal v. Turkey." *European Court of Human Rights. 2001*. Retrieved June 13, 2003. (<http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2001/July/RefahPartisi2001jude.htm>).
- Ryan, Charlotte. 1991. *Prime Time Activism: Media Strategies for Grassroots Organizing*. Boston: South End Press.
- Sabah 1998a. "Mesut Yılmaz: Üzücü Bir Olay (Mesut Yılmaz: A Sad Event)." *Sabah* January 17. Retrieved June 4, 2003. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1998/9801/17/t/p07.html>).
- Sabah*. 1995a. "RP'li Yılmaz: Ya Kanla ya Oyla (RP's Yılmaz: Through either vote or bloodshed)." *Sabah* December 16, p.18.
- Sabah*. 1995b. "Yılmaz: Erbakan Haddini Bilmiyor (Yılmaz: Erbakan Does Not Know his Limits)." *Sabah* December 20, p.22.
- Sabah*. 1995c. "Uc Yilda AB Uyesiyiz (We will be an EU member in three years)." *Sabah* December 16, p.19.
- Sabah*. 1995d. "Refah'i Tarine Gomecegiz (We Will Bury Refah into History)." *Sabah* December 17, p.17.
- Sabah*. 1995e. "RP Bati Karsiti (RP is anti-western)." *Sabah* December 17, p.21.
- Sabah*. 1995f. "Ciller: Erbakan Bolucu (Ciller: Erbakan is Discriminationst)." *Sabah* December 17, p.21.
- Sabah*. 1995g. "Gumruk Birliđi Anlasmasini Yirtariz (We Will Tear Off the Agreement of Customs Union)." *Sabah* December 18, p.21.
- Sabah*. 1995h. "Ciller CHP ile Koalisyon Yapacak (Ciller will Make a Coalition)." *Sabah* December 21, p.14.
- Sabah*. 1995i. "RP Disindaki Partiler Birer Curuftan Ibaret (Parties Outside RP are Thrash)." *Sabah* December 17, p.21.

- Sabah. 1996a. "Türk-Is'ten Refah'a Yesil Isik (Green Light to RP from Turk-Is)." *Sabah* June 11, p. 14.
- Sabah. 1996b. "Royter: Islamci Ilk Basbakan (Reuters: The First Islamist Prime Minister)." *Sabah* June 29, p.11.
- Sabah. 1996c. "Örgütlerden Ret Çağrısı (Call for Negative Vote from Organizations)." *Sabah* July 2, p.11.
- Sabah. 1996d. "Amerikan Gunu (American Day)." *Sabah* July 4, p.19.
- Sabah. 1996e. "Baykal: Turkiye'yi Zor Gunler Bekliyor (Baykal: Hard Days Awaits Turkey)." *Sabah* June 29, p.1.
- Sabah. 1996f. "Sendikaci Bakana Destek (Support of the Minister from Trade Unions)." *Sabah* July 1, p.7.
- Sabah. 1996g. "Uygulanirsa Hamle Yapariz (We'll Make a Jump If Applied)." *Sabah* July 5, p.5.
- Sabah. 1997a. "Orgeneral Karadayı: Her Zaman Güvenliğin Teminatıyız (General Karadayi: We [the Armed Forces] are Always an Assurance for Security)." *Sabah* February 10. Retrieved on October 2. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9702/10/t/f00.html>).
- Sabah. 1997aa. "RP'nin Maskesini Askerler Indirdi (Military Unmasked RP)." *Sabah* June 18. Retrieved on March 15, 2003. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/18/t/p05.html>).
- Sabah. 1997ab. "Meclis'e De Brifing Gerekli (The Parliament Also Needs a Briefing)." *Sabah* June 14. Retrieved on March 15, 2003. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/14/t/p07.html>).
- Sabah. 1997ac. "Baykal: Böyle Devam Edemez (Cannot Continue Like This)." *Sabah* June 17. Retrieved on March 15, 2003. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/13/t/p12.html>).
- Sabah. 1997ad. "Yöneticiler Hukuka Saygı Göstermeli (Administrators Must Respect for Law)." *Sabah* June 18. Retrieved on March 15, 2003. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/18/t/p08.html>).
- Sabah. 1997ae. "RP'nin Ağır Topları Medyaya Yüklendi (RP Leadership's Criticism toward Media)." *Sabah* June 16. Retrieved on March 15, 2003. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/16/t/p10.html>).
- Sabah. 1997af. "Asker Gölgesinde Olmaz (Not Under the Military's Shadow)." *Sabah* June 18. Retrieved on March 15, 2003. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/18/t/p10.html>).
- Sabah. 1997ag. "Tarihi Uyarı (Historical Warning)." *Sabah* May 22. Retrieved on May 26, 2003. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9705/22/t/p10.html>).
- Sabah. 1997ah. "Gül: Başsavcı Politize Olmuş (Gul: The Prosecutor Became Politicized)." *Sabah* May 23. Retrieved on May 26, 2003. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9705/22/t/p00.html>).
- Sabah. 1997ai. "Ecevit: Refah Kanlı Yolu Seçti (Ecevit: RP Chose a Bloody Road)." *Sabah* February 05. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9702/05/t/f00.html>).
- Sabah. 1997aj. "Dava 6 Ay Sürebilir (The Suit Might Last 6 Months)." *Sabah* May 22. Retrieved on June 22, 2003. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9705/22/>).

- Sabah. 1997b. "Yargı bağımsız değil (Judiciary is not Independent)." *Sabah* February 11. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9702/11/t/f00.html>).
- Sabah. 1997c. "Demirel: Laiklikten yanayım (Mr. Demirel: I am Partial for Secularism)." *Sabah* February 9. Retrieved on October 2. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9702/09/t/f00.html>).
- Sabah. 1997d. "Meclis'in üstünde bir güç tanımıyoruz (We Do Not Recognize Any Power Above the Parliament)." *Sabah* February 6. Retrieved on October 2. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9702/06/t/f00.html>).
- Sabah. 1997e. "Erbakan: Bildiri Mükemmel (Erbakan: Declaration Perfect)." *Sabah* March 2. Retrieved on October 3, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9703/02/t/f08.html>).
- Sabah. 1997e. "Orduyla aramızdaki sevgiyi bozamazsınız (You cannot create a Problem Between Us and the Military)." *Sabah* February 2. Retrieved on October 2. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9702/02/t/f00.html>).
- Sabah. 1997f. "Genelkurmay Cevap Verdi (Armed Forces Responded)." *Sabah* March 3. Retrieved on October 3, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9703/03/t/f00.html>).
- Sabah. 1997g. "Erbakan: MGK istişari organdır (Erbakan: NSC is a Counseling Organ)." *Sabah* March 3. Retrieved on October 3, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9703/03/t/f03.html>).
- Sabah. 1997h. "Erbakan Sert: MGK Dayatma Yapamaz (Erbakan Hawkish: NSC Cannot Dictate)." *Sabah* March 4. Retrieved on October 3, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9703/04/t/f00.html>).
- Sabah. 1997i. "Yumuşatma Yok (No Softening)." *Sabah* March 6. Retrieved on October 3, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9703/06/t/f00.html>).
- Sabah. 1997j. "Destek Turları Boşa Gitti (Waisted Tours of Support)." *Sabah* March 6. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9703/06/t/f00.html>).
- Sabah. 1997k. "Refah'a Yasal Kusatma (Legal Siege Against RP)." *Sabah* March 6. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9703/06/t/f00.html>).
- Sabah. 1997l. "Askerler: Muhatap Meclis Degil (Soldiers: We do not Deal with the Parliament)." *Sabah* March 7. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9703/07/t/f00.html>).
- Sabah. 1997m. "Yılmaz: Hukümet MGK'nin Taseronu (Government Submitting to NSC)." *Sabah* March 3. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9703/03/t/f00.html>).
- Sabah. 1997n. "RP'li Zengin: Kimse Geri Adım Atmamızı Beklemesin (RP's Zengin: Nobody Should Expect us to Back Up)." *Sabah* March 4. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9703/04/t/f00.html>).
- Sabah. 1997o. "Din düşmanlığı yapılmamasın (No to Antireligion)." *Sabah* March 3. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9703/03/t/f08.html>).
- Sabah. 1997p. "Erbakan: MGK İstişari Organdır (Erbakan: NSC a Counseling Organ)." *Sabah* March 3. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9703/03/t/f03.html>).

- Sabah. 1997r. "Türkiye sizinle gurur duyuyor (Turkey is Proud of You)." *Sabah* June 11. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/11/t/p01.html>)
- Sabah. 1997s. "İste Briefing (Here is the Briefing)." *Sabah* June 12. Retrieved on March 14, 2003. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/12/t/pix.html>).
- Sabah. 1997t. "Erbakan Neyi İmzaladı (What Did Erbakan Sign?)." *Sabah* March 19. Retrieved on March 15, 2003. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9703/19/t/f01.html>).
- Sabah. 1997u. "Albayrak İçin Suç Duyurusu (Filing Charges Against Albayrak)." *Sabah* June 15. Retrieved on March 15, 2003. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/15/t/r09.html>)
- Sabah. 1997v. "RTÜK'ten Genelkurmay'a: Kanal 7'yi İnceliyoruz (From RTUK to General Staff: We are Investigating Kanal 7)." *Sabah* June 14. Retrieved on March 15, 2003. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/14/t/r06.html>).
- Sabah. 1997x. "RP'li Bakan'dan İtiraf: 22.5 Trilyon Dağıttık (RP Minister Admitted: We Gave Away 22.5 trillion Liras)." *Sabah* June 14. Retrieved on March 15, 2003. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/14/t/r06.html>).
- Sabah. 1997y. "Durum Gerçekten Acı (The Situation is Sad)." *Sabah* June 13. Retrieved on March 15, 2003. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/13/t/p05.html>).
- Sabah. 1997z. "Laik Partiler Hükümeti (Government of Secular Parties)." *Sabah* June 17. Retrieved on March 15, 2003. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/17/t/p09.html>).
- Sabah. 2001. "Mor Kuvvetler tartışması (The Debate of Purple Forces)." *Sabah* June 17. Retrieved May 20, 2003. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah2001/0101/15/t/p04.html>).
- Salt, Jeremy. 1995. "Nationalism and the Rise of Muslim Sentiment in Turkey", *MES*, 31 (1): 13.
- Sartori, Giovanni. 1987. *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*, Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, Inc.
- Savaş, Vural. 2001. *İrtija ve Bölücülüğe Karşı Militan Demokrasi (Militant Democracy Against İrtija and Separatism)* 12<sup>th</sup> edition. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi
- Sazak, Derya. 1995a. "Sol Alternatif (A Leftist Alternative)." *Milliyet* December 20, p. 14.
- Sazak, Derya. 1995b. "Refah Gerçeği (Reality of RP)." *Milliyet* December 17, p. 14.
- Sazak, Derya. 1996a. "CHP-DSP Ayrılığı (The Separation between CHP and DSP)" *Milliyet* June 10, p.16.
- Sazak, Derya. 1996b. "Refah Light (Refah Light)." *Milliyet* July 4, p.14.
- Sazak, Derya. 1997a. "CHP'nin Planı (CHP's Plan B)." *Milliyet* February 11. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/11/yazar/sazak.html>).
- Sazak, Derya. 1997b. "Aklın Yolu (Way of Reason)." *Milliyet* June 15. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/15/yazar/sazak.html>).
- Sazak, Derya. 1998a. "Refah'sız Seçim (Election Without RP)." *Milliyet* January 18. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1998/01/18/yazar/sazak.html>).

- Scheufele, Dietram A. 1999. "Framing as a theory of media effects." *Journal of Communication* 49 (1): 102-122.
- Schudson, Michael. 2002. "The Newsmedia as Political Institutions." *Annual Review of Political Science* 5:249-69. (21 pages). Retrieved June 22, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.
- Sertoglu, Sedat. 1997a. "Muhtira Yiyen Bir Hukümet (A Government that Received an Ultimatum)." March 05. Retrieved on October 2, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9703/05/ty11.html>).
- Sever, Ahmet. 1997. "Ankara'dan Cekilirim Uyarisi (Ankara's warning for Quitting)." *Milliyet* February 4. Retrieved December 22, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/04/yazar/ahmet.html>).
- Sirmen, Ali. 1996a. "Erbakan'ın Hesabi (Erbakan's Calculation)." *Milliyet* July 2, p.18.
- Sirmen, Ali. 1997a. "Baska Ne Olsun? (What Else Should Happen?)." *Milliyet* Feb. 3. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/03/yazar/sirmen.html>).
- Sirmen, Ali. 1997b. "Aferin Molla (Bravo Mulla)." *Milliyet* March 7. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/07/yazar/sirmen.html>).
- Sirmen, Ali. 1997c. "İşlenemez Suç (Impossible Crime)." *Milliyet* June 18. Retrieved October 11, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/06/18/yazar/sirmen.html>).
- Sirmen, Ali. 1998. "Gerçekleri Görelim (We Need to See the Truth)." *Milliyet* January 19. Retrieved October 11, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1998/01/19/yazar/sirmen.html>).
- Snow DA, Benford RD. 1988. "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization." *International Social Movement Research*. 1: 197-218.
- Snow, David and Robert Benford. 1999. "Alternative Types of Cross-National Diffusion in the Social Movement Arena." Pp. 23-39 in *Social Movements in a Globalizing World*, edited by D. Della Porta, H. Kriesi, and D. Rucht. New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc.
- Snow, David and Robert D. Benford. 1992. "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest." Pp. 133-55. In Allen D. Morris and Carol M. Mueller (eds.). 1992. *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*. New Heaven: Yale University Press.
- Snow, D.A., E.B. Rochford, S.K. Worden, and R.D. Benford. 1986. "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation." *American Sociological Review* 51: 464-81.
- Soysal, Mumtaz. 1996a. "Kaybolan Seyler (Lost Things)." *Hurriyet* July 3, p.9.
- Spector, Malcolm and John I. Kitsuse. 1987. *Constructing Social Problems*. New York : Aldine de Gruyter
- Swart, William J. 1995. "The League of Nations and the Irish Question: Master frames, Cycles of Protest, and 'Master Frame Alignment'." *Sociological Quarterly* 36(3): 465-82.
- Swidler, Ann. 1986. "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies." *American Sociological Review* 51: 273-286).
- Tamer, Meral. 1995a. "İs Dünyasından Secim Sonrasi Mesajlar (Post-Election Messages from the Business World)." *Milliyet* December 27, p.6.
- Tamer, Meral. 1996a. "İs Dünyasından Ordu ve Refah Yorumlari (Comments about Military and RP in the Business World)." *Milliyet* June 12, p.8.



- Tamer, Rauf. 1996a. "Tuhaf Seyler (Weird Things)." *Sabah* June 8, p.30.
- Tamer, Rauf. 1997a. "O ses (That Sound)." *Sabah* Feb 5. Retrieved on October 2. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9702/05/t/y16.html>).
- Tamer, Rauf. 1997b. "Neyi tartıřıyoruz? (What are we Disputing?)." *Sabah* Feb 5. Retrieved on October 5, 2002. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9702/05/t/y16.html>).
- Tamer, Rauf. 1997c. "İyi Mi, Kötü Mü Good or Bad?)." *Sabah* May 22. Retrieved on May 31, 2003/ (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9702/05/t/y16.html>).
- Tan, Ahmet. 1996a. "Takiyye Koalisyonu (Coalition of Concealment)." *Sabah* June 14, p.17.
- Tansey, Stephen D. 1995. *Politics: The Basics*. London & NY: Routledge.
- Tarrow, Sidney G. 1994. *Power in Movement : Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics*. New York : Cambridge University Press.
- Thomas, Sue. 2002. "Contesting Education Policy in the Public Sphere: Media Debates over Policies for the Queensland School Curriculum." *Journal of Education Policy* 17(2): 187–198. Retrieved June 22, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.
- Tilly, Charles. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, Mass. : Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.
- Tinc, Ferai. 1997. "Anadolu'nun Yunanlı Diplomatları Şaşırtan Yüzü (Anatolia's Face Surprising the Greek Diplomats)." *Hurriyet* May 23, p.20.
- Tokatli, Orhan. 1996a. "Devlet Mahremiyeti (State's Privacy)." *Milliyet* June 10, p.21.
- Tokatli, Orhan. 1997a. "MGK Kararlari Hukümet-Ordu Bunalimina Donustu (NSC Decisions Turned into a Crisis Between Government and NSC)." *Milliyet* March 10. Retrieved October 17, 2002. (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/10/yazar/tokatli.html>).
- Toker, Metin. 1996a. "Legal Olmak İktidar Olmak İcin Kafi Midir? (Is Legality Sufficient for Coming to Power)." *Milliyet* June 14, p.17.
- Toker, Metin. 1996b. "Boylesi Ne Dünya Gordu Ne Turkiye (Neither World Nor Turkey Has Seen Such as This?)." *Milliyet* June 30, p.13.
- Tuchman, Gaye. 1978. *Making News*, New York: Free Press.
- Turner, Ralph, and Lewis Killian. 1972. *Collective Behaviour*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Tusiad. 1997. *Türkiye'de Demokratikleşme Perspektifleri (Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey)*. Retrieved June 11, 2003. (<http://www.tusiad.org.tr/raporlar.nsf/d775763bed800367c22568da003cc1f9/43d58ae7710414dcc22568db00500af6?OpenDocument>).
- Ulagay, Osman. 1995. "Bu Refah'ı Kim Getirdi Buraya (Who Brought the RP Here)." *Milliyet* December 31, p.9.
- Ulagay, Osman. 1996a. "Dibe Vurma Senaryosu (A Senario of Bottoming Down)." *Milliyet* June 30, p.9.

- Uluc, Hincal. 1997a. "Milli Eğitim'in "Acaba"ları (The Wording of National Education)." February 11. Retrieved on October 2. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9702/11/t/y08.html>).
- Uluc, Hincal. 1997b. "Aydınlar, Refahiyol Açmazında (Intellectual in a Dilemma of Refah-Yol)." June 16. Retrieved on March 16, 2003. (<http://garildi.sabah.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/sabah/sabah1997/9706/16/t/y08.html>)
- Uluengin, Hadi. 1995a. "Yeni Secim Nasil Bir Secim (What Kind of Election is the New Election)." *Hurriyet* December 27, p.16.
- Unal, Suleyman. 1996. "Gecikmis ayrıntılar (Delayed Details)." *Zaman* June 4. Retrieved July 8, 2003. ([http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/1996/06/04/kose/hodri\\_meydan/index.html](http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/1996/06/04/kose/hodri_meydan/index.html)).
- Unal, Suleyman and Hasan Sutay. 1997. "Ekrem'i Kandiramamis (Could Not Convince Ekrem)." *Zaman* February 2. Retrieved July 8, 2003. ([http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/1997/02/04/kose/hodri\\_meydan/index.html](http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/1997/02/04/kose/hodri_meydan/index.html)).
- Unsal, Husamettin. 1994. "Turkey." Pp. 281-292. In Kamalipour, Yahya R. and Hamid Mowlana (eds.). *Mass Media in the Middle East: A Comprehensive Handbook*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Uysal, Ahmet. 2001. "The Media and Religion in Turkey." Unpublished Paper Presented at the SSSR Annual Meetings, October 18-21, 2001, Columbus, Ohio.
- Voss, Kim. 1996. "The Collapse of a Social Movement: The Interplay of mobilizing structures, framing, and political opportunities in the Knights of Labor" Pp. 227-258. In McAdam *et al* 1996.
- White, Jenny B. 1997. "Pragmatists or Ideologues? Turkey's Welfare Party in Power," *Current History* 96(606):29 (6 pages) Retrieved August 12, 2001 Available Infotrac.
- Williams, Rhys. 1995. "Constructing the Public Good: Social Movements and Cultural Resources." *Social Problems* 42: 124-44.
- Winter, James P. & Eyal, Chaim H. 1981. "Agenda-setting for the civil rights issue." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 45: 376-383.
- Yalçın, Aydın. 1967. "Turkey: Emerging Democracy." *Foreign Affairs* 45(4):706. (9 pages). Retrieved July 12, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.
- Yargıtay. 2003. "Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri İç Hizmet Kanunu I (Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Code I)". Retrieved June 6, 2003. ([http://www.yargitay.gov.tr/bilgi/kanun\\_liste/PC1211.HM4.frameset.html](http://www.yargitay.gov.tr/bilgi/kanun_liste/PC1211.HM4.frameset.html)).
- Yavuz, Hakan. 1997. "Political islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey." *Comparative Politics* 30(1):63-82. Retrieved June 23, 1997. Available Jstor Database.
- Yavuz, Hakan. 1999. "Toward an Islamic Liberalism? The Nurcu Movement and Fethullah Gulen." *The Middle East Journal* 53 (4): 584-605.
- Yavuz, Hakan. 2000. "Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere." *Journal of International Affairs*. 54(1):21. (22 pages). Retrieved June 22, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.
- Yeni Safak. 2000a. "Bir'in Eylem Planı (Bir's Action Plan)." October 21. Retrieved May 20, 2003. (<http://www.yenisafak.com/arsiv/2000/ekim/21/politika.html>).
- Yeni Safak. 2000b. "Andıç Medyayı Böldü (The Reminder Divided the Media)." November 04. Retrieved May 20, 2003. (<http://www.yenisafak.com/arsiv/2000/kasim/04/politika.html>).

- Yildiz, Ahmet. 2003. "Politico-Religious Discourse of Political Islam in Turkey: The Parties of National Outlook." *Muslim World* 93(2): 187 (23 pages) Retrieved June 9, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.
- Zald, MN. & Berth Useem. 1987. "Movement and Countermovement Interaction." In *Social Movements in an Organizational Society: Collected Essays*, edited by Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Zaller, John, and Dennis Chiu. 1996. "Government's Little Helper: U.S. Press Coverage of Foreign Policy Crises, 1945–1991." *Political Communication* 13(4):385–405. (29 pages). Retrieved June 12, 2003 Available EBSCO Host - Academic Search Premier.
- Zaman. 1995a. "Erbakan: Gümrük Birliği'ni Tanımayacağız (Erbakan: We Will Not Recognize the Customs Union)." *Zaman* December 14. Retrieved July 8, 2003. (<http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/1995/12/14/guncel/14erbakan.html>).
- Zaman. 1996a. "Erbakan: GB'ye Karsi Degiliz (Erbakan: We are not against the Customs Union)." *Zaman* December 30. Retrieved July 8, 2003. (<http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/1995/12/30/guncel/30erbakan.html>).
- Zaman. 1996b. "Yazicioglu: Halkin Mesaji Önemli (Yazicioglu: People's Message is Important)." *Zaman* December 26. Retrieved July 8, 2003. (<http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/1995/12/26/guncel/26yazici.html>).
- Zaman. 1997a. "Demirel 'Çankaya Hükümeti'ni iyi bilir' (Demirel Know a Government Imposed by the President)." *Zaman* June 21. Retrieved June 5, 2003. (<http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/1997/06/21/guncel/guncel.html>).
- Zaman. 1997b. "Zaman Ayarli Istifa (Timely Resignation)." *Zaman* June 27. Retrieved July 13, 2003. (<http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/1997/04/27/guncel/politika.html#c>).
- Zaman. 1997c. "Özden: Cumhurbaşkanı Doğru Yaptı (Ozden: The President Acted Correctly)." *Zaman* June 21. Retrieved July 13, 2003. (<http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/1997/06/22/guncel/politika/11.html>).
- Zaman. 1997d. "İthamlara Cevaplar (Responses to the Accusations)." *Zaman* June 22. Retrieved July 13, 2003. (<http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/1997/06/22/guncel/politika/11.html>).
- Zaman. 1997e. "Kesintisiz Meclis'ten Gecmez (Eight-Year Continuous Compulsory Education will not be Approved by the Paliament)." *Zaman* April 28. Retrieved July 13, 2003. (<http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/1997/04/28/guncel/politika.html>).
- Zaman. 1997f. "RP'ye goz yumanlar simdi yikiyorlar (Thouse who tolerated the Refah-Yol Coalition Now Want it Destroyed)." *Zaman* February 22. Retrieved July 13, 2003. (<http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/1997/02/02/guncel/politika.html>).
- Zaman. 1997g. "Sol, Refah'a Karsi Birlesiyor (The Left Uniting against the RP)." *Zaman* February 07. Retrieved July 13, 2003. (<http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/1997/02/07/guncel/politika.html>).
- Zaman. 1997h. "Milletin Iradesi Her Seyin Ustunde (National Will is above Everything)." *Zaman* February 07. Retrieved July 13, 2003. (<http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/1997/02/07/guncel/politika.html>).
- Zaman. 1997i. "Hukumette Hicbir Sorun Yok (No Problem Within the Government)." *Zaman* February 12. Retrieved July 13, 2003. (<http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/1997/02/12/guncel/politika.html>).
- Zaman. 1997j. "Orduyu Alet Etmeyin (Don't Use the Military for Personal Agenda)." *Zaman* March 1. Retrieved July 13, 2003. (<http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/1997/03/01/guncel/politika.html#q>).

- Zaman. 1997k. "Demokrasi Disi Telkinler Ihanettir (Antidemocratic Suggestions are Treason)." *Zaman* February 13. Retrieved July 13, 2003. (<http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/1997/02/13/guncel/politika.html>).
- Zaman. 1997l. "Herkes Kendi Kadrosuyla Calismali (Everybody Needs to Work with Their Own Team)." *Zaman* February 11. Retrieved July 13, 2003. (<http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/1997/02/11/guncel/politika.html>).
- Zaman. 1997m. "IHL'lerin Ozel Konumu Var (Religious High Schools Have a Special Status)." *Zaman* March 12. Retrieved July 13, 2003. (<http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/1997/03/12/guncel/politika.html#t>).
- Zaman. 1997n. "Erbakan: Basit Bir Iddia (Erbakan: A Simple Accusation)." *Zaman* May 22. Retrieved July 13, 2003. (<http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/1997/05/22/guncel/politika.html#e>).
- Zaman. 1997o. 'İmam Hatipler Milletindir' Kampanyası (The Campaign called 'Religious High Schools Belong to the People). *Zaman* May 22. Retrieved July 13, 2003. (<http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/1997/05/22/guncel/politika.html#i>).
- Zaman. 1997r. "Universiteler de Siyasete El Atti (Universities are Involved in Politics, Too)." *Zaman* February 07. Retrieved July 13, 2003. (<http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/1997/02/07/guncel/politika.html>).

## VITA

Graduate School  
Southern Illinois University Carbondale

Ahmet Uysal

Date of Birth: February 05, 1972

1935-5 Evergreen Terrace Dr. E., Carbondale, Illinois 62901

Cine Koyu, Geyve – Sakarya 54720 TURKEY

Middle East Technical University, Ankara, TURKEY  
Bachelor of Arts, Sociology, June 1994

Southern Illinois University Carbondale  
Master of Arts, Sociology, May 1998

Dissertation Title:

The Framing of Political Inclusion and Exclusion: Media, State, and Islamic Party Interactions in Turkey, 1995 to 1998

Major Professor: Darren Sherkat